Diaz v. Lampela , 601 F. App'x 670 ( 2015 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT February 11, 2015
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
JOSE A. DIAZ,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 14-1106
(D.C. No. 1:13-CV-01098-WJM-MJW)
JILL LAMPELA; BRANDON (D. Colo.)
SHAFFER,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before HARTZ, McKAY, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Jose A. Diaz is a Colorado sex offender sentenced to a term of eight
years to life under the indeterminate sentencing scheme for sex offenses set out in the
Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act of 1968 (SOLSA), Colo. Rev. Stat.
§§ 18-1.3-1001 to 1012. After he was denied parole at the minimum eight-year mark
and his application for re-entry into a sex-offender treatment and management
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
program (SOTMP) was rejected, Mr. Diaz brought this official-capacity civil rights
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for equitable relief against the Chairman of the Parole
Board (currently Brandon Shaffer) and the Chief of Behavioral Health for the
Colorado Department of Corrections (currently Jill Lampela). The district court
granted defendants’ motion to dismiss and this appeal followed. On de novo review,
see Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1183 (10th Cir. 2010), we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
We accept the following allegations of fact—as opposed to bare conclusions of
law—as true for purposes of our review. See Bixler v. Foster, 596 F.3d 751, 756
(10th Cir. 2010). In 2002, Mr. Diaz pleaded guilty to a class IV felony sex offense
and received the indeterminate sentence noted above.1 Upon his incarceration he
completed the first phase of the SOTMP, but was terminated (i.e., given a “time out”
in order to “help understand his issues”) from the second phase in 2010 for behavior
not specified in the complaint. R. Vol. 1 at 11 par. 22.
In January 2012, Mr. Diaz obtained an independent psychosexual evaluation
from a clinical psychologist, who diagnosed him as a pedophiliac and stated that he
requires treatment for the condition. The psychologist recommended the Colorado
1
Under the SOLSA scheme, sex offenders receive an indeterminate sentence
with a minimum term of years (which is tied to the presumptive sentencing range for
the felony level of the offense) and a maximum term of life. See Vensor v. People,
151 P.3d 1274, 1276 (Colo. 2007) (discussing Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-1004(1)(a)).
After completion of the minimum term, implementation of the remainder is left to the
discretion of the parole board. See id. (discussing Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-1006(1)).
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Institute for Mental Health in Pueblo, Colorado, because the Colorado Department of
Corrections (CDOC) lacked phalometric assessment facilities. Mr. Diaz relied on
this evaluation to request readmission to the SOTMP to improve, manage, or control
his condition. CDOC officials sent him an application, which he completed and
returned in August 2012. After a month without a response, he filed a grievance,
requesting readmission to the SOTMP as well as treatment at the Institute in Pueblo.
The grievance alleged that the refusal of treatment, and continued incarceration
without treatment based on the status of being a pedophile, violated his rights under
the Eighth Amendment. The grievance was denied on the grounds that he had not
used the correct application form for readmission to the SOTMP and had otherwise
not proved his allegations.
In the meantime, Mr. Diaz appeared before the parole board, which deferred
action on parole for risk-related reasons notwithstanding the fact that it rated him
“Very Low” on a risk-assessment scale. The two risk categories the parole board
relied on were “Severity/Circumstances of offense” and “Prior criminal history.”
Mr. Diaz alleges that denying parole on these grounds is impermissible as added
punishment for the underlying offense and as punishment for his mental
condition/status. He also alleges that such grounds are outside the criteria the parole
board may properly consider under state law governing offenders sentenced under
SOLSA.
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The complaint asserts five claims. Two are directed at the CDOC through
defendant Lampela: (1) failure to provide treatment for his pedophilia, in violation
of Eighth Amendment strictures regarding medical care of inmates; and
(2) imprisonment, without adequate treatment, for the condition or status of being a
pedophile predisposed to commit sex offenses, in violation of the Eighth Amendment
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. The remaining three claims are
directed at the parole board through defendant Shaffer: (1) promulgation and
application of policies that inflict added punishment on sex offenders, including
Mr. Diaz, without a judicial trial, in violation of the Bill of Attainder Clause, U.S.
Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; (2) imprisonment, through denial of parole, for the condition
or status of being a sex-offending pedophile predisposed to commit sex offenses, in
violation of the Eighth Amendment; and (3) denial of parole under the wrong
standards or criteria prescribed by state law, in violation of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. For relief, Mr. Diaz sought a declaration that CDOC and
parole board policy violated his constitutional rights; an order requiring his
readmission to the SOTMP and specialized treatment for his pedophilia; and an order
directing the parole board to apply the proper criteria, excluding punishment as a
consideration, at a parole hearing to be scheduled forthwith.2
2
While Mr. Diaz may proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in challenging parole
procedures, to the extent he “challenge[s] a constitutional defect in an individual
parole hearing, where the remedy lies in providing a new parole hearing, [he] must
file a habeas petition.” Herrera v. Harkins, 949 F.2d 1096, 1097 (10th Cir. 1991).
(continued)
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II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Eighth Amendment Claim against CDOC for Inadequate Medical Care
The Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment applies
to officials’ “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.” Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). We recently summarized the two-prong
framework for analyzing deliberate-indifference claims in Al-Turki v. Robinson,
762 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2014):
A claim of deliberate indifference includes both an objective and
subjective component. The objective prong of the deliberate
indifference test examines whether the prisoner’s medical condition was
sufficiently serious to be cognizable under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause. The subjective prong examines the state of mind of
the defendant, asking whether the official knew of and disregarded an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety.
Id. at 1192 (brackets, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court rejected Mr. Diaz’s deliberate-indifference claim under the
objective prong, holding that his pedophilia did not present a serious medical need.
“A medical need is considered sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective prong if the
condition has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or is so obvious
that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”
Id. at 1192-93 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court concluded that
“although [Mr. Diaz] has been diagnosed as having the mental condition of
His request for an order requiring a new parole hearing forthwith is thus beyond the
scope of this civil-rights action. See id. at 1098.
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pedophilia, treatment for his pedophilia has not been mandated,” citing Mr. Diaz’s
allegation that the clinical psychologist had only “recommend[ed]” treatment at the
Colorado Institute for Mental Health in Pueblo. R. Vol. 1 at 147. But even though
Mr. Diaz alleged that that particular treatment had only been recommended, he also
alleged that the psychologist indicated more generally that his condition “requires
treatment.” Id. at 11.
We nevertheless agree that the deliberate-indifference claim fails on the
objective prong. Mr. Diaz alleged that his readmission to the SOTMP was denied
because he used the wrong application, not because he was irrevocably denied access
to the program. His claim is properly analyzed as a delay in treatment. To state such
a claim, he must allege that the delay has caused or will cause “substantial harm,”
such as “lifelong handicap, permanent loss, or considerable pain.” Al-Turki,
762 F.3d at 1193 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Riddle v. Mondragon,
83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting psychiatric treatment may be
constitutionally mandated if a serious condition “is curable or may be substantially
alleviated” and “the potential for harm to the prisoner by reason of delay or the denial
of care would be substantial” (internal quotation marks omitted)). With respect to
medical consequences of the lack of treatment, the complaint alleges only that it has
been a “detriment” to his “well being.” R. Vol. 1 at 16. Such a vague and
conclusory allegation does not suffice to state an Eighth Amendment claim. See
Riddle, 83 F.3d at 1204 (holding that sex offender’s “[v]ague allegations of eroded
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self-esteem, apathy, fear and feelings of differentness . . . do not amount to the basis
for a [deliberate indifference] claim” regarding lack of treatment for sexual disorder).
Mr. Diaz also alleges his condition predisposes him to commit sex offenses, but that
is a potential harm to others, not to himself. Although this predisposition may also
impact his parole prospects, we address that nonmedical concern in the next section
below.
We also think dismissal of this claim is proper under the subjective prong.
The complaint indicates that Mr. Diaz’s own conduct necessitated his removal from
the SOTMP and that his readmission to the program has been impeded by his failure
to properly apply. Nothing in the complaint suggests that his removal from the
program was for any reason other than that his conduct indicated a suspension of
treatment for a period of self-examination was warranted. Mr. Diaz does not allege
that this judgment about the appropriateness of ongoing treatment in light of his
conduct was incorrect or negligent, much less that it rose to the level of deliberate
indifference. See generally Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107 (distinguishing disputed
treatment decisions and even malpractice from deliberate indifference required for
Eighth Amendment claim). As for readmission to the program, he does not allege
that he was incorrectly rejected for using the wrong application, let alone provide
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facts plausibly suggesting that an unjustified denial of his application constituted a
subjective deliberate indifference to his medical needs.3
B. Eighth Amendment Claim for Lack of Treatment for Condition Underlying
Continued Incarceration under SOLSA
Mr. Diaz claims that CDOC’s failure to treat his pedophilia violated his Eighth
Amendment rights for another reason as well. His argument runs as follows: the
focus of his prolonged incarceration under SOLSA beyond the minimum term of his
indeterminate sentence is on his propensity to re-offend arising from his pedophilia;
consequently, the failure to treat this condition while continuing his confinement is
cruel and unusual punishment.
This court has previously rejected (albeit in an unpublished decision) the tacit
legal premise of this argument—that is, that when a psychological condition could
impact a prisoner’s parole, treatment is mandated by the Eighth Amendment even if
the condition would not otherwise require treatment as a serious medical need. See
Hunt v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 194 F. App’x 492, 495 (10th Cir. 2006). But we need
not rely on that analysis. As we have already noted, the SOTMP has been made
available to Mr. Diaz; it appears from the complaint that his current nonparticipation
in the program is attributable to his own conduct.
3
He does allege that he used an application provided by CDOC staff, but there
is no allegation that any mistake in this regard was an intentional effort to impede his
readmission into the SOTMP. Nor does he allege that he has since properly applied
for readmission and still been rejected.
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C. Eighth Amendment Claim for Punishment Based on Status or Propensity
In a related claim brought against the parole board, Mr. Diaz contends that his
continued confinement following the denial of parole constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment for his mere status as a pedophile with a propensity to commit future sex
offenses. It is true that punitive incarceration solely on the basis of a person’s status
or propensities violates the Eighth Amendment. See United States v. Munro, 394
F.3d 865, 872 (10th Cir. 2005) (discussing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962)). But we are not addressing a sentence imposed on such grounds; Mr. Diaz’s
indeterminate sentence was imposed for his commission of a criminal offense. We
are addressing the discretionary denial of parole, which merely continues punishment
already imposed for the underlying offense and does not itself implicate the Eighth
Amendment. See Lustgarden v. Gunter, 966 F.2d 552, 555 (10th Cir. 1992).
D. Bill of Attainder Claim
The constitution prohibits states from passing “Bill[s] of Attainder.” U.S.
Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. A Bill of Attainder “legislatively determines guilt and
inflicts punishment upon an identifiable individual without provision of the
protections of a judicial trial.” Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468
(1977). The Bill of Attainder Clause “prohibit[s] legislatures from singling out
disfavored persons and meting out summary punishment for past conduct.” Landgraf
v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994). Mr. Diaz claims that the parole board
violated this constitutional prohibition by denying him parole for reasons, regarding
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the seriousness of his underlying offense, that SOLSA excludes from the parole
board’s consideration.
This claim fails for at least two reasons. First, a parole determination is an
executive adjudication, not a legislative enactment. Indeed, Mr. Diaz’s objection to
the parole board’s decision is that it was in contravention of the controlling
legislative enactment (SOLSA).
Second, Mr. Diaz’s incarceration following the discretionary denial of parole
is not a new punishment meted out by the parole board. It simply continues the
punishment previously imposed by the court that sentenced him for the underlying
offense. See Mahn v. Gunter, 978 F.2d 599, 602 n.7 (10th Cir. 1992) (discretionary
denial of parole in Colorado does not impose additional punishment, because it “does
not change the length of a prisoner’s sentence”); cf. Malek v. Haun, 26 F.3d 1013,
1016 (10th Cir. 1994) (when parole is discretionary, “the denial of parole . . .
[cannot] constitute cruel and unusual punishment, double jeopardy, or ex post facto
application of the law”).
E. Due-Process Claim
Mr. Diaz contends that the parole board’s consideration of a sex offender’s
underlying offense in connection with parole is prohibited by SOLSA and that the
board violated (and will continue to violate) his due-process rights by doing so. But
a due-process claim could arise here only if Mr. Diaz had a cognizable liberty interest
in securing parole. He does not.
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“Whatever liberty interest exists is, of course, a state interest created by [state]
law. There is no right under the Federal Constitution to be conditionally released
before the expiration of a valid sentence, and the States are under no duty to offer
parole to their prisoners.” Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859, 862 (2011)
(per curiam). The question, then, is whether state law affords the prisoner a
legitimate claim of entitlement to parole or instead has left the determination of
parole to the discretion of the parole board. See Straley v. Utah Bd. of Pardons,
582 F.3d 1208, 1212-14 (10th Cir. 2009). SOLSA leaves it to the parole board “to
determine whether the sex offender may be released on parole,” Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 18-1.3-1006(1)(a) (emphasis added), and the Colorado Supreme Court has
recognized that this provision “assigns discretion to the parole board to release [an
offender],” Vensor, 151 P.3d at 1276; see also Lustgarden, 966 F.2d at 553 (state
court’s interpretation of parole statute as discretionary is “controlling in federal
court”). SOLSA does not create a liberty interest in parole of sex offenders.4
Mr. Diaz has argued at length that SOLSA has a rehabilitative purpose and that
the parole board contravenes this purpose in violation of due process by considering,
in allegedly punitive fashion, a sex offender’s underlying offense in deciding whether
to grant parole. Defendants have argued at length to the contrary. But as we have
already concluded that due process is not implicated in the denial of parole under
4
While its unpublished decision is not binding on us, we note that another panel
of this court reached the same conclusion for much the same reasons in Jago v. Ortiz,
245 F. App’x 794, 796-97 (10th Cir. 2007).
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SOLSA, we need not address the point. Without that asserted constitutional
dimension, the dispute over the parole board’s understanding and implementation of
SOLSA is merely a matter of state law. “An action under § 1983 . . . cannot be
maintained on the basis of alleged violations of state law.” Cardoso v. Calbone,
490 F.3d 1194, 1197 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Mr. Diaz’s motion to certify
questions of state law is denied.
Entered for the Court
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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