United States v. Lee , 599 F. App'x 839 ( 2015 )


Menu:
  •                                                                                FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    April 8, 2015
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSElisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.                                                            No. 14-8055
    (D.C. Nos. 2:12-CV-00039-NDF and
    RANDY LEE,                                              1:09-CR-00232-ABJ-1)
    (D. Wyo.)
    Defendant - Appellant.
    ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
    Before HARTZ, McKAY, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
    Appellant seeks a certificate of appealability to appeal the district court’s denial of
    his 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     habeas petition.
    Following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted in federal court on several charges
    arising out of his participation in a scheme to roll back odometers on vehicles sold
    through his family’s used car dealership. We affirmed his convictions and sentence on
    direct appeal. United States v. Lee, 401 F. App’x 336 (10th Cir. 2010). Appellant then
    filed the instant § 2255 petition, in which he mainly raised claims of ineffective assistance
    *
    This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case,
    res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
    consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    of trial counsel. The district court concluded that he was not entitled to relief on any of
    his claims and denied his habeas petition.
    Appellant seeks a certificate of appealabilty to appeal the dismissal of two of his
    ineffective assistance claims: (1) that trial counsel should have raised claims of
    vindictive and/or selective prosecution; and (2) that trial counsel should have inquired
    further or requested a juror replacement when one of the jurors informed the court mid-
    trial that he had worked with the government’s handwriting expert at some point and had
    known him for years.
    We conclude that reasonable jurists would not debate the district court’s denial of
    either these claims. For substantially the same reasons given by the district court, we are
    convinced Appellant has not alleged facts which would give rise to a viable claim of
    vindictive or selective prosecution, much less shown that counsel was ineffective for
    failing to raise such a claim.
    As for Appellant’s habeas claim relating to the possible juror bias issue, we have
    reviewed not only the habeas appendix Appellant submitted on appeal but also the
    pertinent trial transcripts from Appellant’s underlying criminal case.1 Based on this
    review, we first note the record does not support Appellant’s allegation that the juror was
    dishonest during voir dire. Rather, the record indicates that the juror did not realize he
    1
    “[F]ederal courts, in appropriate circumstances, may take notice of proceedings
    in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings
    have a direct relation to matters at issue.” St. Louis Baptist Temple v. FDIC, 
    605 F.2d 1169
    , 1172 (10th Cir. 1979).
    -2-
    knew the expert, whose full name was not provided at voir dire, until the expert began to
    testify. Our review also persuades us that Appellant has not met his burden of showing
    that trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective representation by failing to request
    a replacement or inquire further regarding the juror’s acquaintance with the expert. At
    trial, counsel’s defense strategy was not to controvert the expert’s testimony that
    Appellant had signed various title documents, but rather to argue that Appellant had
    signed these documents without realizing or knowing the odometer readings on the
    documents were incorrect.2 In light of the uncontroversial nature of the expert’s
    testimony, we are not persuaded the juror’s acquaintance with this witness gave rise to
    such an implication of prejudicial bias that counsel was constitutionally ineffective for
    failing to inquire further or request replacement of the juror. See Hughes v. United States,
    
    258 F.3d 453
    , 458 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
    is grounded in the claim that counsel failed to strike a biased juror. To maintain a claim
    that a biased juror prejudiced him, however, Petitioner must show that the juror was
    actually biased against him.” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)); see also
    United States v. Brooks, 
    569 F.3d 1284
    , 1289 (10th Cir. 2009) (describing the very
    limited circumstances in which we will find actual or implied juror bias, none of which
    appear in this case).
    2
    A different handwriting expert testified for the defense that Appellant’s signature
    had been forged on certain other documents. However, the defense expert did not review
    or dispute the government expert’s conclusions regarding the documents he testified had
    been signed by Appellant.
    -3-
    Finally, because Appellant has not “articulated facts which, if proven, would
    entitle him to relief,” United States v. Weeks, 
    653 F.3d 1188
    , 1200 (10th Cir. 2011), we
    reject Appellant’s argument that the district court erred in denying his habeas petition
    without holding an evidentiary hearing.
    We therefore DENY Appellant’s request for a certificate of appealability and
    DISMISS the appeal.
    ENTERED FOR THE COURT
    Monroe G. McKay
    Circuit Judge
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-8055

Citation Numbers: 599 F. App'x 839

Judges: Hartz, McKay, Matheson

Filed Date: 4/8/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024