Halfacre v. United States ( 2021 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT June 2, 2021
_________________________________
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
BLAKE EDWARD HALFACRE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 20-4101
(D.C. No. 1:19-CV-00038-CW)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, (D. Utah)
Defendant - Appellee.
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
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Before MATHESON, BRISCOE, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Blake Edward Halfacre, appearing pro se, appeals the district court’s order
dismissing his complaint under the Federal Torts Claim Act (“FTCA”) for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we
affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Halfacre was working as an aircraft mechanic at Hill Air Force Base (“Air
Force”) in Utah, when, in January 2013, he injured his right shoulder in a slip and fall
incident. In February, he filed a claim with the Office of Workers’ Compensation
Programs (“OWCP”) for compensation under the Federal Employee’s Compensation
Act (“FECA”) for a closed dislocation of the right shoulder and a closed right
acromioclavicular dislocation. The OWCP accepted Mr. Halfacre’s claim for his
shoulder injury.
Following surgery to repair his shoulder, in May 2013, Mr. Halfacre’s treating
surgeon cleared him to return to light-duty work; upon his return, Mr. Halfacre was
assigned to work that required no lifting whatsoever, primarily wiping off tables and
countertops in the break room and filling out identification tags for parts. In early
June, the Air Force received a letter from a different medical provider, who indicated
that he was treating Mr. Halfacre for a back injury and to “[p]lease limit [his]
bending requirements and heavy lifting between 5-10 [pounds] until we are able to
evaluate his recent back injury.” R., Vol. I at 223. In July, Mr. Halfacre stopped
work altogether and filed for total disability.
In August 2015, while he was on total disability, Mr. Halfacre filed a second
claim for compensation with the OWCP. According to Mr. Halfacre, he suffered
several injuries, including emotional distress and depression, when: (1) he was forced
to return to light-duty work; (2) his assigned duties violated the work restrictions
noted by his medical providers; and (3) the Air Force falsified his work restrictions.
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The OWCP refused to accept the claim because Mr. Halfacre did not submit any
proof that the events occurred as he described them. On appeal, the Employees’
Compensation Appeals Board (“ECAB”) remanded the case to the OWCP with
instructions to administratively combine Mr. Halfacre’s second claim with the claim
for his shoulder injury.
On remand, the OWCP accepted Mr. Halfacre’s first claim for his injured
shoulder as including, among several conditions, major depressive disorder and
adjustment disorder related to the slip and fall. However, the OWCP denied
Mr. Halfacre’s second claim for an emotional condition related to his return to light-
duty work because there was no probative evidence that he was required to perform
work beyond the limitations expressed by his medical providers or that the Air Force
falsified his work restrictions. The ECAB affirmed.
In the meantime, Mr. Halfacre filed a third claim with the OWCP. This time,
Mr. Halfacre sought compensation for a shoulder injury from wiping off tables
during his short tenure at work in June 2013. The OWCP denied the claim because
Mr. Halfacre failed to establish that he suffered an injury. The record contains no
evidence of an appeal.
Dissatisfied with the resolution of his second and third claims under the
FECA, Mr. Halfacre tried for a second bite at the apple and sued the United States
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under the FTCA.1 According to the allegation in the complaint, Air Force
employees: (1) failed to properly document the work restrictions imposed by his
treating medical providers; (2) failed to properly scrutinize work restrictions while he
was on light-duty work; (3) negligently required him to perform work contrary to the
orders of his treating medical providers; (4) made false statements regarding his work
restrictions; (5) intentionally caused him to suffer emotional distress; and (6) acted or
failed to act, which made the United States vicariously liable. In other words,
Mr. Halfacre sued under the FTCA for the same claims that had been previously
adjudicated under the FECA.
The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. Mr. Halfacre appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
“We review de novo a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).” Baker v. USD 229 Blue
Valley, 979 F.3d 866, 871 (10th Cir. 2020). “We review any findings of
jurisdictional fact for clear error.” Id. “The party invoking federal jurisdiction has
the burden to establish that it is proper, and there is a presumption against its
1
By the time Mr. Halfacre filed suit in 2019, he had received more than
$200,000 in disability compensation under the FECA, and the OWCP had covered
more than $100,000 in medical expenses.
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existence.” Salzer v. SSM Health Care of Okla. Inc., 762 F.3d 1130, 1134 (10th Cir.
2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
B. The FECA
The FECA is a comprehensive workers’ compensation scheme for federal
civilian employees. See 5 U.S.C. § 8102(a) (“The United States shall pay
compensation . . . for the disability . . . of an employee resulting from personal injury
sustained while in the performance of his duty . . . .”). The Act provides a wide
range of benefits for covered work-related injuries, including compensation for lost
wages, related medical costs, and vocational rehabilitation. See 5 U.S.C.
§§ 8103-8107. Thus, when a federal employee’s injury falls within the scope of the
FECA, its administrative process controls and the employee may not sue the
government under the FTCA seeking damages for the injuries. See Lockheed Aircraft
Corp. v. United States, 460 U.S. 190, 192-94 (1983) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c)); see
also Tippetts v. United States, 308 F.3d 1091, 1094 (10th Cir. 2002); Swafford v.
United States, 998 F.2d 837, 839 (10th Cir. 1993).
Central to the FECA’s statutory scheme is the role of the Secretary of Labor,
who has exclusive authority to administer FECA claims and to decide questions
arising under that Act, including whether a claim is covered. See 5 U.S.C. § 8145.
See also Tippetts, 308 F.3d at 1094; Swafford, 998 F.2d at 839. The Secretary’s
decision to allow or to deny payment under that Act is “final and conclusive for all
purposes and with respect to all questions of law and fact; and . . . not subject to
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review by another official of the United States or by a court by mandamus or
otherwise.” 5 U.S.C. § 8128(b)(1)-(2); see also Swafford, 998 F.2d at 839.
Indeed, the FECA “contains an unambiguous and comprehensive provision
barring any judicial review of the Secretary of Labor’s determination of FECA
coverage. Consequently, the courts have no jurisdiction over FTCA claims where the
Secretary determines that [the] FECA applies.” Sw. Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni, 502 U.S.
81, 90 (1991). This bar applies even when an employee is not entitled to any
benefits, such as when the Secretary decides that an injury is not compensable under
the FECA. See Farley v. United States, 162 F.3d 613, 616 (10th Cir. 1998);
Swafford, 998 F.2d at 841.
Plainly, the district court here lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the
FTCA complaint, and Mr. Halfacre’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. First,
Mr. Halfacre takes issue with the strength of the evidence on which his second and
third claims were resolved and asks this court to re-examine the evidence and reach a
different result. But we have no authority to conduct such a review. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 8128(b)(1)-(2).
Second, Mr. Halfacre suggests that he was not a federal employee when he
returned to light-duty work in May 2013 because he was not given a federal job
classification or wage code. We agree with the government that this argument is
baseless. Mr. Halfacre filed his claims under the FECA as a federal employee, both
the OWCP and ECAB recognized the claims as having been filed by a federal
employee, and at a hearing in the district court on the government’s motion to
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dismiss, Mr. Halfacre’s counsel acknowledged that he was a federal employee for
purposes of determining FECA coverage. It is obviously too late, and inaccurate, for
Mr. Halfacre to argue that he was not a federal employee.
III. CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Entered for the Court
Joel M. Carson III
Circuit Judge
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