Fogle v. Gonzales ( 2015 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
TENTH CIRCUIT January 6, 2015
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
RONALD JENNINGS FOGLE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 14-1428
(D.C. No. 1:14-CV-02150-LTB)
ANGELINA GONZALES, in her (D. Colo.)
individual and official capacities as case
manager for Crowley County Correctional
Facility,
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before HARTZ, McKAY, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
Ronald Jennings Fogle, a Colorado state prisoner appearing pro se,1 appeals the
district court’s decision to dismiss without prejudice his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.
Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
* After examining Appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not
binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed.
R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2000, Mr. Fogle was convicted in Colorado state court of kidnapping, robbery,
aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery, and attempted escape. Regarding the
attempted escape, while in pretrial detention in the Denver County Jail, Mr. Fogle posed
as a visitor and walked out of the facility. He was quickly apprehended, returned to the
facility, and placed in segregation.
Mr. Fogle was sentenced to 64 years in prison. When he arrived there, he was
placed in administrative segregation without receiving a formal prison disciplinary
hearing. He remained there from 2000 to 2003.
Since that time, Mr. Fogle has brought numerous suits and petitions, including
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,2 petitions for post-conviction relief under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2254,3 and a legal malpractice claim.4
1
We therefore construe his arguments liberally. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007) (per curiam); see also United States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d 972, 975 (10th Cir.
2009) (“[W]e must construe [a pro se litigant’s] arguments liberally; this rule of liberal
construction stops, however, at the point at which we begin to serve as his advocate.”).
2
See Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252 (10th Cir. 2006); Fogle v. Slack, 419 F.
App’x 860 (10th Cir. 2011) (unpublished); Fogle v. Gonzales, 570 F. App’x 795 (10th
Cir. 2014) (unpublished); Fogle v. Infante, No. 14-1231, 2014 WL 7139574 (10th Cir.
Dec. 16, 2014) (unpublished).
3
See Fogle v. Estep, 220 F. App’x 814 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (initial
§ 2254 petition); Fogle v. Smelser, 314 F. App’x 89 (10th Cir. 2008) (unpublished)
(second § 2254 petition); In re Fogle, No. 12-1252 (10th Cir. July 3, 2012) (third § 2254
petition).
4
Fogle v. Elliott, 536 F. App’x 831 (10th Cir. 2013) (unpublished).
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Mr. Fogle is currently housed at the Crowley County Correctional Facility near
Olney Springs, Colorado. Angelina Gonzales is Mr. Fogle’s prison case manager. In
March 2014, Mr. Fogle requested a copy of his official time-computation report and
noticed alleged errors regarding his good-time and earned-time credits. He asked Ms.
Gonzales for a grievance form to contest the report, but she refused to provide one.
Mr. Fogle filed the instant suit under § 1983, alleging Ms. Gonzales’s actions
violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and Colorado state law:
By not entering in his Earned/Good Time awards, [Ms. Gonzales] violated
[Mr. Fogle]’s due process rights guaranteed by the 14th Amend. to the U.S.
Const. to where he brings this complaint here trying to obtain justice via
trying to have awarded his Good/Earned Time off his prison term that he
had earn[ed] for his good behavior while he was housed [in administrative
segregation].
Complaint, App. at 5.5
The district court dismissed Mr. Fogle’s case without prejudice. It first noted any
challenge to the fact or duration of his sentence could be considered only in habeas
proceedings and would not be addressed in his § 1983 action. Next, the court said Mr.
Fogle’s due process claim is barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994),
because his argument—that the defendant’s failure to award credits “increases the
5
Based on his frivolous lawsuits and the numerous strikes he has accumulated
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), Mr. Fogle may no longer proceed in forma pauperis in any
future civil action or appeal in federal court unless he “is under imminent danger of
serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); see also Fogle v. Elliott, 536 F. App’x at
832 (first strike); Fogle v. Gonzales, 570 F. App’x at 797-98 (second and third strikes);
Fogle v. Infante, 2014 WL 7139574, at *3 (fourth strike).
The district court considered the instant case, however, because Mr. Fogle pre-
paid the filing fee. And we may consider this appeal because Mr. Fogle pre-paid the
appellate filing fee.
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duration of his incarceration”—questions the validity of “the failure to award the good
and earned time credits.” App. at 49-50.
Mr. Fogle now appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
We affirm the district court on the alternative ground that Mr. Fogle’s claim has
already been decided and otherwise fails to state a claim.
Mr. Fogle claims Ms. Gonzales violated his rights by failing to apply credits and
denying him a grievance. See Aplt. Br. at 5 (stating “[Mr.] Fogle’s procedural and
constitutional due process rights were violated” when Ms. Gonzales refused to “credit
him earned time and good time” for his tenure in administrative segregation). He alleges
his due process rights were violated when he was denied the opportunity to earn good-
time and earned-time credits while in administrative segregation. See Complaint, App. at
5; see also Aplt. Br. at 3 (“[Mr.] Fogle believes he is . . . entitled to the credits in
question”); Aplt. Br. at 12-28 (arguing why Colorado law creates a liberty interest in
prison credits and how administrative segregation deprived him of his due process right
to that liberty interest). Although his lengthy brief attempts to assert multiple issues,
whether he has a due process liberty interest underlies his claim. And he has brought this
claim before.
First, in 2006, he claimed “that his due process rights were violated when he was
denied the opportunity to earn ‘earned time’ credits while in administrative segregation.”
Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1262 (10th Cir. 2006). The district court concluded his
claim was frivolous, and we affirmed:
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[Mr.] Fogle has no constitutionally-protected liberty interest in earning the
credits. As this court explained in Templeman, denying a prisoner
mandatory earned time credits—i.e., those to which he has some
entitlement—would deprive him of a liberty interest if those credits
advance his mandatory date of release on parole. However, where, as here,
the credits are discretionarily awarded, the defendants have not deprived
[Mr.] Fogle of any earned time to which he was entitled and thus no liberty
interest is involved.
Id. at 1262 (citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis in original) (citing Templeman v.
Gunter, 16 F.3d 367, 370 (10th Cir. 1994)).
Second, Mr. Fogle sued Ms. Gonzales earlier this year, relying on the same facts
arising from the same incident as in the instant case. See Fogle v. Gonzales, 570 F.
App’x 795, 796 (10th Cir. 2014). He alleged that when he asked her for a grievance form
to contest his time-computation report and she refused to provide one, Ms. Gonzales
violated his First Amendment rights by preventing his access to the courts and retaliating
against him. We affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss the claim as frivolous
and awarded him a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See id. at 797-98. He also claimed
“Colorado law gives him a constitutionally protected right to good-time credits” and
“earned-time credits.” Id. at 796. We rejected those arguments because “[a]s for [Mr.]
Fogle’s good-time and earned-time arguments, those claims were never raised in the
district court. For the most part, we will not review a claim raised for the first time on
appeal, and we see no reason to depart from that rule here.” Id. (citation omitted).
His instant attempt to raise these same arguments fails yet again, whether based on
res judicata, precedent, or both. His due process claim fails for the same reasons we
expressed in 2006: “where, as here, the credits are discretionarily awarded, ‘the
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defendants have not deprived [Mr.] Fogle of any earned time to which he was entitled’
and thus no liberty interest is involved.” Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d at 1262 (quoting
Templeman, 16 F.3d at 370). Mr. Fogle has not and cannot show he has a liberty interest
in accruing credits during his administrative segregation. See Kodama v. Johnson, 786
P.2d 417, 419 (Colo. 1990) (en banc) (“An inmate does not have a constitutional right to
good time credit.”).
For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the appeal. We also conclude this appeal is
frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and counts as a strike. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) (“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have
been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the
action or appeal . . . is frivolous or malicious . . . .”).
III. CONCLUSION
We dismiss Mr. Fogle’s appeal and award him a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT,
Scott M. Matheson, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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