Jones v. Archuleta , 691 F. App'x 902 ( 2017 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    April 19, 2017
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    BERNARD JONES,
    Petitioner - Appellant,
    v.                                                      No. 16-1398
    (D.C. No. 1:15-CV-01829-PAB)
    LOU ARCHULETA, Warden; THE                                (D. Colo.)
    ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
    STATE OF COLORADO,
    Respondents - Appellees.
    ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
    Before PHILLIPS, McKAY, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
    Petitioner Bernard Jones, a state prisoner represented by counsel, seeks a
    certificate of appealability to appeal the district court’s denial of his § 2254
    habeas application.
    Petitioner is serving a lengthy state prison sentence for conspiracy to
    possess cocaine as a habitual criminal. In his § 2254 petition, he raised five
    claims for relief: (1) his federal constitutional rights were violated when the
    *
    This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
    the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
    persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    conspiracy count was amended several years after the statute of limitations had
    run; (2) his conviction was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause because he was
    also fined under a controlled substance tax for possession of the drugs that were
    involved in his criminal conviction for conspiracy; (3) Petitioner received
    ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel inadvertently solicited
    incriminating hearsay regarding a confidential informant; (4) counsel was
    ineffective for failing to attack the validity of Petitioner’s earlier convictions that
    formed the basis for his sentencing as a habitual offender; and (5) Petitioner
    received ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to perform a
    reasonable investigation in preparation for trial. The district court denied relief
    as to all of these claims. Petitioner now seeks to appeal the district court’s ruling
    as to his first four claims for relief. He does not raise any arguments regarding
    the fifth claim raised in his habeas application, and we accordingly will not
    address this claim in determining whether Petitioner is entitled to a certificate of
    appealability.
    After thoroughly reviewing the record and Petitioner’s arguments on
    appeal, we conclude that reasonable jurists would not debate the district court’s
    denial of habeas relief. See Slack v. McDaniel, 
    529 U.S. 473
    , 484 (2000). First,
    the district court correctly concluded that Petitioner’s first claim was procedurally
    barred because Petitioner did not raise any federal constitutional claims relating
    to the amendment of the indictment in the state court proceedings. See Anderson
    -2-
    v. Harless, 
    459 U.S. 4
    , 6 (1982) (“[Section] 2254 requires a federal habeas
    petitioner to provide the state courts with a ‘fair opportunity’ to apply controlling
    legal principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional claim. It is not
    enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the
    state courts, or that a somewhat similar state-law claim was made.” (citations
    omitted)). Second, as the district court explained more comprehensively below,
    Petitioner has not shown the state court’s disposition of his double jeopardy
    argument was contrary to clearly established federal law. See Mansfield v.
    Champion, 
    992 F.2d 1098
    , 1100 (10th Cir. 1993) (“In a habeas corpus proceeding
    under section 2254, a federal court should defer to a state court’s interpretation of
    state law in determining whether an incident constitutes one or more than one
    offense for double jeopardy purposes.”). Third, the state court conducted a
    thorough postconviction review of Petitioner’s claim regarding trial counsel’s
    solicitation of evidence regarding the confidential informant and concluded the
    evidence did not prejudice Petitioner’s case, given the other evidence linking
    Petitioner to drug sales. We are not persuaded the state court determination was
    based on an unreasonable determination of the facts or an unreasonable
    application of clearly established federal law, and Petitioner accordingly has not
    demonstrated that he is entitled to habeas relief on this claim. See 28 U.S.C. §
    2254(d). Finally, the state court held multiple postconviction hearings at which it
    heard testimony from Petitioner, at least one attorney who represented Petitioner
    -3-
    in an earlier criminal case, and at least two eyewitnesses to the events that gave
    rise to Petitioner’s first criminal conviction. After hearing all of this testimony,
    the state court found as a factual matter that even if trial counsel in this case had
    challenged the validity of the earlier convictions, these convictions would have
    been affirmed. Again, Petitioner has not shown the state court’s holding was
    based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, nor has he otherwise
    demonstrated an entitlement to federal habeas relief.
    We therefore DENY Petitioner’s request for a certificate of appealability
    and DISMISS the appeal.
    ENTERED FOR THE COURT
    Monroe G. McKay
    Circuit Judge
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-1398

Citation Numbers: 691 F. App'x 902

Judges: Phillips, McKay, McHugh

Filed Date: 4/19/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024