United States v. Mancillas , 132 F. App'x 780 ( 2005 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS June 3, 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 04-3087
v. (D.C. No. 02-CR-10140-20-MLB)
(Kansas)
VICTOR MANCILLAS,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, HARTZ, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
Victor Mancillas was charged with one count of conspiracy to distribute
500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of
cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, one count of distribution of
approximately 218 grams of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
*
After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R.
34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and
judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata, or collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of
orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the
terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and eight counts of using a communication facility
to facilitate the distribution of a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
843(b). After a jury trial, Mr. Mancillas was found guilty on all counts and
sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of ten years incarceration pursuant to 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Mr. Mancillas’ counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and moved for leave to withdraw as counsel.
For the reasons set out below, we deny counsel’s motion to withdraw and remand
the case to the district court.
Anders holds that if counsel finds a case to be wholly frivolous after
conscientious examination, he may so advise the court and request permission to
withdraw. Id. at 744. Counsel must also submit to both the court and his client a
brief referring to anything in the record arguably supportive of the appeal. Id.The client may then raise any point he chooses, and the court thereafter
undertakes a complete examination of all proceedings and decides whether the
appeal is in fact frivolous. Id. If it so finds, it may grant counsel’s request to
withdraw and dismiss the appeal. Id. Pursuant to Anders, counsel provided Mr.
Mancillas with a copy of his appellate brief. Mr. Mancillas was given an
opportunity to respond, which he did by filing a pro se reply brief raising several
issues.
Mr. Mancillas first contends the government failed to present sufficient
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evidence to sustain his conviction. This court reviews de novo a sufficiency of
the evidence challenge. United States v. Hanzlicek, 187 F.3d 1228, 1239 (10th
Cir. 1999). In advancing such a challenge, Mr. Mancillas is “faced with a high
hurdle.” United States v. Voss, 82 F.3d 1521, 1524 (10th Cir. 1996). This court
must examine the evidence adduced at trial in the light most favorable to the
government, determining only whether any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Hanzlicek, 187
F.3d at 1239. We must consider both direct and circumstantial evidence, as well
as any reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence. United States v.
Davis, 1 F.3d 1014, 1017 (10th Cir. 1993). Furthermore, in resolving such a
challenge, we do not weigh conflicting evidence or consider the credibility of
witnesses. United States v. Pappert, 112 F.3d 1073, 1077 (10th Cir. 1997). It is
the jury’s prerogative as fact finder to resolve conflicting testimony, weigh the
evidence, and draw inferences from the facts presented. United States v. Nieto,
60 F.3d 1464, 1469 (10th Cir. 1995). A review of the trial record under these
standards convinces us the evidence was more than sufficient for a reasonable
juror to find Mr. Mancillas guilty on all charges. 1
1
At sentencing, Mr. Mancillas complained that his apartment had been
illegally searched by the police. Rec. vol. V, at 7. The exclusionary rule bars the
admission of physical evidence and live testimony obtained directly or indirectly
through the exploitation of unconstitutional police conduct. Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 485-88 (1963); United States v. Lin Lyn Trading, Ltd., 149
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Mr. Mancillas also contends the admission of telephone transcripts into
evidence constitutes error because the transcripts were not accurately transcribed
from Spanish to English. Mr. Mancillas did not move for the suppression of the
recordings or transcripts prior to trial, nor did he object to their admission into
evidence at trial. Generally, the failure to object to the admissibility of evidence
constitutes a waiver of the issue absent plain error. United States v. Jones, 44
F.3d 860, 875 (10th Cir. 1995). Before an appellate court can correct an error not
raised at trial, there must be (1) “error,” (2) that is “plain,” and (3) that “affect[s]
substantial rights.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). If all three
conditions are met, we may then exercise our discretion to notice a forfeited error,
but only if (4) “the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quotation omitted).
“The admission of transcripts to assist the trier of fact lies within the
discretion of the trial court.” United States v. Gomez, 67 F.3d 1515, 1526 (10th
Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Mayes, 917 F.2d 457, 462 (10th Cir. 1990)).
F.3d 1112, 1116 (10th Cir. 1998). However, when questioned by the district
court, Mr. Mancillas admitted that no evidence was obtained during the search of
his apartment that was used against him during the proceedings. Rec. vol. V, at 7.
Therefore, even if Mr. Mancillas prevailed in his argument that officers
conducted an illegal search of his apartment, the district court had no evidence
before it that could be suppressed. United States v. Walker, 931 F.2d 631, 633
(10th Cir. 1991).
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Mr. Mancillas’ counsel neither moved to suppress the transcripts nor objected at
trial when the government attorney introduced them. The district court had no
way of knowing that Mr. Mancillas took issue with admission of the transcripts,
and nothing in the record suggests the district court abused its discretion in
admitting them. Accordingly, Mr. Mancillas has failed to satisfy the first prong
of the plain error analysis and our inquiry ends. Olano, 507 U.S. 725.
Mr. Mancillas next complains that he was denied his Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel because, among other things, his counsel
failed to raise a Fourth Amendment claim on his behalf. This court has repeatedly
stated that ineffective assistance claims should be brought in collateral
proceedings, not on direct appeal. United States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1240
(10th Cir. 1995). “Such claims brought on direct appeal are presumptively
dismissible, and virtually all will be dismissed.” Id.; see also United States v.
Coleman, 9 F.3d 1480, 1487 (10th Cir. 1993). Mr. Mancillas has failed to show
his claim qualifies as one of those “rare instances” in which we should hear an
ineffective counsel challenge on direct review. Galloway, 56 F.3d at 1240.
Mr. Mancillas also argues that his sentence was imposed in violation of his
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, citing Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct.
2531 (2004), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The Supreme
Court recently held the federal sentencing guidelines were incompatible with the
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Sixth Amendment requirement that a jury find certain sentencing facts, thus
requiring severance of the guidelines’ mandatory provisions. United States v.
Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 764 (2005). We need not reach any issues connected to
Blakely or Booker, however, because, whether or not the district court committed
a Sixth Amendment sentencing error, the court’s erroneous imposition of a ten
year statutory minimum requires a remand for re-sentencing. United States v.
Cano-Silva, 402 F.3d 1031, 1039 (10th Cir. 2005).
According to the presentence report (PSR), Mr. Mancillas’ total offense
level was 30 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(3) because of the amount of
controlled substances involved in his offenses. See PSR at 12. Based on an
offense level of 30 and a criminal history category of I, Mr. Mancillas’ guidelines
range was 97 to 121 months. See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A. The PSR advised the
district court, however, that 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) required that Mr.
Mancillas receive a ten year minimum penalty. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(c)(2)
(stating that a “sentence may be imposed at any point within the applicable
guideline range, provided that the sentence . . . is not less than any statutorily
required minimum sentence”). Following the recommendation of the PSR, the
court sentenced Mr. Mancillas to the statutory mandatory minimum term of ten
years.
Section 841(b)(1)(A) makes clear that a mandatory minimum ten year term
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of imprisonment must be imposed when a defendant is convicted of, inter alia,
either distribution of or conspiracy to distribute “500 grams or more of a mixture
or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine” or distribution
of or conspiracy to distribute “5 kilograms or more of a mixture or substance
containing a detectable amount of . . . cocaine.” 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)(ii),
(viii). As stated above, Mr. Mancillas was indicted on one count of distribution
of approximately 218 grams of methamphetamine and one count of conspiracy to
distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing a detectable
amount of cocaine. Neither the amount of methamphetamine nor the amount of
cocaine alleged in Mr. Mancillas’ indictment was sufficient to trigger the ten-year
mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Therefore,
as the government concedes, the district court plainly erred by sentencing the
defendant to a statutory minimum ten year sentence.
For the aforementioned reasons, we DENY counsel’s request to withdraw
and REMAND this case to the district court for resentencing. The resentencing
proceeding must be conducted in light of Booker. Appellee’s motion to
supplement the record is denied as moot.
SUBMITTED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour
Circuit Judge
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