United States v. Santana-Aviles ( 2024 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 22-1654
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
MIGUEL SANTANA-AVILÉS,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Aida M. Delgado-Colón, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Kayatta, Selya, and Rikelman,
Circuit Judges.
Richard B. Klibaner and Klibaner & Sabino on brief for
appellant.
W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney, Mariana E. Bauzá-
Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate
Division, and Gregory B. Conner, Assistant United States Attorney,
on brief for appellee.
October 22, 2024
SELYA, Circuit Judge. In this appeal,
defendant-appellant Miguel Santana-Avilés seeks to set aside his
conviction and sentence for assault of a correctional officer.
See 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1), (b). That conviction, he insists, is
fatally flawed because it resulted from erroneous evidentiary
rulings. Concluding, as we do, that the appellant's reach exceeds
his grasp, we affirm his conviction and sentence.
I
We briefly rehearse the relevant facts and travel of the
case. "Because these appeals do not present challenges to the
sufficiency of the evidence but, rather, deal with other claims of
error, we rehearse 'the facts in a balanced manner in which we
objectively view the evidence of record.'" United States v.
Rodriguez, 115 F.4th 24, 33 (1st Cir. 2024) (quoting United States
v. Amador-Huggins, 799 F.3d 124, 127 (1st Cir. 2015)).
A
Witnesses for the prosecution testified as to the
following facts. Correctional Officer Efrén Rosario was working
in the Metropolitan Detention Center in Guaynabo, Puerto Rico (MDC
Guaynabo). On August 20, 2020, he conducted an inmate count with
the assistance of officer-in-training Marianés Santana. This
count required the officers to confirm that each inmate was in his
assigned cell and then lock the cell door.
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When Officers Rosario and Santana arrived at the cell
shared by the appellant, Héctor Maldonado-Maldonado (Maldonado),
and a third roommate, only the appellant was present. Officer
Rosario searched the cell and found an extra pillow on Maldonado's
bed, which violated prison policy. As Officer Rosario was removing
the extra pillow, Maldonado rushed into the cell. He complained
that "you're always putting your foot in the way of the inmate,
[expletive deleted]."
Anger morphed into violence when Maldonado punched
Officer Rosario in the face. The appellant then grabbed Officer
Rosario from behind, allowing Maldonado to continue beating him.
Stirring the pot further, the appellant encouraged the assault by
twice saying "Hit him."
As the scuffle continued, Officers Rosario and Santana
were able to press their emergency buttons, summoning
reinforcements to the scene. Officer David Figueroa was one of
two officers to arrive first. He pepper-sprayed both the appellant
and Maldonado and then restrained the appellant against a wall.
Officer Figueroa later testified that the appellant — after being
pepper-sprayed — stated in a "normal tone": "I didn't do nothing"
and "It wasn't me."
In due course, other officers arrived. Both the
appellant and Maldonado were restrained and taken to the prison's
infirmary.
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B
Once the dust had settled, the authorities charged both
the appellant and Maldonado with assaulting, resisting, or
impeding prison officers. See 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1), (b). A
federal grand jury eventually indicted both men on this charge.
Maldonado entered into a plea agreement, while the appellant
maintained his innocence and proceeded to trial.
At trial, two evidentiary disputes arose that are
relevant here. To begin, the appellant did not testify but sought
to introduce his statements that "I didn't do nothing" and "[i]t
wasn't me." The government sought to exclude these statements as
inadmissible hearsay, see Fed. R. Evid. 802, while the appellant
sought to justify their introduction as excited utterances, see
id. 803(2). The district court sustained the government's
objection and refused to admit the statements.
The second evidentiary dispute concerned an email
explaining the lack of video evidence. Although there was a video
camera positioned to show the interior of the appellant's cell, no
video of the assault was recorded. To explain this gap, a prison
technician from MDC Guaynabo, Norman Rivera, testified that MDC
Guaynabo had updated its security camera recording system in the
summer of 2020. Rivera had prepared a report about this update in
2021. This update led to a year's worth of problems with the video
system, including "crashes" due to incompatibilities between the
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cameras and the computer system used to store security footage.
Cameras outside the unit in question, however, were working that
day, and video was recorded from those cameras.
Following the appellant's cross-examination of Rivera,
the government sought to introduce an email from Rivera summarizing
the relevant problems with the video system from October of 2020.
It argued that the cross-examination suggested either fabrication
or recent improper motive. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B)(i).
Over the appellant's objection, the district court admitted the
email into evidence.
The government presented five witnesses before it
rested. The defense presented none. The jury found the appellant
guilty of "aiding and abetting, knowingly . . . forcibly
assault[ing], imped[ing], intimidat[ing], or interfer[ing] with an
officer of the United States while engaged in or on account of the
performance of official duties." The court sentenced the appellant
to an eighty-seven-month term of immurement. This timely appeal
followed.
II
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291. The district court had subject matter jurisdiction
over the original prosecution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.
When objections to the district court's evidentiary
rulings are preserved for appeal, those objections are ordinarily
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reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Hatch, 514
F.3d 145, 153 (1st Cir. 2008). We will not find an abuse of
discretion unless "a relevant factor deserving of significant
weight is overlooked," "an improper factor is accorded significant
weight," or there is "a palpable error of judgment in calibrating
the decisional scales." United States v. Nguyen, 542 F.3d 275,
281 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Roberts, 978 F.2d
17, 21 (1st Cir. 1992)). "Abuse of discretion is not a monolithic
standard of review." United States v. Soto-Villar, 40 F.4th 27,
33 (1st Cir. 2022). "Under this rubric, 'we afford de novo review
to the [district] court's interpretation and application of [law],
assay the court's factfinding for clear error, and evaluate its
judgment calls for abuse of discretion.'" Id. (quoting United
States v. Ruiz-Huertas, 792 F.3d 223, 226 (1st Cir. 2015)).
Not every error in the admission or rejection of
proffered evidence demands a new trial. As long as "it is highly
probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict," the
verdict will not be overturned. United States v. Abbas, 100 F.4th
267, 290 (1st Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Galíndez, 999
F.3d 60, 64 (1st Cir. 2021)).
III
The appellant first challenges the ruling excluding his
statements that "I didn't do nothing" and "[i]t wasn't me." This
ruling, he says, constituted an abuse of discretion. In his view,
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these statements fall under an exception to the hearsay rule for
excited utterances. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(2). As explained below,
we find no reversible error.
To qualify as an excited utterance, a statement must
satisfy two requirements: first, it must relate to a startling
event; and second, it must be made when the declarant is still
under stress from the startling event. See id.In the case at hand, the district court found that the
proffered statements did not comprise excited utterances because
they did "not relate directly to the startling event." This
finding was based on the premise that the statements were not
specific to either the beating or "the incident of the contraband."
We deem this assessment problematic. Although — as the district
court noted — the statements did not describe the specific
incident, that is not a requirement for an excited utterance. See
Bemis v. Edwards, 45 F.3d 1369, 1372 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995)
(explaining that even though "the subject matter of an excited
utterance is frequently a description of the 'startling event,'
the statement need only 'relat[e] to' the startling event."
(alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 803(2))). As the
appellant points out, it seems unlikely that — moments after being
pepper-sprayed and while being pinned to a wall — a prisoner would
be thinking at all about his cellmate's contraband pillow. Here,
moreover, there are no facts in the record suggesting that the
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pillow was a continuing focal point of the incident. Fairly
viewed, then, the circumstances indicate that the statements were
about the physical altercation. We thus regard the district
court's conclusion concerning the first excited utterance
criterion as dubious.
Of course, the district court also concluded that the
appellant was not under the stress of the startling event. The
court identified two factors in support of this conclusion. First,
it relied on the officers' testimony to find that the appellant
had a "calm" demeanor and was not agitated. In our view, this
finding rests on shaky ground: after all, the appellant had just
been pepper-sprayed and was being pinned to a wall. What is more,
the scene was swarming with guards: Officer Figueroa's
uncontradicted testimony reflects that many officers arrived at
the cell within seconds of his own arrival. Although the district
court was entitled to credit Officer Figueroa's testimony about
the appellant's demeanor, see Deguio v. United States, 920 F.2d
103, 106 (1st Cir. 1990), the objective evidence of the stressful
situation might well have overwhelmed the officer's subjective
assessment of the appellant's demeanor, see United States v.
Nieves-Díaz, 99 F.4th 1, 7 n.2 (1st Cir. 2024) ("[A factual]
finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
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committed." (quoting In re The Bible Speaks, 869 F.2d 628, 630
(1st Cir. 1989) (alteration in original))).
Second, the district court held that the appellant had
time to reflect before making the statements as evinced by the
statements' self-serving nature. Therefore — the district court
reasoned — the appellant was not under the stress of the event.
We agree that the self-serving nature of the statement is highly
relevant to the question of its admissibility. See text infra.
But we hesitate to agree that this fact indicates that the
appellant was not under the stress of the event.
Importantly, all of the relevant events occurred within
a matter of minutes — and the appellant made the statements while
still restrained against a wall by Officer Figueroa. This is well
within the customary parameters for what courts consider to be
excited utterances. See United States v. Taveras, 380 F.3d 532,
537 (1st Cir. 2004) ("The time lapse in most excited utterance
cases is usually a few seconds . . . or a few minutes.").
The government rejoins that "[w]here incriminating
evidence is discovered in one's possession, it requires only the
briefest reflection to conclude that a denial and plea of ignorance
is the best strategy." United States v. Sewell, 90 F.3d 326, 327
(8th Cir. 1996). The district court agreed that the self-serving
nature of the statements indicated time to reflect because the
declarant would understand the "legal ramifications" of his
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statement. United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 61-62 (1st Cir.
2005). But the portions of Brito relied upon by the district court
were related to Brito's Confrontation Clause issue. See id. They
are not dispositive as to whether a statement should be admitted
as an excited utterance under the rules of evidence. See id. at
61. For these reasons, we conclude that here, too, the district
court's analysis was less than compelling.
Notwithstanding these doubts, abuse of discretion is a
high bar, and we are not sure that the exclusion of the statements
reaches it. Here, however, we need not decide whether an abuse of
discretion occurred.
Even if the district court's ruling crossed the line
into abuse — a question that we need not resolve — any such error
was harmless. Put another way, any such error "did not
substantially sway the jury's verdict" and, therefore, it does not
undermine the verdict. United States v. Soler-Montalvo, 44 F.4th
1, 19 (1st Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Rivera-
Carrasquillo, 933 F.3d 33, 46 (1st Cir. 2019)). After all, there
is ample evidence in the record to support the appellant's
conviction: the record shows that the statements were in direct
contradiction to the testimony of several officers. And the
statements' conclusory and self-serving nature — although not
necessarily vitiating admissibility — suggests that the statements
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would have been of such little probative weight that their
admission would have had no effect on the outcome of the trial.
IV
This brings us to Rivera's October 2020 email regarding
the problems with the prison's video system. The appellant
contends that this email was improperly admitted under hearsay
principles.
Some background is useful. The government sought the
admission of the email under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, which provides that a statement is not hearsay if it
"is consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered: (i)
to rebut an express or implied charge that the declarant recently
fabricated it or acted from a recent improper influence or motive
in so testifying; or (ii) to rehabilitate the declarant's
credibility as a witness when attacked on another ground."1 The
district court allowed the email to be introduced over the
appellant's objection.
1The district court admitted the email under both Rule
801(d)(1)(B)(i) and (ii). The government's argument at trial and
the district court's oral ruling regarding admission combine to
make clear that the appellant's credibility attack drew its essence
from a charge of fabrication or improper motive. There was no
discussion of a collateral attack or inconsistency that might
engage the gears of Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(ii). See United States v.
Portillo, 969 F.3d 144, 175 (5th Cir. 2020). Our analysis,
therefore, focuses on Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(i).
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We hold that the admission of the email was not an abuse
of discretion. In conducting the Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(i) inquiry,
"we consider whether there is 'some degree of fit between the
alleged fabrication and the prior statement.'" Lech v. von Goeler,
92 F.4th 56, 68 (1st Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Chiu, 36
F.4th 294, 301 (1st Cir. 2022)). "[A] charge of recent fabrication
does not have to be 'expressly made,'" but there must be "'specific
questions' during the opposing party's examination 'that suggest
recent fabrication or bias.'" Id. (quoting United States v.
Lozada-Rivera, 177 F.3d 98, 104 (1st Cir. 1999)). The general
rule is "that a prior consistent statement introduced to rebut a
charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive [is]
admissible if the statement had been made before the alleged
fabrication, influence, or motive came into being, but it [is]
inadmissible if made afterwards." Tome v. United States, 513 U.S.
150, 156 (1995).
In laying the foundation for the admission of this
evidence, the government suggests that the appellant indicated
through argument and cross-examination that the absence of the
video evidence was the result of some improper conduct or that its
absence was suspicious. The record bears out the government's
suggestion.
The cross-examination of Rivera (especially when viewed
in light of the record as a whole) was designed to invite the jury
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to believe that some nefarious conduct was hiding behind a technical
error. For example, the cross-examination highlighted the absence
of any complaint about the computers that day. In addition, defense
counsel asked Rivera, "[W]hen you prepared your report, do you
remember writing in the report that . . . the cameras in unit 1-B
were compatible with the system being used at that time with the
cameras?" Defense counsel claimed that this question referred to
compatibility at the time of the report in 2021. But the district
court rejected this interpretation of the evidence, noting that the
phrasing and context of the question gave the impression that it
referred to the time of the crime. That would, of course,
contradict the witness's other testimony.
The appellant responds that the cross-examination was
insufficient to "open the door" to the admission of the email.
Lozada-Rivera, 177 F.3d at 103. In support, he cites our decision
in Lozada-Rivera. But this case is at a far remove from
Lozada-Rivera, in which the court observed that the
cross-examination was both "remarkable . . . for its brevity" and
"meandering"; that the alleged improper motive was suggested only
through "weak innuendo"; and that the admitted document was "highly
prejudicial." Id. at 103-04.
Here — as the district court supportably found — the
appellant commingled technological concepts and chronological
events in an attempt to give the impression that the witness had
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fabricated his testimony. What is more, this was a central theory
of the defense. The appellant's brief describes the absence of the
video, "which would have allowed the jury an objective view of what
had occurred," as one of the three main pillars of the defense.
In all events, the email only served to confirm the
reason for the missing video. It did not change the fact of its
absence. It follows inexorably that the admission of the email
could only be prejudicial to the appellant if he is suggesting
fabrication or an improper motive for the testimony regarding the
video's absence. Thus, it was well within the district court's
broad discretion to admit the email to rebut these implicit charges.
In a footnote to his brief, the appellant suggests that
the email does not satisfy the requirement that the prior statement
predate any motivation to lie. See Tome, 513 U.S. at 167. This
suggestion rests on a porous foundation: the appellant says that
the email was sent in October of 2022 (after Rivera's declaration
for the proceedings below was signed in December of 2021). But the
email was in fact written in October of 2020 — well before the
declaration was signed. Consequently, this argument collapses of
its own weight.
To sum up, we hold that it was not an abuse of discretion
for the district court to admit the challenged email under Rule
801(d)(1)(B)(i). The court reasonably found that the appellant
was attempting to imply fabrication and recent improper motive.
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Accordingly, the email was properly admitted to rebut this
implication.
V
We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above,
the judgment of the district court is
Affirmed.
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