United States v. Adams , 587 F. App'x 499 ( 2014 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
December 10, 2014
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 14-5087
(D.C. Nos. 4:13-CV-00349-CVE-PJC
GARY WAYNE ADAMS, a/k/a Gary and 4:11-CR-00017-CVE-1)
W. Adams, Gary Wayne Redden, and (N.D. Okla.)
Gary W. Redden,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER
DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Before KELLY, ANDERSON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Gary Wayne Adams, a federal prisoner, seeks a certificate of
appealability (COA) to challenge the district court’s denial of his motion to
vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Because Mr.
Adams has not made “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), we deny his request for a COA and dismiss the
appeal.
Mr. Adams pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) and was sentenced to 180
months’ imprisonment. Judgment was entered on June 18, 2012. Mr. Adams
filed a pro se notice of appeal on October 5, 2012. The appeal was dismissed as
untimely. United States v. Adams, No. 12-5165 (10th Cir. Nov. 1, 2012)
(unpublished).
On June 10, 2013, Mr. Adams filed the instant motion seeking post-
conviction relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In support of this petition, Mr.
Adams advances two claims of constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.
He contends that counsel was ineffective in (1) not challenging the use of a 1993
second-degree burglary conviction in Colorado as a predicate offense used to
enhance his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. §
924(e)(1), and (2) not filing a notice of appeal. The district court rejected the
first ground because, under the modified categorical approach, it was clear that
Mr. Adams broke into a building (as opposed to a ship or vehicle) and therefore
the offense constituted generic burglary that qualified as a “violent felony”
predicate offense. United States v. Adams, No. 11-CR-0017-CVE, 2014 WL
1119780, at *4 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 20, 2014). The district court also noted that Mr.
Adams had three other prior convictions that would qualify as predicate offenses.
Id. at *4 n.3. Accordingly, he could not demonstrate prejudice even were he able
to demonstrate deficient performance. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687–688 (1984).
As to the second claim, the district court held an evidentiary hearing.
Thereafter, it found that Mr. Adams did not specifically instruct counsel to file an
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appeal, although counsel did consult with Mr. Adams about an appeal after his
sentencing. United States v. Adams, No. 11-CR-0017-CVE, 2014 WL 3449915,
at *6 (N.D. Okla. July 11, 2014). The court further found that although Mr.
Adams “figured it was taken care of,” counsel would not have been on
notice—considering the content of the conversations between Mr. Adams and his
attorney—of any desire to appeal. Id. Thus, counsel did not act unreasonably in
failing to file a notice of appeal. Id.A COA is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal from the denial of a
§ 2255 motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.
322, 336 (2003). Mr. Adams now “must demonstrate that reasonable jurists
would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or
wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
For several reasons, Mr. Adams has not made this showing. Mr. Adams has
not demonstrated that use of the modified categorical approach was improper, let
alone demonstrate any prejudice given his three other convictions that could serve
as predicate offenses under § 924(e)(1). Similarly, he has not made any
argument, in the district court or in this court, that the sentencing judge
considered improper documentation when it found that the 1993 conviction
constituted a predicate offense.
Insofar as the failure to file an appeal, Mr. Adams cannot demonstrate that
the district court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous. Therefore, the factual
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predicate of this ineffective assistance claim is missing. Surely there are two
permissible views of the evidence on whether Mr. Adams requested counsel to
file an appeal (or counsel should have known to do so), and thus the district
court’s factual findings cannot be clearly erroneous. See Anderson v. City of
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). While we do not doubt that the
possibility of an appeal had previously been discussed between defense counsel
and Mr. Adams, we cannot say that defense counsel should have reasonably
inferred from Mr. Adams’ statements, considered in their totality, Mr. Adams’
desire to appeal from his sentence. Accordingly, we conclude that reasonable
jurists would not find that the district court’s resolution of this claim was
“debatable or wrong.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.
Accordingly, we DENY a COA, deny IFP status and DISMISS the appeal.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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