McAllister v. Kellogg , 637 F. App'x 518 ( 2016 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
March 1, 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
SEAN McALLISTER,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 15-1175
v. (D.C. No. 1:13-CV-02896-
CMA-MJW)
DETECTIVE MICHAEL S. D. Colo.
KELLOGG, in his individual and
official capacities,
Defendant-Appellant
and
POLICE OFFICER MICHAEL
REIFSTECK, in his individual and
official capacities; POLICE OFFICER
ROBERT CASH, in his individual and
official capacities; and THE CITY
AND COUNTY OF DENVER, a
municipality,
Defendants.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, EBEL, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
Detective Michael Kellogg appeals the district court’s denial of his motion
to dismiss based on qualified immunity. The district court’s ruling is an
appealable final decision for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 535 (1985). We AFFIRM.
Sean McAllister was arrested for purportedly violating a protective order
after an unintentional encounter with his stepdaughter. He was released within
four to five hours of his arrest, and the charges were dismissed. McAllister filed
a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Kellogg, two other officers, and the City and
County of Denver for false arrest and failure to train or supervise. The
defendants moved to dismiss McAllister’s second amended complaint under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In a thorough written order, the district
court dismissed all of McAllister’s claims, except as to Kellogg. Kellogg now
appeals the district court’s denial of his qualified immunity defense.
We review a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo. Khalik v. United Air Lines,
671 F.3d 1188, 1190 (10th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). District courts may
grant a motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity, but “[a]sserting a
qualified immunity defense via a Rule 12(b)(6) motion . . . subjects the defendant
to a more challenging standard of review than would apply on summary
judgment.” Peterson v. Jensen, 371 F.3d 1199, 1201 (10th Cir. 2004). “[I]t is the
defendant’s conduct as alleged in the complaint that is scrutinized for ‘objective
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legal reasonableness.’” Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 309 (1996) (emphasis
in original).
After reviewing the briefs and the record, we adopt the reasoning set forth
in the district court’s order. The district court determined Kellogg was not
entitled to qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage because McAllister
adequately alleged Kellogg violated his clearly established constitutional rights
by omitting a “clearly critical” fact in his arrest warrant affidavit. Accepting
McAllister’s well-pleaded facts as true, Kellogg’s omission of a known fact that
would have vitiated probable cause—namely that McAllister’s stepdaughter was
not a party to the protective order at the time of the encounter—is adequate to
plead a constitutional violation. See Bruning v. Pixler, 949 F.2d 352, 357, n.4
(10th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). And the law was clearly established on this
point at the time of the alleged violation. See, e.g., Bruner v. Baker, 506 F.3d
1021, 1026 (10th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
Accordingly, we AFFIRM for substantially the same reasons set forth in the
district court’s order.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Chief Judge
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