United States v. Carter ( 1997 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
OCT 7 1997
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 96-3354
(D.C. No. 95-CR-10095-ALL)
JAMES CARTER, (D. Kan.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, MCKAY, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Defendant James Carter entered a conditional plea of guilty to being an
accessory after the fact to his son Tony Carter’s offense of failure to appear at
trial. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3, 3146(a). We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
Tony Carter’s trial on various drug charges began on August 29, 1995.
He appeared during the first two days of trial, and also on the morning of
August 31, 1995. However, after the noon recess on the afternoon of August 31,
he did not return to the courtroom. Federal marshalls determined that both
defendant and Tony Carter were missing. Defendant was apprehended by the
marshalls; he admitted that he knew his son was on trial and that he had assisted
in his absence from court by driving him to Greenville, Texas on the afternoon of
August 31. Defendant was charged with being an accessory after the fact. The
district court denied his motion to dismiss the indictment. He entered into a
conditional plea of guilty, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to
dismiss the indictment. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2).
Defendant’s conditional guilty plea does not specify the issue which he has
reserved for appellate consideration. At the change of plea hearing, defendant
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admitted the facts detailed by the prosecution, with one caveat. 1 His attorney then
described the reserved issue as follows:
[W]hether or not my client aided and assisted in a crime or an
offense against the United States, that being a failure to appear or
whether or not any of the assistance that my client gave to his son
was simply a violation of a bond condition which we submit would
not be an offense against the United States but just a violation of the
conditions of release.
Supp. R. Vol. I, doc. 36, at 9.
In his opening brief in this court, defendant claimed that the indictment was
defective because it did not detail whether the underlying offense was his son’s
failure to appear at trial, or his original drug crime. The government responded
by arguing that the indictment, viewed as a whole, was sufficient. In his reply
brief, defendant explained that he does not challenge the language of the
indictment. See Appellant’s Reply Br. at 4. If defendant challenges neither the
language of the indictment, nor the facts underlying his guilty plea, he has no
basis on which to bring this appeal.
Moreover, even assuming defendant has not conceded his entire appeal, his
arguments on the merits cannot succeed. Defendant’s argument that his son’s
1
Defendant’s counsel stated that there was a factual issue concerning
whether the judge ordered all parties to be back for the afternoon session on
August 31. We address the merits of this factual dispute infra at page four.
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“failure to appear” was merely a bond violation, not a crime, is frivolous. See
18 U.S.C. § 3146(a) (describing offense of “failure to appear”). Although the
district court’s order setting conditions of release stated that if defendant’s son
did not appear he might be prosecuted for failure to appear, rather than he would
be prosecuted, this is irrelevant to the issue of whether failure to appear was a
crime. In light of the promise to appear contained in the order setting conditions
for release, defendant’s arguments that his son could “voluntarily” absent himself
from trial, and that his son was not specifically ordered to appear on the afternoon
of August 31, also lack merit. Finally, defendant’s argument that failure to
appear is a continuing criminal offense, to which one cannot be an accessory after
the fact, was not raised in the district court, and we decline to consider it here.
See Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1228 (10th Cir. 1996).
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas
is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
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