Wilson v. Colvin , 596 F. App'x 638 ( 2014 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT December 19, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
SHANAN E. WILSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 14-5034
(D.C. No. 4:11-CV-00615-FHM)
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting (N.D. Okla.)
Commissioner, Social Security
Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HOLMES, BACHARACH, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
This appeal involves the denial of a motion for an award of
attorneys’ fees. The appeal grew out of our decision in Wilson v. Colvin,
541 F. App’x 869 (10th Cir. 2013), where we reversed a district court
judgment affirming the Commissioner’s denial of an application for
disability benefits. On remand, Ms. Wilson moved for attorney fees under
*
The Court grants the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent, except under
the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But the order
and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P.
32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The
district court denied the motion, holding that the Commissioner’s position
was substantially justified. Ms. Wilson appeals, and we affirm.
In the previous appeal, Ms. Wilson argued that the administrative law
judge had erred in analyzing evidence of an opinion by Dr. Denise
LaGrand, a consultative examiner. According to Ms. Wilson, the
administrative law judge failed to explain the decision to reject moderate
limitations assessed by Dr. LaGrand.
Using a mental RFC evaluation form, Dr. LaGrand found that Ms.
Wilson had
● mild restrictions in the ability to interact appropriately with the
public and with co-workers, and
● moderate restrictions in the ability to interact appropriately
with supervisors and respond appropriately to usual work
situations and to changes in a routine work setting.
See Aplt. App., vol. 3 at 484. The administrative law judge limited Ms.
Wilson to “simple, unskilled work” and restricted her contact with the
public, co-workers, and supervisors, but also stated that Ms. Wilson had
the ability to adapt to work situations. Id., vol. 2 at 15.
We held that the district court should have reversed because the
administrative law judge failed to explain why he had rejected some of the
doctor’s limitations, and adopted others. Based on that failure, we
reversed and remanded, with instructions to direct the agency to clarify
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whether it intended to reject Dr. LaGrand’s moderate restrictions on Ms.
Wilson’s ability to respond and adapt to work settings. Wilson, 541 F.
App’x at 874.
As the prevailing party, Ms. Wilson filed an EAJA motion, arguing
that the Commissioner lacked substantial justification to defend the
agency’s decision. Opposing the motion, the Commissioner contended that
her position was reasonable even though it ultimately did not convince our
court. Ms. Wilson responded that the Commissioner’s position was not
substantially justified because in Haga v. Astrue, 482 F.3d 1205, 1208
(10th Cir. 2007), we had already rejected her contention that a moderate
limitation was the same as no limitation based on the mental RFC form’s
definition of “moderate.”
The district court denied Ms. Wilson’s motion. It held that the
Commissioner had reasonably argued that the administrative law judge’s
assessment accounted for all of Dr. LaGrand’s limitations. With this
holding, the district court acknowledged that we had previously rejected in
Haga one of the Commissioner’s contentions. But, the district court
concluded that contention “was only one aspect of [the Commissioner’s]
argument, and certainly was not the main focus.” Aplt. App., vol. 1 at 194
n.2. The court gave three reasons for concluding that the Commissioner’s
position was substantially justified:
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1. The administrative law judge thoroughly summarized Dr.
LaGrand’s medical opinion.
2. The administrative law judge framed his hypothetical question
to the vocational expert as limiting Ms. Wilson’s ability to
adapt to work settings to the particular circumstances expressed
in the hypothetical (which included the limitations ultimately
stated in the RFC assessment).
3. The administrative law judge commented in the decision that
“the record does not contain any opinions from treating or
non-treating physicians indicating that claimant is disabled, or
has medical or functional limitations greater than those
determined in this decision.”
Id. at 195 (internal quotation marks omitted).
We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s determination
that the Commissioner’s position was substantially justified. Madron v.
Astrue, 646 F.3d 1255, 1257 (10th Cir. 2011). The court abuses its
discretion when it bases its ruling on an incorrect legal conclusion or relies
on factual findings that are clearly erroneous. Id. In applying this
standard, we can consider the government’s success in the district court.
Hadden v. Bowen, 851 F.2d 1266, 1267 (10th Cir. 1988).
The Commissioner has consistently argued that the administrative
law judge’s assessment of functional capacity encompassed all of Dr.
LaGrand’s limitations. But, the Commissioner has asserted different (and
arguably conflicting) grounds to support this claim. On the one hand, the
Commissioner contends that the moderate restrictions found by
Dr. LaGrand are equivalent to no restrictions in light of the definition of
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“moderate” in the mental RFC form that the doctor completed. That form
defined “moderate” as “more than a slight limitation in this area but the
individual is still able to function satisfactorily.” Aplt. App., vol. 3 at 483
(emphasis added). But, we rejected this contention in Haga, where we
stated that “a moderate impairment is not the same as no impairment at
all.” 482 F.3d at 1208.
But, the Commissioner also argues that the administrative law judge
intended to address all of Dr. LaGrand’s moderate restrictions. According
to the Commissioner, the administrative law judge concluded that Ms.
Wilson’s moderate difficulties in responding and adapting to work settings
are addressed by restricting the jobs to simple, unskilled work and by
limiting contacts with co-workers, supervisors, and the public. The
Commissioner asserts that this reading of the residual functional capacity
assessment is substantially justified based on the other findings and the
way that the administrative law judge framed the hypothetical to the
vocational expert.
The hypothetical question asked the vocational expert to assume an
individual with limitations involving unskilled work activities, limited
ability to relate to coworkers and supervisors, and inability to relate to the
general public. The question then directed the vocational expert to assume
the individual “could adapt to a work situation under those circumstances.”
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Aplt. App., vol. 2 at 95 (emphasis added). Thus, the hypothetical question
drew an explicit connection between the limitations stated and
Ms. Wilson’s ability to adapt to work situations. In these circumstances,
the Commissioner could reasonably argue that the administrative law judge
intended to draw the same connection in the residual functional capacity
assessment.
On appeal, Ms. Wilson argues that the Commissioner lacked
substantial justification after Haga to treat moderate limitations as the
equivalent of no limitation. But, the district court held that argument was
not the Commissioner’s main focus, and we cannot regard that
determination as irrational. See Madron, 646 F.3d at 1257. The district
court then considered the Commissioner’s alternative contention
supporting her position and found it reasonable. Ms. Wilson fails to show
that the district court abused its discretion in holding that argument was
substantially justified. Thus, we affirm the denial of Ms. Wilson’s motion
for fees under the EAJA.
Entered for the Court
Robert E. Bacharach
Circuit Judge
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