Wood v. Harrington ( 1998 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JAN 6 1998
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
SHERRY ANN WOOD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 96-6337
(D.C. No. CIV-92-243-L)
RUBYE L. HARRINGTON; LILLIE (W.D. Okla.)
MAE SMALLWOOD, individually
and in her representative capacity;
EFFECTIVE SECRETARIAL
SERVICES, INC., an Oklahoma
corporation; EFFECTIVE SUPPORT
SERVICES, INC., dba Effective
Secretarial Support Services, Inc.; dba
ESS, Inc.,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before PORFILIO and LUCERO, Circuit Judges, and MARTEN, ** District Judge.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
The Honorable J. Thomas Marten, District Judge, United States District
Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
This is the second appeal in plaintiff’s suit arising out of her retaliatory
discharge from employment with Effective Secretarial Services, Inc. and Effective
Support Services, Inc. Defendant Rubye L. Harrington is the only defendant to
respond on this appeal.
The past procedural history is set out in the first appeal and will only be
summarized here. See Wood v. Harrington, No. 95-6192, 1996 WL 196598,
at **1 (10th Cir. Apr. 24, 1996) (order and judgment). Plaintiff asserted several
claims against defendants, including claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, and the Service Contract Act of
1965, 41 U.S.C. §§ 351-58, in conjunction with the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19. Her claims were tried twice. The first jury found
in her favor, awarding her reinstatement to her job with defendants and
$42,894.00 for wages lost up to that point and emotional distress. A judgment to
that effect was filed on April 20, 1993. Defendants moved for and were granted a
new trial. The first trial judge then recused, and the case was reassigned.
Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the grant of a new trial, which was denied
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by the new trial judge. By this time, defendants Smallwood and Effective
Secretarial Services, Inc. were in bankruptcy, and Effective Support Services,
Inc., allowed a default judgment to be entered against it. Plaintiff’s claims were
therefore retried solely against Ms. Harrington. 1 The second jury also found in
plaintiff’s favor. Ms. Harrington moved for and was granted judgment as a matter
of law. Accordingly, a judgment in favor of plaintiff against Effective Support
Services, Inc. alone was entered on April 5, 1995. Plaintiff then appealed, raising
points of error related to both trials.
In that first appeal, we ordered the judgment from the second trial to be
vacated because defendants’ motion for a new trial had been granted on an
impermissible ground, and ordered the judgment from the first trial to be
reinstated. See Wood, 1996 WL 196598, at **2-**3 (citing MacCuish v. United
States, 844 F.2d 733, 735-36 (10th Cir. 1988)). We held that plaintiff’s claims of
error related to the second trial were moot.
On remand, the district court reinstated the April 20, 1993 judgment, and
then considered plaintiff’s motions for equitable relief in the form of additional
back pay, liquidated damages, and an interim award of attorney’s fees. In its
subsequent judgment, the court denied plaintiff additional back pay because it
1
The order and judgment in the first appeal erroneously stated that
plaintiff’s claims were retried against both Ms. Harrington and Effective Support
Services, Inc. See Wood, 1996 WL 196598, at **1.
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found no legal basis to support such an award, but awarded plaintiff “$42,894.00
as liquidated damages and $24,638.50 as attorney’s fees, with interest thereon at
the rate allowed by law from this date until paid.” Appellant’s App. at 42.
Plaintiff now appeals from the district court’s judgment awarding
liquidated damages and attorney’s fees. She claims the district court erred: (1) in
denying her additional back pay; (2) in denying her attorney’s fees for the second
trial and first appeal; and (3) in reducing the hours and hourly rates requested by
her attorney and his legal assistant.
Plaintiff sought equitable relief in the form of additional back pay because
she has never been reinstated to her job with defendants, as directed by the
reinstated April 20, 1993 judgment. In cases of retaliation by an employer against
an employee, such equitable relief is permitted by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b),
which was cited in plaintiff’s district court brief. The district court therefore
erred in stating that “plaintiff has presented no authority that would permit or
require such an award.” Appellant’s App. at 40 (District Court’s Aug. 26, 1996
order, at 2). Moreover, despite the district court’s discretion in fashioning an
award of back pay, to award nothing at all is inappropriate in these circumstances.
District courts have “‘the historic power of equity to provide complete relief in
light of the [FLSA’s] purposes.’” Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. v. Lennen,
732 F.2d 1495, 1507 (10th Cir. 1984) (quoting Mitchell v. Robert DeMario
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Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960)). Plaintiff substantially prevailed in both
trials and on the first appeal. The second trial was granted and allowed to
proceed in contravention of controlling authority, which was cited to the court in
plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. The delay in reinstatement caused by the
second trial and first appeal was not plaintiff’s fault, and she should not be
penalized for it.
We review an award of attorney’s fees for abuse of discretion. See
Bankston v. Illinois, 60 F.3d 1249, 1255 (7th Cir. 1995) (FLSA case). The
district court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff attorney’s fees for the
second trial. The FLSA allows attorney’s fees “in addition to any judgment
awarded.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Plaintiff has a judgment in this action. Vacating
the second judgment did not change that, as the first judgment, also in plaintiff’s
favor, was reinstated. We therefore will remand for a determination of fees for
the second trial.
We affirm the district court’s decision not to award appeal-related fees,
however, because the district court had no jurisdiction to award them. See Hoyt
v. Robson Cos., Inc., 11 F.3d 983, 985 (10th Cir. 1993); International Ass’n of
Fire Fighters, Local 2203 v. West Adams County Fire Protection Dist., 877 F.2d
814, 821 (10th Cir. 1989) (FLSA case).
Finally, plaintiff argues, somewhat redundantly, that the district court erred
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in reducing the hours and hourly rates requested by her attorney and his legal
assistant. The district court’s determinations of the reasonable number of hours
to be compensated and the reasonable hourly rates to be used are reviewed for
abuse of discretion. See Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1505, 1510 (10th Cir.
1995). The district court reduced the hours and hourly rates requested by
plaintiff’s attorney and his legal assistant because: (1) it lacked jurisdiction to
award appeal-related fees, so hours spent on the first appeal were subtracted;
(2) this court’s previous order and judgment rendered the second trial a nullity, so
hours spent on the second trial were subtracted; and (3) the rates requested
exceeded those the district court found reasonable in a companion case. See
Appellant’s App. at 40-41 (District Court’s Aug. 26, 1996 order, at 2-3.) As
discussed above, hours for the first appeal were appropriately subtracted, but the
vacation of the second judgment is not a valid reason to deny plaintiff fees for
time spent to prosecute the second trial. Plaintiff has not shown that the district
court abused its discretion in reducing the hourly rates claimed by her attorney
and his legal assistant. We affirm the district court’s determination of the rates to
be awarded, but will remand for recalculation of the hours to be compensated.
We note that Ms. Harrington argues that because she was not named in
plaintiff’s EEOC charge, the district court lacked jurisdiction to try plaintiff’ Title
VII claims against her, and this court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal. See
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Romero v. Union Pac. R.R., 615 F.2d 1303, 1311-12 (10th Cir. 1980) (explaining
four-part test used to determine whether party not named in EEOC charge may be
sued under Title VII). We find it unnecessary to decide this issue. First, the
judgment for liability is outside the scope of this appeal. Next, liquidated
damages were awarded to plaintiff under the FLSA; therefore, Ms. Harrington’s
Title VII jurisdictional argument cannot affect this award. See Appellant’s App.
at 40 (District Court’s Aug. 26, 1996 order, at 2 (citing FLSA cases to support
liquidated damages award)). Furthermore, as we have discussed above, the other
relief plaintiff seeks from Ms. Harrington is available under the FLSA.
Ms. Harrington does not challenge this court’s jurisdiction under the FLSA. As a
result, her challenge to this court’s jurisdiction under Title VII is unavailing even
if it is correct.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part, and the case is
REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this order and judgment.
Entered for the Court
J. Thomas Marten
District Judge
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