Jordan v. Pugh ( 2017 )


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  •                                                                                  FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    December 8, 2017
    TENTH CIRCUIT                     Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    MARK JORDAN,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.                                                           No. 17-1280
    (D. C. No. 1:02-CV-01239-MSK-KLM)
    MICHAEL V. PUGH; J. YORK; R. E.                               (D. Colo.)
    DERR; B. SELLERS; STANLEY
    ROWLETT,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    ------------------------------
    FRANCIS SCHAEFFER COX,
    Movant - Appellant.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
    Before BRISCOE, HARTZ, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this
    appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is, therefore,
    submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
    except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may
    be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
    Cir. R. 32.1.
    Francis Schaeffer Cox, a federal prisoner appearing pro se, appeals from the
    district court’s denial of his motion to intervene in a case previously filed by another
    inmate that is now closed. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we
    affirm.
    I
    In 2002, a federal inmate named Mark Jordan, who at the time was housed in the
    Administrative Maximum Unit in Florence, Colorado, filed a lawsuit challenging the
    constitutionality of a prison regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 540.20(b), that forbid inmates from
    “act[ing] as a reporter or publish[ing] under a byline.” The Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
    interpreted the regulation as “prohibit[ing] inmates from publishing under a byline online
    in the ‘news media,’” which the BOP defined “as newspapers, news magazines, national
    and international news services, and TV and radio news programs.” Jordan v. Pugh, 
    504 F. Supp. 2d 1109
    , 1112 (D. Colo. 2007). The case proceeded to a bench trial and the
    district court found in Jordan’s favor, concluding that the challenged regulation
    “violate[d] the First Amendment rights of Mr. Jordan, other inmates in federal
    institutions, and the press.” 
    Id. at 1126.
    As part of the relief granted, the district court
    enjoined the BOP “from punishing any inmate for violation of” the challenged regulation.
    
    Id. Judgment in
    the case was entered on August 9, 2007. There was no appeal from the
    judgment and the case was closed.
    On May 23, 2017, appellant Cox, a federal inmate incarcerated at the United States
    Penitentiary in Marion, Illinois, filed a motion to intervene, both as of right and
    2
    permissively. In his motion, Cox alleged that in late 2016, the BOP had disciplined him
    for violating the regulation that was declared unconstitutional in Jordan. Cox in turn
    alleged that he was seeking to enforce against the BOP the injunction that had been
    entered in Jordan. In support of his motion, Cox submitted copies of BOP documents
    indicating that a prison disciplinary hearing officer (DHO) sanctioned him with
    disallowance of good conduct time credits and the temporary loss of commissary, phone
    and email privileges for “hav[ing] committed the prohibited act of Use of the Telephone
    for Abuses Other Than Criminal Activity, Code 297.” ROA, Vol. 1 at 92. In support, the
    DHO found that on November 3, 2016, Cox placed a telephone call to a pastor who was
    in the midst of conducting a regularly scheduled live internet program and, in turn, spoke
    with the pastor as part of the program that was broadcast to the internet audience.
    On June 16, 2017, the district court summarily denied Cox’s motion, noting that
    there was “no currently-pending action in which [he] could intervene.” 
    Id. at 97.
    On July 18, 2017, Cox filed a motion for reconsideration of the district court’s
    ruling. On July 19, 2017, the district court denied his motion for reconsideration by a
    text-only docket entry that stated:
    Mr. Cox’s reliance upon Floyd v. Ortiz, 
    300 F.3d 1223
    (10th Cir. 2002), is
    misplaced for several reasons. Unlike in that case, the judgment entered
    here in favor of Mr. Jordan was not intended to be enforceable by inmates
    other than Mr. Jordan, nor did the Court retain jurisdiction over the matter
    in anticipation of further proceedings. To the extent Mr. Cox believes that
    his First Amendment rights are being infringed by the Federal Bureau of
    Prisons, he is free to commence his own lawsuit assering [sic] as much.
    Dist. Ct. Docket No. 415.
    3
    Cox filed a timely notice of appeal.
    II
    An order denying intervention is a final and appealable order if it prevents a
    putative party from participating in litigation. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. PJ
    Utah, LLC, 
    822 F.3d 536
    , 539 (10th Cir. 2016). We review de novo a district court’s
    denial of a motion to intervene as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a).
    
    Id. We review
    for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a motion to permissively
    intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b). 
    Id. Intervention is
    governed generally by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. As
    outlined in Rule 24, the right to intervene, either unconditionally or conditionally, can be
    afforded by a federal statute. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). No such right is at
    play in this case, however, and Cox does not assert otherwise. Rule 24 also requires a
    district court to permit intervention if the movant “claims an interest relating to the
    property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of
    the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its
    interest.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). Again, however, no such interest is at issue in this
    case.
    For Cox, who is neither a government officer or agency as required by Federal
    Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b)(2), that leaves only one other avenue for intervention: that
    he “has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or
    fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B). Although Cox’s motion alleged on its face that his
    4
    claim against BOP officials shared a common question of law with Jordan, i.e., the
    constitutionality of 28 C.F.R. § 540.20(b), the BOP documents he submitted in support of
    his motion belie that allegation. Those documents indicate that Cox was not punished for
    violating § 540.20(b), but rather for violating an entirely different disciplinary code
    provision. Thus, his claim against BOP officials does not, in fact, share with Jordan a
    common question of law or fact.
    Thus, in sum, we conclude that Cox failed to assert a valid basis for intervening in
    Jordan.
    AFFIRMED.
    Entered for the Court
    Mary Beck Briscoe
    Circuit Judge
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-1280

Judges: Briscoe, Hartz, Bacharach

Filed Date: 12/8/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024