Hill v. Chater ( 1997 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
OCT 6 1997
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
EDWARD L. HILL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 97-5006
(D.C. No. 94-CV-1017-K)
JOHN J. CALLAHAN, Acting (N.D. Okla.)
Commissioner, Social Security
Administration, *
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT **
Before BRORBY, LOGAN, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
*
Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secretary of Health and
Human Services in social security cases were transferred to the Commissioner of
Social Security. P.L. No. 103-296. Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c), John J.
Callahan, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, is substituted for Donna E.
Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, as the defendant in this action.
**
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff appeals the district court order affirming the denial of plaintiff’s
application for social security disability benefits. In what became the final
decision of the Commissioner, the administrative law judge (ALJ) found that
plaintiff’s gouty arthritis in his left foot and ankle and his hypertension
constituted severe impairments that prevented plaintiff from performing his past
relevant work, which was heavy to light and required prolonged standing or
walking. The ALJ further found, however, that plaintiff could perform a full
range of sedentary work despite his severe impairments. The ALJ then applied
the vocational-medical guidelines at step five of the sequential analysis, see
40 C.F.R. § 404.1520, and determined that plaintiff was not disabled. We affirm.
Plaintiff raises only one issue on appeal: whether the ALJ properly
evaluated his allegations of pain. We review the Commissioner’s decision to
determine whether the correct legal standards were applied and whether the
findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record viewed as a whole.
See Castellano v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th
Cir. 1994). “If supported by substantial evidence, the [Commissioner’s] findings
are conclusive and must be affirmed.” Sisco v. United States Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 10 F.3d 739, 741 (10th Cir. 1993). Substantial evidence is “such
-2-
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quotation
omitted). “In evaluating the appeal, we neither reweigh the evidence nor
substitute our judgment for that of the agency.” Casias v. Secretary of Health &
Human Servs., 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir. 1991).
In evaluating the effect of plaintiff’s alleged pain on his ability to work, the
ALJ first considered whether plaintiff’s pain was, in and of itself, disabling. The
ALJ followed the analytical framework we set forth in Luna v. Bowen, 834 F.2d
161, 163-66 (10th Cir. 1987), which first requires the ALJ to determine whether
objective medical evidence establishes that the claimant has an impairment
capable of producing pain Id. at 163. If the claimant has such an impairment, the
ALJ must then determine whether the claimant has established at least a loose
nexus between that impairment and the kind of pain alleged. Id. Finally, the ALJ
must consider all the evidence, both objective and subjective, to decide whether
he believes the claimant’s allegations of disabling pain. Id.At the final step of the analysis, the ALJ should consider a variety of
factors, including a claimant’s “regular use of crutches or a cane,” id. at 165-66,
“the possibility that psychological disorders combine with physical problems,” id.
at 166, and “the claimant’s daily activities,” id. Here, the ALJ specifically
mentioned these three factors in his assessment of plaintiff’s allegations of
-3-
disabling pain, as well as the fact that plaintiff’s impairment had not, to date,
required surgical treatment. Based on the evidence as a whole, the ALJ
concluded that while plaintiff experienced some pain, his pain was not disabling.
The ALJ then considered whether plaintiff’s nondisabling pain constituted
a nonexertional impairment that otherwise limited his ability to work. The ALJ
concluded that plaintiff’s pain prevented him from performing light to heavy
physical demands, but that it did not limit his ability to perform a full range of
sedentary work.
Plaintiff’s arguments notwithstanding, our review shows that the ALJ
applied the correct legal standards in assessing plaintiff’s allegations of pain, and
the record fully supports both the ALJ’s determination that plaintiff’s pain is not
disabling and his determination that plaintiff’s pain does not limit his ability to
perform a full range of sedentary work. Therefore, the ALJ, and ultimately the
Commissioner, properly determined that plaintiff was not disabled and denied his
application for disability benefits.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
-4-