Cracraft v. Utah Valley University ( 2022 )

Appellate Case: 22-4034 Document: 010110775523 Date Filed: 11/30/2022 Page: 1
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT November 30, 2022
_________________________________
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
TRAVIS CRACRAFT,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 22-4034
(D.C. No. 2:19-CV-00397-TC-DBP)
UTAH VALLEY UNIVERSITY; JARED (D. Utah)
LESSER, d/b/a JL Home Design,
Defendants - Appellees.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before PHILLIPS, MURPHY, and EID, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Pro se Appellant Travis Cracraft is back again, seeking review of the district
court’s denial of another round of post-judgment motions. In those, he asks us to
consider whether his procedural missteps permit the extraordinary remedy of relief
from the district court’s judgment. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
we conclude they do not and affirm.
We need not dwell on the facts or procedural posture. A former student of
Utah Valley University and former employee of Jared Lesser’s company, Cracraft
asserts that the University and Lesser conspired to steal an algorithm he developed in
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 22-4034 Document: 010110775523 Date Filed: 11/30/2022 Page: 2
2003. Sixteen years later, Cracraft sued the pair, alleging $300 million in damages
from this conspiracy and asserting claims under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962, 1964(c). After Cracraft
amended, the district court dismissed his amended complaint as time-barred and
inadequately pled; we affirmed. Cracraft v. Utah Valley Univ., No. 21-4031, 2021
WL 5500604, at *1 (10th Cir. Nov. 24, 2021). We agreed with the district court that
Cracraft’s injury accrued in 2012, causing his complaint to be three years too late
under RICO’s four-year statute of limitations. Id. at *3-4. We also discarded
Cracraft’s argument that Lesser and the University fraudulently concealed their
conspiracy, reasoning that Cracraft did not make that argument below. Id. at *4. Even
if he did, we concluded that “Cracraft’s fraudulent concealment theory is just a
repackaged challenge to the district court’s inquiry-notice determination, which we
have already rejected.” Id.We also affirmed the district court’s denial of Cracraft’s motion to reopen and
post-judgment motion to amend. We recited the oft-quoted standard for Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 60(b) that “such relief is extraordinary and may only be granted in
exceptional circumstances.” Id. at *5 (quoting Servants of the Paraclete v. Does, 204
F.3d 1005, 1009 (10th Cir. 2000)). And we specified that post-judgment motions are
not places to “revisit issues already addressed or advance arguments that could have
been raised in prior briefing.” Id. (citation omitted). Applying that standard, we
affirmed the district court’s ruling that Cracraft’s motions were “based on facts that
2
Appellate Case: 22-4034 Document: 010110775523 Date Filed: 11/30/2022 Page: 3
were available when he filed the original complaint” and failed to address the
exceptional circumstances mandated by the Federal Rules. Id. at *5-6.
Four months later, Cracraft filed another pair of post-judgment motions with
the district court. The first is an “Amended Motion for Retrial,” which supplanted an
earlier-filed “Motion for Retrial due to Inadequate Representation.” The second is a
derivative “Motion to Amend Motion for Retrial.” Both motions press that Rule
60(b)(6) warrants a “retrial” because the district court “did not consider extenuating
circumstances due to [his] procedural missteps.” R. vol. II, at 34. In other words, the
district court got it wrong because Cracraft didn’t know what he was doing. Broadly,
Cracraft’s motions go on to dredge up arguments about inquiry notice and fraudulent
concealment. The district court summarily denied both motions.
We review the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion. Johnson
v. Spencer, 950 F.3d 680, 701 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Kile v. United States, 915
F.3d 682, 688 (10th Cir. 2019)). “The denial of a 60(b)(6) motion will be reversed
only if we find a complete absence of a reasonable basis and are certain that the
decision is wrong.” Davis v. Kan. Dep’t of Corr., 507 F.3d 1246, 1248 (10th Cir.
2007) (quoting Zurich N. Am. v. Matrix Serv., Inc., 426 F.3d 1281, 1293 (10th Cir.
2005)). Here, we are certain the district court’s decision is right. Cracraft’s Rule
60(b)(6) motion identifies no grounds for relief that qualify as extraordinary or
exceptional. See Bud Brooks Trucking, Inc. v. Bill Hodges Trucking Co., 909 F.2d
1437, 1440 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting that “exceptional circumstances” typically
include “compelling circumstances beyond [the parties’] control”). Cracraft’s
3
Appellate Case: 22-4034 Document: 010110775523 Date Filed: 11/30/2022 Page: 4
Opening Brief before us confirms as much, arguing that he “later discovered”
precedent helpful to his argument. Cf. Collins v. City of Wichita, 254 F.2d 837, 839
(10th Cir. 1958) (“A change in the law or in the judicial view of an established rule
of law is not . . . an extraordinary circumstance which justifies such relief.” (citation
omitted)). And to be sure, Cracraft’s motion does little more than unearth arguments
about tolling that we have already rejected or that he could have raised earlier.1
Nor are we persuaded that the district court interpreted Cracraft’s motions too
harshly. True, as Cracraft points out, we liberally construe pro se filings. But equally
true is that “pro se status does not relieve [Cracraft] of the obligation to comply with
procedural rules.” Murray v. City of Tahlequah, 312 F.3d 1196, 1199 n.3 (10th Cir.
2002) (citing Ogden v. San Juan County, 32 F.3d 452, 455 (10th Cir. 1994)). Nor will
we “‘assume the role of advocate’ and make [Cracraft’s] arguments for him.” Walters
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 703 F.3d 1167, 1173 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Yang v.
Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008)). On these precepts, we affirm the
district court. Cracraft’s retrial motion is foreign to the Federal Rules but can be
liberally construed as one for post-judgment relief under Rule 60(b)(6). So construed,
Cracraft’s “procedural missteps” are not reason enough to justify extraordinary relief
under Rule 60(b)(6). And because Cracraft’s Rule 60(b) motion is meritless, his
1
Cracraft contends that we never considered his tolling arguments on the
merits. Our prior decision belies that reading. There, we noted that Cracraft failed to
properly preserve his tolling arguments. Cracraft, 2021 WL 5500604, at *4 & n.3. But
we also noted that Cracraft’s tolling theory lacked merit because it “repackaged [his]
challenge to the district court’s inquiry-notice determination, which we have already
rejected.” Id. at *4 (citing Dummar v. Lummis, 543 F.3d 614, 621 (10th Cir. 2008)).
4
Appellate Case: 22-4034 Document: 010110775523 Date Filed: 11/30/2022 Page: 5
derivative (and unnecessary) motion to amend is moot. See Chihuahuan Grasslands
All. v. Kempthorne, 545 F.3d 884, 891 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[A] case or controversy no
longer exists when it is impossible to grant any effectual relief.” (citations omitted)).
We discern no abuse of discretion with the district court’s conclusions that echoed
this reasoning.2
We affirm.
Entered for the Court
Gregory A. Phillips
Circuit Judge
2
We are also troubled that Cracraft has used this appeal to reargue the merits
of our prior decision. The place for that argument is a petition for panel rehearing,
not recursive appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 40(a)(1) (noting that litigants have
fourteen days after entry of judgment to file petition for panel rehearing).
5