Cottriel v. Jones , 588 F. App'x 753 ( 2014 )


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  •                                                               FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS       Tenth Circuit
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                        October 15, 2014
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    JON ANDREW COTTRIEL,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                                         No. 14-6037
    (D.C. No. 5:03-CV-00125-W)
    JUSTIN JONES, Director,                                   (W.D. Okla.)
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
    Before KELLY, PORFILIO, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
    Jon Andrew Cottriel, an Oklahoma prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
    district court’s order denying his motion to hold the Director (Director) of the
    Oklahoma Department of Corrections (ODOC) in contempt for violating a permanent
    injunction requiring that he be provided kosher meals. Because the order under
    review disposed of all relief sought in a post-judgment motion, we take jurisdiction
    over this appeal. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     (providing appellate jurisdiction over “final
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
    appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
    ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
    precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
    estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
    Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    decisions of the district courts”); cf. Consumers Gas & Oil, Inc. v. Farmland Indus.,
    Inc., 
    84 F.3d 367
    , 370 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding order finding party in contempt
    during the post-judgment stage was appealable).
    I.     Background
    This matter arises from a permanent injunction entered February 8, 2006, that
    required the Director, in his official capacity, to provide Mr. Cottriel a kosher diet
    at no cost to Mr. Cottriel. The injunction required that the kosher diet comply with
    the nutritional requirements of the diets served to other inmates. R. at 942. On
    March 27, 2013, Mr. Cottriel filed an Application to Hold Defendant in Contempt
    alleging that the meals served to him were not kosher and did not provide sufficient
    nutrition. He claimed that some of the food served to him was not kosher because
    (1) non-kosher utensils were used to prepare and serve it; (2) the inmate preparing
    and serving the kosher meals was not properly trained and supervised; and (3) the
    Shabbos and holiday meals did not include the required “wine (non-alcoholic or
    grape juice), two loaves of bread (or rolls or whole matzos), fish and meat,”
    id. at 1211. Mr. Cottriel asserted that he was required to supplement the prison meals
    with kosher food he paid for with his personal funds.
    A magistrate judge recommended denying Mr. Cottriel’s contempt motion.
    Mr. Cottriel sought review by the district court, which then ordered the Director to
    address in writing Mr. Cottriel’s assertions that inmate Marvin Gibson was not
    properly trained or supervised, the kitchen utensils were not kosher, and the Shabbos
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    and holiday meals did not meet recognized nutritional requirements. The Director
    responded that the prison had complied with the permanent injunction by training
    inmate Gibson to comply with the prison’s kosher diet protocol when preparing
    kosher meals for Mr. Cottriel and other inmates on a kosher diet. Inmate Gibson was
    supervised by a prison-food-service manager, Baldemar Hernandez, and the kosher
    meals were prepared in a separate kitchen area with utensils separate from the
    non-kosher meals. Moreover, pursuant to the affidavit of William Weldon, prison
    Food Service Manager III, inmate Gibson had been trained in the preparation and
    service of kosher meals and he understood and followed the accepted protocol. The
    Director further asserted that the kosher meals were nutritionally adequate and that
    prison officials had attempted to resolve Mr. Cottriel’s complaints about the kosher
    diet within the rules and protocols applicable to kosher diets. In addition, after the
    court ordered the Director to respond, Mr. Cottriel met with prison officials to
    address and correct his concerns about kosher meals.
    The district court found that Mr. Cottriel had conceded that the prepackaged
    kosher food served to him was generally acceptable and that the prison kitchen staff
    had taken all reasonable steps to ensure that it complied with the permanent
    injunction. Further, the court found that the prison kitchen had a separate preparation
    area for the kosher meals and the kosher meals exceeded the required nutritional
    guidelines. Finally, the court rejected Mr. Cottriel’s claim that inmate Gibson had
    not been properly trained or supervised by a qualified kosher supervisor.
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    Accordingly, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and
    denied Mr. Cottriel’s motion to hold the Director in contempt. Mr. Cottriel appeals,
    renewing his arguments presented to the district court.
    II.    Discussion
    We liberally construe Mr. Cottriel’s pro se filings. See Ledbetter v. City of
    Topeka, 
    318 F.3d 1183
    , 1187 (10th Cir. 2003). We do not, however, “take on the
    responsibility of serving as the litigant’s attorney in constructing arguments and
    searching the record.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 
    425 F.3d 836
    , 840
    (10th Cir. 2005).
    Mr. Cottriel’s contempt motion was properly characterized as seeking a
    finding of civil, rather than criminal, contempt. “A contempt sanction is considered
    civil if it is remedial and for the benefit of the complainant.” Federal Trade Comm’n
    v. Kuykendall, 
    371 F.3d 745
    , 752 (10th Cir. 2004) (brackets and internal quotation
    marks omitted).
    We review a district court’s determination of civil contempt for
    abuse of discretion. A district court abuses its discretion if the court’s
    adjudication of the contempt proceedings is based upon an error of law
    or a clearly erroneous finding of fact. As the moving party in this case,
    [Mr. Cottriel] had the initial burden of proving, by clear and convincing
    evidence, that a valid court order existed, that [the Director] had
    knowledge of the order, and that [the Director] disobeyed the order.
    Once [Mr. Cottriel] made that showing, the burden then shifted to [the
    Director] to show either that he had complied with the order or that he
    could not comply with it.
    ClearOne Commc’ns, Inc. v. Bowers, 
    651 F.3d 1200
    , 1210 (10th Cir. 2011) (citations
    and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Reliance Ins. Co. v. Mast Constr. Co.,
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    159 F.3d 1311
    , 1315 (10th Cir. 1998) (“We review the district court’s denial of a
    civil contempt motion for an abuse of discretion.”). Neither party disputed that
    Mr. Cottriel met his burden to prove that a valid court order existed and that the
    Director had knowledge of it. The disputed element was whether the Director was in
    compliance with the permanent injunction.
    Mr. Cottriel challenges the district court’s determination that the Director was
    not in contempt, arguing: (1) the court did not have sufficient information to
    determine that the kosher meals served to Mr. Cottriel complied with the nutritional
    and caloric requirements of the permanent injunction; (2) he submitted a photograph
    of a non-kosher meat slicer in the area designated as separate for kosher food
    preparation; (3) the kosher food preparation did not follow the protocol approved by
    Chaplain Gary Friedman, Chairman, Jewish Prisoner Services International, for
    preparation and supervision of kosher meals; and (4) a qualified kosher supervisor
    must be available to verify that the meals are kosher.1
    Mr. Cottriel claims the district court had insufficient information to support a
    finding that the kosher meals were nutritionally adequate. The court relied on
    documents showing that the Kosher Master Menu exceeded ODOC’s nutritional
    guidelines, and thus complied with the permanent injunction’s mandate that the “diet
    1
    Mr. Cottriel pursues on appeal his claim that Shabbos and holiday meals did
    not include the required “wine (non-alcoholic or grape juice), two loaves of bread (or
    rolls or whole matzos), fish and meat,” Aplt. Opening Br. at 4, but he has not
    identified any authority requiring these components.
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    [provided to Cottriel] shall comply with all nutritional requirements and standards
    currently applicable to the diets served to all other inmates in . . . [ODOC] custody.”
    R. at 1418-19 (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Cottriel’s claim on appeal that
    the court was not informed of what he “was actually being served,” Aplt. Opening
    Br. at 6, without evidentiary or legal support, is inadequate appellate argument. See
    Simpson v. T.D. Williamson Inc., 
    414 F.3d 1203
    , 1206 n.4 (10th Cir. 2005) (rejecting
    general argument unsupported by legal authority and noting that an appellate
    argument is insufficient if the party fails to cite legal authority or present a developed
    argument). Similarly, the photograph of a meat slicer, without more, is not evidence
    of a violation of the permanent injunction.
    We turn to the question of supervision, which the district court and
    Mr. Cottriel acknowledged was the critical issue. Mr. Cottriel contends that the
    preparation of kosher meals requires supervision by “highly-competent skilled and
    learned Jews [who] have supervised the entire process: the source, preparation and
    service of the [meal or individual product”]. Aplt. Opening Br. at 7 (internal
    quotation marks omitted). He relies on the prison protocol approved by Chaplain
    Friedman for supervision of kosher-meal preparation at the prison.
    The district court also relied on the protocol approved by Chaplain Friedman,
    which states that “the procedures contained in the referenced protocol are acceptable
    for correctional food service operations” provided certain conditions are met,
    including as relevant here, “personnel involved in the handling and preparation [be]
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    provided with adequate training.” R. at 1234. Based on the affidavits of the prison
    food service managers, Hernandez and Weldon, the district court determined that
    inmate Gibson’s training was not deficient. And the district court pointed out that
    “[t]here is no requirement in the [permanent injunction] that [the Director] provide
    training to any individual, including [inmate] Gibson, by a rabbi or a practicing Jew,
    and the fact that Gibson was not trained by a rabbi or practicing Jew does not render
    his training inadequate or deficient.” Id. at 1421. Mr. Cottriel has not provided any
    basis for his challenge to the district court’s holding that the supervision of kosher
    meals complied with Chaplain Friedman’s approved protocol and the preliminary
    injunction. Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding
    that the Director was not in contempt.
    Mr. Cottriel argues that the Director’s failure to provide him an acceptable
    kosher diet was in bad faith. But bad faith is irrelevant to civil contempt. See
    McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 
    336 U.S. 187
    , 191 (1949) (“Since the purpose is
    remedial, it matters not with what intent the defendant did the prohibited act.”);
    cf. In re Kendall, 
    712 F.3d 814
    , 831 (3d Cir. 2013) (distinguishing criminal and civil
    contempt, stating good faith is not a defense to civil contempt); United States v.
    Puerto Rico, 
    642 F.3d 103
    , 108 n.8 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting that “good faith will not
    excuse civil contempt” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Chao v. Transocean
    Offshore, Inc., 
    276 F.3d 725
    , 728 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Good faith is not a defense to
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    civil contempt; the question is whether the alleged contemnor complied with the
    court’s order.”).
    Mr. Cottriel also argues that the steps the Director took to address and correct
    his complaints about the kosher meals did not absolve him of contempt. He
    maintains that because those steps were taken after he filed the contempt motion and
    after the district court ordered the Director to respond, the Director’s past failures
    require a finding that he was in contempt of the permanent injunction. As noted
    above, the purpose of a civil-contempt sanction is remedial and is intended to benefit
    the complainant. Kuykendall, 
    371 F.3d at 752
    . “In civil contempt, the contemnor is
    able to purge the contempt . . . by committing an affirmative act [to bring himself
    into compliance].” Lucre Mgmt. Group, LLC v. Schempp Real Estate, LLC (In re
    Lucre Mgmt. Group, LLC), 
    365 F.3d 874
    , 876 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation
    marks omitted). Therefore, under these circumstances, the fact that the Director
    addressed Mr. Cottriel’s complaints about the kosher meals after he filed his
    contempt motion does not dictate a finding of contempt.
    III.   Pending Motions
    Mr. Cottriel’s “Request to Take Judicial Notice” is denied. He asks this court
    to take judicial notice of an undated newspaper article, as well as prison grievances
    he filed in June, July, and August of 2014. These documents were not submitted to
    the district court, so we do not consider them. See Keith v. Koerner, 
    707 F.3d 1185
    ,
    1190 (10th Cir. 2013) (refusing to consider correspondence submitted with appellate
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    brief because it was “additional evidence not submitted to the district court”).
    Mr. Cottriel’s “Motion in Limine” asking this court to omit any reference to the
    nature of his underlying conviction or the length of his sentence is denied as moot.
    IV.    Conclusion
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the Director was
    not in contempt. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
    Entered for the Court
    Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
    Circuit Judge
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