Anderson v. Intermountain Power ( 1999 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
OCT 14 1999
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
EVAN B. ANDERSON; MERRILY
ANDERSON, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
No. 98-4175
v. (D. Ct. No. 96-CV-167-B)
(D. Utah)
INTERMOUNTAIN POWER
SERVICE CORPORATION,
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , HOLLOWAY , and BALDOCK , Circuit Judges.
Appellants, Evan and Merrily Anderson, filed suit against appellee,
Intermountain Power Service Corporation (IPSC), claiming violations of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, the Utah Antidiscrimination Act, and the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). On September 21,
1998, the district court granted appellee’s motion for summary judgment on all
claims and denied appellants’ cross motion for summary judgment. The
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Andersons appeal the district court’s denial of their ERISA claim. We affirm.
IPSC, a Utah nonprofit corporation, employed Evan Anderson from 1984
until 1989, when Mr. Anderson became totally disabled and left his job. At the
time IPSC hired Mr. Anderson, IPSC provided its employees with a benefits
package that included medical insurance. In its employee handbook, IPSC
reserved the right to amend or terminate its benefit plans at any time.
Shortly after Mr. Anderson became disabled, he began to receive disability
benefits under IPSC’s Long Term Disability Plan. In February of 1990, IPSC
notified Mr. Anderson that he was required to pay regular premiums if he wanted
to keep his health insurance in effect and that his insurance would be canceled if
payments were not made. Mr. Anderson failed to make timely premium payments
in May, October and November of 1990 and again in February and March of
1991. In May and November of 1990 and March of 1991, IPSC notified Mr.
Anderson by letter that his premiums were delinquent and his health insurance
would be canceled if he failed to make the necessary payments. Moreover, in
June and November of 1990 and in June of 1992, IPSC informed Mr. Anderson
that his premium payments were due by the first of each month.
On March 29, 1991, IPSC learned that Mr. Anderson had accepted a lump-
sum disability settlement. Accordingly, in a letter dated April 5, 1991, IPSC
terminated Mr. Anderson’s employment. In the same letter, IPSC noted that Mr.
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Anderson had not made his overdue premium payments and canceled his medical
coverage effective March 1, 1991. Shortly thereafter, IPSC agreed to reinstate
Mr. Anderson’s health insurance and continue his coverage.
In July of 1991, IPSC amended and restated its medical and dental benefits
plan. Under the heading “Collection of Plan Participant Contributions,” the new
plan included the following language:
The disabled employee shall submit the appropriate monthly
contribution on a monthly basis to the Company. Payments
shall be made in advance at the beginning of the month for
which coverage applies; however, there is a thirty (30) day
grace period. If full payment is not received by the end of
the grace period, participation in this Plan shall end
retroactively as of the last day of the month for which the last
payment was timely made.
IPSC Medical and Dental Benefits Plan Wraparound Document § 4.06(b), at 10
(July 1, 1991) (hereinafter “Wraparound Document”). Mr. S. Gale Chapman, the
President and Chief Operations Officer (COO) of IPSC, executed the Wraparound
Document on IPSC’s behalf.
Mr. Anderson failed to make his January 1995 premium payment until
February 8, 1995, several days after the grace period had expired. As a result,
IPSC canceled the Andersons’ health insurance effective January 1, 1995.
Appellants first argue that IPSC did not follow corporate procedures when
it amended the benefits plan in 1991. Specifically, appellants claim that IPSC’s
Board of Directors never approved the new benefit plan and Mr. Chapman did not
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have the authority to amend the benefits package on his own. Second, appellants
argue that IPSC breached its fiduciary duty to them when it narrowly interpreted
§ 4.06(b) of the Wraparound Document to require premium payment by the first
of each month. In addition, appellants claim that interpretation of the language in
§ 4.06(b) is a question of fact to be determined by a jury. Third, appellants argue
that IPSC breached its fiduciary duty to them because it canceled their insurance
after permitting them to make partial payments as far in advance as they wished.
Fourth, appellants argue that their breach of IPSC’s benefits plan was not
material. Fifth, appellants argue that IPSC could not cancel their insurance
because it had promised Mr. Anderson that he could never lose his benefits.
Sixth, appellants argue that IPSC discriminated against them in violation of both
the benefits plan and ERISA. Finally, appellants argue that IPSC waived any
requirement for timely monthly payments.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Kaul v. Stephan , 83 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 1996).
Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. When applying this standard, we examine the factual
record and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light
most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.
If there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute,
then we next determine if the substantive law was correctly
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applied by the district court.
Id. (quoting Wolf v. Prudential Ins. Co. , 50 F.3d 793, 796 (10th Cir. 1995)
(further citations omitted)). We find that there are no material facts in dispute
and conclude that the district court correctly applied the substantive law.
I. Did IPSC Properly Amend Its Benefits Plan?
Appellants insist that IPSC violated corporate procedures when Mr.
Chapman amended its benefits plan in 1991 because Mr. Chapman did not have
the authority to amend the plan and IPSC’s Board of Directors never approved the
amendments. To determine whether appellants’ claim is accurate, we must
engage in “a fact-intensive inquiry, under applicable corporate law principles,
into what persons or committees within [IPSC] possessed plan amendment
authority, either by express delegation or impliedly, and whether those persons or
committees actually approved the new plan provision . . . .” Curtiss-Wright Corp.
v. Schoonejongen , 514 U.S. 73, 85 (1995).
Because IPSC is a nonprofit corporation, Curtiss-Wright directs us to look
to Utah nonprofit corporation law. Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-40 permits a nonprofit
corporation to delegate management of its affairs to its officers and agents
through its articles of incorporation or bylaws. Accordingly, IPSC’s bylaws
authorize IPSC’s officers to “manage the activities of [IPSC] and its employees
within the guidelines provided by the Board [of Directors].” IPSC Bylaws art. II,
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§ 2.1.1 (May 11, 1989). Furthermore, the bylaws state that IPSC’s officers
include “a President and Chief Operations Officer.” Id. art. 5, § 5.1.
Pursuant to Utah law and through its bylaws, IPSC had authorized Mr.
Chapman, president and COO of IPSC, to manage IPSC’s activities and its
employees. Therefore, we hold that Mr. Chapman possessed the authority under
Utah law to amend IPSC’s medical and dental benefits plan. IPSC properly
amended its benefits plan, and IPSC is entitled to summary judgment on this
issue.
II. Did IPSC Breach Its Fiduciary Duty to the Andersons?
Appellants claim that IPSC breached its fiduciary duty to them because (1)
it interpreted the language in § 4.06(b) of the Wraparound Document to require
premium payments by the first of the month and (2) it canceled their insurance
after accepting partial payments in advance. Specifically, appellants insist that
§ 4.06(b) merely requires payment by the tenth day of each month and that partial
payment of a premium entitles the payee to a prorated amount of insurance which,
in turn, extends the grace period.
Section 4.06(b) states, “Payments shall be made in advance at the beginning
of the month for which coverage applies; however, there is a thirty day grace
period. If full payment is not received by the end of the grace period,
participation in this Plan shall end . . . .” Using our common sense, we read
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§ 4.06(b) to mean that payments were due on the first day of each month. In
addition, IPSC informed Mr. Anderson on multiple occasions that his premium
payments were due on the first of each month. Therefore, appellants’ strained
interpretation of § 4.06 is without merit. Moreover, § 4.06(b) makes it clear that
premiums must be paid-in-full each month. There is no provision in the plan for
beneficiaries to receive prorated insurance in return for partial payments. Thus,
IPSC is entitled to summary judgment on appellants’ breach of fiduciary duty
claims.
III. Was the Andersons’ Breach of IPSC’s Benefits Plan Material?
Appellants argue that their breach of IPSC’s benefits plan was not material
because they made a partial premium payment before the grace period expired and
their failure to pay the entire premium did not impact the financial well-being of
IPSC. As discussed above, the plan documents do not provide for partial
payments. Therefore, any such payments are irrelevant to the question of whether
the Andersons’ breach was material, and IPSC is entitled to summary judgment on
this issue.
IV. Did IPSC Promise Mr. Anderson He Could Never Lose His Benefits?
Appellants claim that through oral promises and written documents, IPSC
promised Mr. Anderson he could never lose his benefits. “ERISA requires all
modifications to an employee benefit plan to be written and to conform to the
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formal amendment procedures.” Miller v. Coastal Corp. , 978 F.2d 622, 624 (10th
Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, an employer’s “promise to
provide vested benefits ‘must be incorporated, in some fashion, into the formal
written ERISA plan.’” Chiles v. Ceridian Corp. , 95 F.3d 1505, 1511 (10th Cir.
1996) (quoting Jensen v SIPCO , 38 F.3d 945, 949 (8th Cir. 1994)). In addition,
an employer’s intent to vest benefits “‘must be stated in clear and express
language.’” Id. at 1513 (quoting Wise v. El Paso Natural Gas Co. , 986 F.2d 929,
937 (5th Cir. 1993)). In the instant case, there are no plan documents which state
in any way that IPSC intended to vest Mr. Anderson’s benefits. Accordingly,
IPSC is entitled to summary judgment on this issue.
V. Did IPSC Discriminate Against the Andersons?
Appellants argue that IPSC discriminated against them under both IPSC’s
benefits plan and ERISA. They claim IPSC consciously and systematically
amended the plan in a concerted effort to strip them of their insurance. However,
“ERISA does not create any substantive entitlement to employer-provided health
benefits . . . . Employers . . . are generally free under ERISA, for any reason at
any time, to adopt, modify, or terminate welfare plans.” Curtiss Wright , 514 U.S.
at 78. Therefore, appellants’ complaint that IPSC “amended its plan to deprive
[them] of health benefits is not . . . cognizable . . . under ERISA,” id. , and IPSC
is entitled to summary judgment on appellants’ discrimination claim
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VI. Did IPSC Waive Its Right to Require Timely Premium Payments?
Finally, appellants argue that IPSC waived any requirement for timely
premium payments because it accepted partial payments and previously had
accepted late payments. As discussed above, “ERISA requires all modifications
to an employee benefit plan to be written and to conform to the formal
amendment procedures.” Miller , 978 F.2d at 624. In the instant case, the plan
documents provided for monthly premium payments and cancellation of coverage
for failure to pay. There is no evidence which suggests that IPSC ever modified
its benefits plan through formal amendment procedures to provide for partial or
late payments. In addition, as IPSC points out, appellants have failed to establish
the elements of waiver. See K&T, Inc. v. Koroulis , 888 P.2d 623, 628 (Utah
1995). Thus, IPSC is entitled to summary judgment on appellants’ waiver claim.
AFFIRMED .
ENTERED FOR THE COURT,
Deanell Reece Tacha
Circuit Judge
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