Blauch v. City of Westminster, Colorado ( 2021 )


Menu:
  •                                                                                  FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         Tenth Circuit
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                          June 16, 2021
    _________________________________
    Christopher M. Wolpert
    Clerk of Court
    JOANNA BLAUCH,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.                                                         No. 20-1430
    (D.C. No. 1:20-CV-00431-LTB-GPG)
    CITY OF WESTMINSTER, COLORADO,                              (D. Colo.)
    a home rule municipality; DONALD
    TRIPP, in his official and individual
    capacity; HERBERT ATCHISON, in his
    official and individual capacity; ANITA
    SEITZ, in her official and individual
    capacity; DAVID DEMOTT, in his official
    and individual capacity; KATHRYN
    SKULLEY, in her official and individual
    capacity; BRUCE BAKER, in his official
    and individual capacity; ALBERT
    GARCIA, in his official and individual
    capacity; EMMA PINTER, in her official
    and individual capacity; MARIA DE
    CAMBRA, in her official and individual
    capacity; SHANNON BIRD, in her official
    and individual capacity; MARK
    BROSTROM, in his official and individual
    capacity; TIFFANY SORICE, in her
    individual and official capacity,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    _________________________________
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
    this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
    ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
    precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
    _________________________________
    Before MORITZ, BALDOCK, and EID, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________
    Joanna Blauch appeals an order dismissing her pro se 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     claims
    as frivolous or barred by absolute-immunity defenses. For the reasons below, we
    affirm.
    Blauch’s claims stem from her 2013 arrest for a domestic-violence incident.
    The arrest led to Blauch’s criminal convictions for unspecified offenses following a
    jury trial prosecuted by Mark Brostrom, a prosecutor for the City of Westminster,
    Colorado. Blauch sought postconviction relief in municipal-court proceedings
    overseen by Judge Tiffany Sorice, though the result of those proceedings is unclear
    from the record. Later, Blauch filed this pro se complaint in federal court alleging
    constitutional violations under § 1983 and state-law claims against the City, Sorice,
    Brostrom, and ten other City officials. To remedy these violations, Blauch sought
    damages and unspecified declaratory and injunctive relief.
    The district court granted Blauch’s request to proceed in forma pauperis but
    dismissed her claims under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B)(i) and (iii), determining that
    they were frivolous or subject to absolute-immunity defenses.1 It also denied
    estoppel. But it may be cited for its persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a);
    10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
    1
    The district court also concluded that the applicable two-year statute of
    limitations barred some of Blauch’s claims. We need not address this conclusion,
    however, because (as explained below) the district court properly dismissed all
    claims on other grounds.
    2
    Blauch’s request to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, certifying that any appeal
    from the dismissal would not be taken in good faith. See § 1915(a)(3). Blauch
    appeals.
    On appeal, Blauch challenges several aspects of the district court’s order
    dismissing her claims under § 1915(e)(2)(B). That statute requires federal courts to
    dismiss in forma pauperis claims if they are frivolous, if they fail to state a claim on
    which relief may be granted, or if they seek damages from a defendant who is
    immune from such relief. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii). A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an
    arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 
    490 U.S. 319
    , 325
    (1989). A claim is not frivolous, however, simply because it does not state a claim on
    which relief may be granted. See 
    id.
     at 329–30. Although “[w]e generally review a
    district court’s dismissal for frivolousness under § 1915 for abuse of discretion,” our
    review is de novo if “the frivolousness determination turns on an issue of law.” Fogle
    v. Pierson, 
    435 F.3d 1252
    , 1259 (10th Cir. 2006). De novo review likewise applies to
    dismissals on absolute-immunity grounds. See Gagan v. Norton, 
    35 F.3d 1473
    , 1475
    (10th Cir. 1994). Because Blauch proceeds pro se, we liberally construe her
    arguments when applying these standards. See Hall v. Bellmon, 
    935 F.2d 1106
    , 1110
    (10th Cir. 1991). But in doing so, we do not act as her advocate. 
    Id.
    Under these standards, Blauch raises no issue requiring reversal. Blauch
    largely repeats points she made below, ignoring the district court’s dispositive
    reasons for dismissing her claims. Specifically, none of Blauch’s arguments show
    that the district court improperly dismissed her complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B).
    3
    At the outset, the district court properly dismissed the claims against Sorice
    and Brostrom. Both those defendants are entitled to absolute immunity because
    Blauch’s claims arise from acts they performed in their judicial or prosecutorial
    capacities, respectively. See Hunt v. Bennett, 
    17 F.3d 1263
    , 1266 (10th Cir. 1994)
    (judicial immunity); 
    id. at 1267
     (prosecutorial immunity). Certain exceptions could
    overcome these immunity defenses, but Blauch does not allege them here.
    Blauch’s § 1983 claims against the other individual defendants also fall short.
    As the district court observed, Blauch alleges no specific facts showing how these
    officials, a city manager and several city-council members, personally participated in
    the alleged constitutional violations at her trial and postconviction proceedings. See
    Henry v. Storey, 
    658 F.3d 1235
    , 1241 (10th Cir. 2011). We disagree, however, with
    the district court’s view that this conclusion supports dismissal for frivolousness.
    Even though these claims ultimately fail because Blauch alleges no facts on a
    material element required to obtain relief, they at least invoke a recognized legal
    theory and avoid making baseless factual allegations. See Williams, 
    490 U.S. at 327
    .
    Accordingly, the district court should have dismissed the claims against the
    remaining individual defendants under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a
    claim—not under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) for frivolousness—and we affirm on that
    alternative basis. See Johnson v. Raemisch, 763 F. App’x 731, 734–35 (10th Cir.
    2019) (unpublished).
    That leaves Blauch’s claims against the City. To succeed on those claims,
    Blauch had to show that the City created some policy or custom that directly caused
    4
    her alleged injuries. Mocek v. City of Albuquerque, 
    813 F.3d 912
    , 933 (10th Cir.
    2015). As in the district court, Blauch argues that the City adopted a policy “of
    ‘lawsuit avoidance’ to ‘stay ahead of the ACLU’ by falsifying and ignoring material
    evidence in multiple reported cases.” Aplt. Br. 13 (quoting R. 241). But her argument
    faces the same problem on appeal that it faced below: she fails to support the
    existence of such a policy with “particular facts” and relies exclusively on
    “conclusory allegations.” R. 373. And contrary to Blauch’s view, this failure did not
    occur because the magistrate judge excluded “[b]ackground evidence” documenting
    examples of other people that the City has mistreated, Aplt. Br. 7; the district court
    rightly noted that the examples Blauch points to “do not involve the same type of
    conduct allegedly perpetrated against [her],” R. 374. Because Blauch did not allege a
    municipal policy that could have caused her injuries, the district court did not err in
    dismissing the claims against the City. See Mocek, 813 F.3d at 934 (“Aside from
    conclusory statements, no allegations in the complaint give rise to an inference that
    the municipality itself established a deliberate policy or custom that caused
    [plaintiff’s] injuries.”). But as with the previous set of claims, we note that the
    appropriate basis for dismissal was failure to state a claim rather than frivolousness.
    See Johnson, 763 F. App’x at 734–35.
    None of Blauch’s remaining arguments affect the district court’s dispositive
    reasons for dismissing her complaint. Blauch contends that the district court ignored
    her objections to factual inaccuracies in the magistrate judge’s recommendations and
    distorted facts in its dismissal order. But she does not say what facts the magistrate
    5
    judge inaccurately described or the district court distorted. And we are not persuaded
    by Blauch’s argument that the district court’s legal conclusions “were demonstrably
    based on almost entirely distorted facts.” Aplt. Br. 36. As discussed above, our de
    novo review of the complaint persuades us that it was subject to dismissal under
    § 1915(e)(2)(B) for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court.
    In sum, we affirm the dismissal of Blauch’s § 1983 claims under
    § 1915(e)(2)(B). And because Blauch asserted no other federal claims, we also affirm
    the district court’s decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Blauch’s
    state-law claims. See Smith v. City of Enid, 
    149 F.3d 1151
    , 1156 (10th Cir. 1998)
    (“When all federal claims have been dismissed, the court may, and usually should,
    decline to exercise jurisdiction over any remaining state claims.”). As a final matter,
    we deny Blauch’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal because although
    the complaint may have raised nonfrivolous claims, Blauch has “failed to show the
    existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support of the
    issues raised on appeal.” Rolland v. Primesource Staffing, L.L.C., 
    497 F.3d 1077
    ,
    1079 (10th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).
    Entered for the Court
    Nancy L. Moritz
    Circuit Judge
    6