Vigil v. Social Security Administration , 623 F. App'x 936 ( 2015 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT August 18, 2015
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
ANITA LOUISE VIGIL,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 15-2007
(D.C. No. 1:13-CV-00905-GBW)
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting (D. N.M.)
Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,
Defendant - Appellee.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before KELLY, BALDOCK, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Anita Louise Vigil appeals the district court’s order denying her motion to
remand to the Commissioner to reconsider the denial of her application for disability
benefits. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and
we affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
I.
In Ms. Vigil’s application for disability insurance benefits, she alleged her
disability commenced December 26, 2008, when she was 45 years old. The agency
denied her application initially and on reconsideration. Following a de novo hearing,
an administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded Ms. Vigil was not disabled.
In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ conducted a five-step sequential
evaluation process. See Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007). At step
one, the ALJ noted Ms. Vigil had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the
alleged onset date of her disability. At step two, the ALJ found Ms. Vigil had the
following severe impairments: “superior and posterior labral tears, and supraspinatus
tendinopathy of the right shoulder, myofascial cervicalgia, asthma, diabetes, and
migraine headaches.” Admin. R. at 14. At step three, the ALJ found Ms. Vigil did
not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled a listed
impairment.
The ALJ then assessed Ms. Vigil’s residual functional capacity (RFC),
concluding that she could perform light work, with some additional limitations. At
step four, the ALJ determined Ms. Vigil could not perform her past relevant work as
a retail supervisor, but the ALJ found at step five that Ms. Vigil was capable of
performing other available work.
The Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ’s decision that Ms. Vigil was
not disabled. On review, the district court upheld the ALJ’s decision, denied
2
Ms. Vigil’s motion to remand, and dismissed the case with prejudice. This appeal
followed.
II.
“We review the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether the factual
findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the correct
legal standards were applied.” Doyal v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 758, 760 (10th Cir.
2003). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It requires more than a scintilla, but less
than a preponderance.” Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Ms. Vigil argues that “[t]he ALJ failed to adequately consider the effects of
[her] severe migraines when formulating the RFC finding at step four.” Aplt. Br. at 9.
“[She] contends that the ALJ’s omission of headache-related limitations in the RFC
is not supported by substantial evidence.” Id.In evaluating the impact of subjective symptoms such as pain or fatigue on a
claimant’s RFC, the ALJ engages in a two-part process. SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL
374186, at *2 (July 2, 1996). First, the ALJ must determine whether “there are
medical signs and laboratory findings demonstrating the existence of a medically
determinable . . . impairment[] that could reasonably be expected to produce the
symptoms.” Id. at *1. Once the ALJ has determined the existence of a medically
determinable impairment, she then evaluates the claimant’s credibility concerning
3
“the intensity, persistence, and functionally limiting effects of the symptoms . . . .”
Id.The ALJ found that Ms. Vigil’s medical impairments “could reasonably be
expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, [Ms. Vigil’s] statements
concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not
credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the [RFC finding].” Admin. R. at 18.
The ALJ assessed Ms. Vigil with an RFC for light work with some additional
functional and environmental limitations, but did not include any limitations related
to her headaches. The ALJ acknowledged that Ms. Vigil experiences “some levels of
pain,” Admin. R. at 21, but ultimately determined that this impacted her ability to
work only to the extent described in the RFC assessment.
Ms. Vigil asserts that the ALJ improperly discredited her testimony as to the
disabling or limiting effects of her headaches “solely based on a lack of clinical or
diagnostic findings.” Aplt. Br. at 12. The ALJ did note the lack of objective
evidence to support headaches to the degree or frequency alleged by Ms. Vigil, but
the ALJ also gave other reasons for her adverse credibility determination that
Ms. Vigil does not mention in her brief.
In explaining why she found Ms. Vigil not fully credible, the ALJ noted that
Ms. Vigil “continued working for years after her initial injury and left her job
because the store closed rather than because of her disability.” Admin. R. at 21.
Although there is some disagreement among her physicians, Ms. Vigil and at least
one of her doctors believes that her headaches and migraines may be associated with
4
a shoulder injury she suffered in May 1995. The record reflects that she complained
of a severe headache as far back as March 2006, and she repeatedly complained of
headaches and migraines throughout 2008. By Ms. Vigil’s own account, she
frequently suffered from headache pain before she stopped working, yet she
continued to work. She testified that she only stopped working because her store
closed and she lost her job. The ALJ properly concluded that these circumstances
cast doubt on Ms. Vigil’s credibility. See Cowan v. Astrue, 552 F.3d 1182, 1191
(10th Cir. 2008) (noting that a claimant’s ability to work in the past despite his
impairments suggests his conditions would not currently prevent him from working
and casts doubt on his credibility).
The ALJ also noted that Ms. Vigil “collected unemployment benefits and was
searching for work, while at the same time maintaining that she is unable to work.”
Admin. R. at 21. Ms. Vigil alleged in her disability application that she became
disabled as of December 26, 2008—when her store closed and she was laid off from
her job. She testified, however, that she was looking for jobs while she was receiving
unemployment benefits, but she was unable to find a job. She estimated that she
drew unemployment benefits for two years. Yet during this timeframe in 2009 and
2010, Ms. Vigil continued to complain that she was suffering from painful headaches
and migraines. The fact that Ms. Vigil actively sought employment while
maintaining she suffered from disabling pain is a legitimate ground for the ALJ to
discount her credibility. Cf. Newbold v. Colvin, 718 F.3d 1257, 1267 (10th Cir.
5
2013) (observing that claimant’s interest in returning to work during the period when
she was allegedly disabled supported ALJ’s adverse credibility finding).
Finally, the ALJ noted that Ms. Vigil made inconsistent statements about the
side effects of her medication. She testified at the hearing “that she takes numerous
prescription medications for neck and shoulder pains, migraine headaches, as well as
to help her sleep.” Admin. R. at 19. Although the medications provide some relief,
she said they “make her tired and dizzy ‘loopy’ like, making it difficult to
concentrate.” Id. But as the ALJ correctly noted, the record reflects she told her
doctors that she did not have any side effects from her medications, see, e.g., id.
at 660, 662. “One strong indication of the credibility of an individual’s statements is
their consistency, both internally and with other information in the case record.”
SSR 96-7p, at *5. The ALJ properly relied on Ms. Vigil’s inconsistent statements
about the side effects of her medication when making her adverse credibility
determination.
“Credibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact,
and we will not upset such determinations when supported by substantial evidence.”
Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1173 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The ALJ based her credibility determination on appropriate considerations
that are supported with substantial evidence in the record. Accordingly, the ALJ did
not err in assessing Ms. Vigil’s RFC.
6
We affirm the district court’s order denying the motion to remand and
dismissing the case.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
7