Smilde v. Herman ( 1999 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DEC 21 1999
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
PETER V. SMILDE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 99-1217
(D.C. No. 99-Z-245)
ALEXIS M. HERMAN, Secretary, (D. Colo.)
U.S. Department of Labor; USA;
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL , LUCERO , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Peter V. Smilde appeals the district court’s sua sponte dismissal
of his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(h)(3). This court, exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
vacates the district court’s order and judgment of dismissal and remands with
instructions.
BACKGROUND
In his complaint, Smilde alleges he is a Colorado resident and was
employed as a paralegal by the Private Industry Council (PIC), an Oregon
nonprofit agency, under the Older American Community Service Employment
Program (OACSEP). OACSEP provides federal funds for the creation and
subsidization of part-time, community service jobs for low-income Americans
over age fifty-four. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3056-56i. It is administered by the United
States Department of Labor (DOL) through contracts with nonprofit
organizations. Before making a payment toward the cost of an OACSEP program,
the Secretary of Labor is required to “assure” that employed persons
shall be paid wages which shall not be lower than whichever is the
highest of (i) the minimum wage which would be applicable to the
employee under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 . . ., (ii) the
State or local minimum wage for the most nearly comparable covered
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employment, or (iii) the prevailing rates of pay for individuals
employed in similar public occupations by the same employer.
42 U.S.C. § 3056(b)(1)(J).
Proceeding pro se, Smilde filed suit claiming that PIC’s pay scale did not
comply with § 3056(b)(1)(J), in that he was paid a minimum wage of $4.75
an hour but others performing the same work were paid $14.96 an hour. Alleging
that he had exhausted his administrative remedies, he sought an order compelling
the Secretary of the DOL to enforce Smilde’s interpretation of
§ 3056(B)(1)(J)(iii) by requiring PIC to pay him $9,686.00 in back pay. Smilde
claimed that the district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (the
Mandamus and Venue Act), and § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction).
The district court, on its own motion and before issuing a summons to
defendants, reviewed its subject matter jurisdiction. It concluded that its
jurisdiction could arise only under § 1361, determined that mandamus was not
appropriate, and entered an order dismissing the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(h)(3). 1
1
Previously, the district court ordered a review of the complaint pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) to determine if the complaint was frivolous or
malicious, failed to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or sought
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. The court,
however, did not base its dismissal on that provision.
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I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Applying “liberal rules of pleading, particularly where a party proceeds
pro se,” this court reviews de novo a dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, accepting as true the complaint’s uncontroverted factual allegations.
See Sac & Fox Nation of Okla. v. Cuomo , Nos. 97-6317, 98-6212, 1999 WL
811669, *2, *4 (10th Cir. Oct. 12, 1999) (discussing dismissal under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(1)). It is a federal court’s duty to review pleadings for jurisdictional
defects. See Maier v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency , 114 F.3d 1032,
1036 (10th Cir. 1997). In weighing the advisability of a sua sponte dismissal
based on a complaint alone, however, the court must keep in mind that a plaintiff
with an arguable claim is ordinarily accorded notice of a pending dismissal to
alert him to the legal theory underlying [a] challenge, and enable him
meaningfully to respond by opposing the motion to dismiss on legal
grounds . . . so as to conform with the requirements of a valid legal
cause of action. This adversarial process also crystallizes the
pertinent issues and facilitates appellate review of a trial court
dismissal by creating a more complete record of the case.
Neitzke v. Williams , 490 U.S. 319, 329-30 (1989) (citations omitted) (comparing
a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), the precursor to § 1915(e)(2), with one
under Rule 12(b)(6)). “[S]ua sponte dismissals without prior notice or
opportunity to be heard are hazardous. . . . [U]nless the defect is clearly incurable
a district court should grant the plaintiff leave to amend, allow the parties to
argue the jurisdictional issue, or provide the plaintiff with the opportunity to
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discover the facts necessary to establish jurisdiction.” Joyce v. Joyce , 975 F.2d
379, 386 (7th Cir. 1992) (quotations and citations omitted).
This court has previously held that a sua sponte dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6) is only proper when “it is patently obvious that the plaintiff could not
prevail on the facts alleged, and allowing him an opportunity to amend his
complaint would be futile.” Hall v. Belmon , 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.
1991) (quotation omitted). It has also permitted dismissal of a pro se claim “if
the plaintiff cannot make a rational argument on the law and facts in support of
[his] claim.” Whitney v. New Mexico , 113 F.3d 1170, 1172-73 (10th Cir. 1997)
(quotations omitted). The same principles apply to a sua sponte dismissal for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.
II. DISCUSSION
In the instant case, the sufficiency of the jurisdictional allegations must be
examined in light of the relief sought: an order requiring the Secretary to perform
what Smilde asserts is a statutorily-required duty. This type of relief is
authorized by the Mandamus Act and Venue Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, and also the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06. See Hernandez-Avalos
v. INS , 50 F.3d 842, 844 (10th Cir. 1995). These “two statutes are . . . merely
different means of compelling an agency to take action which by law it is required
to take.” Id. at 844 (quotation omitted). “‘A mandatory injunction issued under
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the APA is essentially in the nature of mandamus. Thus, jurisdiction for its
issuance can be based on either § 1361 [mandamus jurisdiction] or § 1331
[federal question jurisdiction] or both.’” Id. at 845 (quoting Carpet, Linoleum &
Resilient Tile Layers, Local Union No. 419 v. Brown , 656 F.2d 564, 566
(10th Cir. 1981)).
“The APA provides that any person suffering legal wrong because of
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof . . . . As the
Supreme Court has recognized, the APA establishes a strong presumption in favor
of reviewability of agency action .” McAlpine v. United States , 112 F.3d 1429,
1432 (10th Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted).
In contrast, mandamus is a drastic remedy which will issue only in
exceptional circumstances. See Pindus v. Fleming Companies , 146 F.3d 1224,
1226 (10th Cir. 1998). Because of its unique nature, we have evaluated a district
court’s jurisdiction over a mandamus request in an anomalous manner. “‘[T]he
test for jurisdiction [under § 1361] is whether mandamus would be an appropriate
means of relief.’” Marquez-Ramos v. Reno , 69 F.3d 477, 479 n.3 (10th Cir.
1995) (quoting Carpet, Linoleum & Resilient Tile Layers , 656 F.2d at 567)
(further quotation omitted). As a result, a failure to demonstrate entitlement to
relief may preclude jurisdiction.
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Generally, the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction does not depend on
whether there is a “possibility that averments might fail to state a cause of action
on which petitioners could actually recover.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Env’t , 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (quotation omitted).
Rather, the District Court has jurisdiction if the right of petitioners to
recover under their complaint will be sustained if the Constitution
and laws of the United States are given one construction and will be
defeated if they are given another, unless the claim clearly appears to
be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining
jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly insubstantial and
frivolous. Dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because
of the inadequacy of the federal claim is proper only when the claim
is so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of [the
Supreme Court] or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to
involve a federal controversy.
Id. (quotations and citations omitted). The conversion of what is usually a merits
issue into a jurisdictional one may be avoided by looking to the APA first, and
resorting to mandamus jurisdiction under § 1361 only if necessary. 2
2
Because the issue is not properly framed on appeal, we make no
determination whether the holding of Steel Co. , 523 U.S. at 89, affects
established case law on the jurisdictional character of the mandamus elements.
We note, however, that the resolution of this issue may have no practical effect
on the treatment of requests for relief from agency action. This court has
previously stated that a district court should “avoid tackling the merits under the
ruse of assessing jurisdiction . . . . If dereliction in discharging a mandatory duty
is alleged and if that allegation is not patently frivolous, both mandamus and
injunctive relief are available, and we must remand for a trial on the merits.”
Carpet, Linoleum & Resilient Tile Layers , 656 F.2d at 567 (quotation omitted).
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Moreover, § 1361 is “intended to provide a remedy for a plaintiff only if he
has exhausted all other avenues of relief. . . .” Heckler v. Ringer , 466 U.S. 602,
616 (1984). Because “[t]he availability of a remedy under the APA technically
precludes [an] alternative request for a writ of mandamus,” Mt. Emmons Mining
Co. v. Babbitt , 117 F.3d 1167, 1170 (10th Cir. 1997), suggests an initial
examination under the provisions of the APA. This procedure follows the general
practice of this court. See id. ; Western Shoshone Bus. Council ex rel.
W. Shoshone Tribe of Duck Valley Reservation v. Babbitt , 1 F.3d 1052, 1059
(10th Cir. 1993); see also R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Babbitt , 113 F.3d 1061, 1065
(9th Cir. 1997) (“[W]e [have] recognized that mandamus relief and relief under
the APA are ‘in essence’ the same; . . . as a result we [have] elected to analyze
the claim under the APA where there is an adequate remedy under the APA.”).
A. Relief under the APA
Here, the district court analyzed Smilde’s request for relief from agency
action in reverse order. It viewed and disposed of the matter as solely a
mandamus action, without specifically mentioning the APA. In discussing the
mandamus request, however, the district court determined that Smilde should
have first sought review of the agency’s action in a court of appeals. See R.,
doc. 7, at 4-5. This conclusion is the equivalent of a ruling that, in the district
court, Smilde has no entitlement to relief under the APA.
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The district court analyzed the OACSEP statutory framework and reached
its conclusion in a nonadversarial context. It began with a recognition that
OACSEP does not set out a specific judicial review process. The court noted,
however, that 42 U.S.C. § 3056a(B)(1) requires the Secretary to coordinate
programs under OACSEP with programs under the Job Training Partnership Act
(JTPA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1792b, and concluded that persons aggrieved by
OACSEP working conditions should follow procedures under the JTPA. See
R., doc. 7, at 4-5. Under the JTPA, judicial review is “in the United States Court
of Appeals having jurisdiction over the applicant or recipient of funds.”
29 U.S.C. § 1578(a)(1).
We note, however, that the reference to coordination is in an OACSEP
section titled “Administration of community service projects,” requiring
coordination with the JTPA, as well as other programs, “to increase the likelihood
that eligible individuals for whom employment opportunities under this
subchapter are available and who need services under such subchapters receive
such services.” 42 U.S.C. § 3056a(b)(i). On its face, the primary concern of this
provision appears to be a fair distribution of grants, not the procedural
requirements for program enrollees.
It is not patently obvious that Smilde failed to allege the jurisdictional facts
supporting his request for district court review of DOL’s action. When the
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controlling statute is silent or ambiguous on the proper court for judicial review
of an agency action, a ruling on the issue implicates a complex area of the law.
As the Eighth Circuit has noted, a determination of “whether initial review [of an
agency action] should proceed in the court of appeals or the district court . . . is
often complicated by confused case law standards or poorly drafted and
ambiguous statutory language.” Jaunich v. United States Commodity Futures
Trading Comm’n , 50 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995); see also National Parks &
Conservation Ass’n v. FAA , 998 F.2d 1523, 1526-29 (10th Cir. 1993) (dealing
with the intricacies of jurisdiction over review of agency action). At the outset
of litigation, Smilde’s claim is not so deficient that it is now subject to dismissal
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
B. Mandamus relief
If his claim for relief under the APA ultimately fails for any reason, Smilde
must then proceed to demonstrate entitlement to mandamus relief by showing: (1)
a clear right to the relief sought, (2) a plainly-defined and peremptory duty on the
part of the defendant, and (3) no other adequate remedy. See Johnson v. Rogers ,
917 F.2d 1283, 1285 (10th Cir. 1990). Smilde’s complaint alleges that he had
exhausted his administrative remedies, that the Secretary owes a statutory duty to
him, and that the duty is mandatory. Liberally construed, these allegations are
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sufficient to allow the adversary process to begin. Therefore, the district court’s
sua sponte dismissal for lack of mandamus jurisdiction was improper.
CONCLUSION
We render no opinion on the merits of Smilde’s claims, but harbor some
doubt that the district court lacked jurisdiction. As a consequence, the judgment
of the district court dismissing Smilde’s complaint for lack of subject matter is
VACATED and the matter is REMANDED to the district court with instructions
to issue service of process and require defendants to answer or otherwise respond
to the complaint. Smilde’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal is
granted.
Entered for the Court
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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