United States v. Millet ( 2000 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
NOV 1 2000
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
vs. No. 99-4115
(D.C. No. 99-CR-22-C)
JASON MILLET, (D. Utah)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, KELLY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. **
Mr. Jason Millet appeals from the sentencing court’s imposition of an
upward departure of five offense levels for extreme psychological injury under
U.S.S.G. § 5K2.3 and extreme conduct under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.8. Mr. Millet was
charged by indictment with witness tampering under 18 U.S.C. §§
2, 1512(a)(1)(C), see I R. (99-4105), doc. 1, and pled guilty to an information
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1 (G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
charging the offense under, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b). The information omitted the
original allegations of intent to commit murder contained in the indictment.
At sentencing, the court determined that Mr. Millet’s offense level was 25
under U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2 (aggravated assault guideline) with a criminal history
category of I, leading to a possible sentencing range of 57-71 months. V R. (Sent.
Tr.) at 16-17. In deciding to depart upward, the court then determined that the
underlying criminal conduct was analogous to assault with intent to commit
murder and attempted murder (U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1) and determined that a departure
to an offense level of 30, criminal history category I was appropriate. Id. at 28-
29. The court began with the base offense level of 28 from U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1,
added 8 levels (resulting in 36) because the victim sustained permanent or life-
threatening injury and because the offense involved the receipt of something of
pecuniary value. Id. ; § 2A2.1(b). The court then deducted 5 levels (resulting in
31) for acceptance of responsibility, U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, 1
and determined that
departure to an offense level of 30 would be appropriate because “this is not
murder.” V R. (Sent. Tr.) at 29. This resulted in a guideline range of 97-121
months, and the court sentenced Mr. Millet to the statutory maximum of 120
months imprisonment, 36 months of supervised release and $89,106 in restitution.
1
The deduction should have been 3 levels, resulting in an offense level of
33, but it does not make a difference here.
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On appeal, Mr. Millet argues that the upward departure (1) is unwarranted
because the facts taken into consideration by the district court are covered in the
Guidelines, (2) is unwarranted because hidden facts were taken into consideration
in crafting the plea bargain and could not be taken into account by the district
court, (3) violates separation of powers under the U.S. Constitution, (4) is against
public policy, and (5) is fundamentally unfair. Our jurisdiction arises under 18
U.S.C. § 3742(a) and we affirm.
Background
Jason Millet was hired by a third party to intimidate and prevent a
confidential informant, Linda Gren Hadden, from cooperating with an ongoing
narcotics investigation. Around midnight, on July 12, 1998, Jason and his
brother, Shawn, wearing overalls and masks, rode bicycles to Ms. Hadden’s
apartment. After arriving at the apartment, Jason saw Ms. Hadden through a
window and fired between five and seven shots into the apartment at close range.
The two brothers then fled the scene to an adjacent location. They were
apprehended soon after. Shawn Millet pled guilty to misprision of a felony, and
was sentenced to 36 months imprisonment based on an upward departure, 12
months supervised release, and $89,106 in restitution. His sentence was affirmed
on appeal. See United States v. Shawn Millet , No. 99-4105, 2000 WL 797334-3-
(10th Cir. Apr. 27, 2000).
Ms. Hadden was hit five times: in the face, throat, shoulder, hip, and left
arm. She required extensive surgery and was hospitalized for six weeks following
the surgery. The following paragraphs from the presentence report describe the
resulting impact:
15. As a result of damage to her face, the victim lost
most of her tongue and now speaks with an impediment.
Her mandible was completely destroyed, and she has
very little chin. . . . Because of scarring around her
lips, she has difficulty eating and drinking without
drooling. All of her lower teeth were blown out, and all
but three were replaced during surgery. In summary, the
victim was severely damaged by these injuries and
reported that she does not want to be seen in public. . . .
16. Ms. Hadden is living with acquaintances who are
helping her. She reported taking five types of
medication in order to sleep and help control the
constant pain. She indicated having severe nightmares
since the attack occurred.
17. Emotionally, this experience has been devastating.
Ms. Hadden indicated that some children screamed when
they saw her in the hospital following surgery. She
suffered severe psychological distress, including deep
depression, and has contemplated suicide. . . .
PSR (VII R.) at 5.
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Discussion
We review the district court’s decision for upward departure from the
Sentencing Guidelines under a unitary abuse of discretion standard. See Koon v.
United States , 518 U.S. 81, 98-99 (1996); see also United States v. Collins , 122
F.3d 1297, 1302 (10th Cir. 1997). In doing so, we evaluate four components: (1)
whether the departure is based upon a permissible departure factor; (2) whether
the departure factors relied on by the district court remove the defendant from the
heartland of the Guidelines; (3) whether the departure is sufficiently supported by
the facts in the record; and (4) whether the degree of departure is reasonable. See
United States v. Bartsma , 198 F.3d 1191, 1195 (10th Cir. 1999).
A. Mr. Millet’s Contentions
Mr. Millet first argues that upward departure is not appropriate for factors
already taken into account in the Guidelines. He suggests the psychological
injuries of Ms. Hadden fall under the specific offense characteristics for “serious
bodily injury” contained in the guideline applicable to the offense of conviction,
aggravated assault. See U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2(b)(3)(B) (calling for a four-level
increase for “serious bodily injury”). While “serious bodily injury” may mean
“injury involving . . . the protracted impairment of a function of a . . . mental
faculty,” U.S.S.G. §1B1.1, comment. (n.(1)(j)), it does not “mean that in an
aggravated assault context, § 2A2.2(b) takes into account all of the extraordinary
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psychological injuries covered by § 5K2.3.” United States v. Jacobs , 167 F.3d
792, 801 (3rd Cir. 1999) (footnote omitted). Moreover, the facts of this case go
well beyond the protracted impairment of a mental faculty addressed by the
Guidelines, taking this case out of the heartland.
Mr. Millet also contends that a departure that results in the statutory
maximum (120 months) deprives him of credit for cooperating with the
prosecutor, relying upon United States v. Morberg , 863 F. Supp. 511, 522 (W.D.
Mich. 1994). Morberg involved the grant of a U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 substantial
assistance motion, something not involved in this case. Mr. Millet was informed
during the plea colloquy that his sentence could be 10 years and that the judge
could depart, II R. (Plea Tr.) at 12, 14-15. There was no promise of credit for
cooperation with the prosecutor.
Mr. Millet next contends that an upward departure is unwarranted because
hidden facts, known only to the prosecutor in making the charging decision, were
not taken into account by the district judge. Among these facts, the PSR indicates
that the victim was involved in a relationship with a drug dealer and Mr. Millet
and his brother Shawn were not charged with attempted murder. Building on this
argument, he contends that a departure violates separation of powers and is
fundamentally unfair because the judiciary is nullifying an executive decision,
ignoring the deal crafted by the prosecutor and departing upward. He also
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contends that the departure is similar to an ex post facto law.
We reject all of these challenges. First, federal sentencing has always
been a shared venture between the three branches of government. See Mistretta v.
United States , 488 U.S. 361, 364 (1989). Second, Congress has authorized
judicial departure from the Guidelines when “there exists an aggravating or
mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines . . . .”
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). Third, acceptance of a plea agreement involving the
dismissal of indictment in favor of a less serious charge than contained in the
indictment requires an independent determination by the district court “that the
remaining charges adequately reflect the seriousness of the actual offense
behavior and that accepting the agreement will not undermine the statutory
purposes of sentencing or the sentencing guidelines.” U.S.S.G. § 6B1.2(a); see
also Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(1)(A), (e)(2). Finally, as the PSR makes clear, Mr.
Millet’s guilty plea significantly reduced his exposure from 20 years
imprisonment, see 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(2)(B), to 10.
B. Departure Framework Applied
Applying the proper test to the departure, we have no hesitation in
affirming the sentence. First, U.S.S.G. §§ 5K2.3 and 5K2.8 are permissible
grounds of departure. Second, the departure factors relied upon by the district
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court remove the defendant from the heartland of the Guidelines–the district court
found that the offense guideline simply did not take into account the permanent
psychological injuries resulting from the horrific physical injuries inflicted upon
the victim. See V R. (Sent. Tr.) at 18. It further found that the repeated firing at
the victim is extreme conduct, beyond the characteristics inherently associated
with the applicable guideline, even with a firearm. Id. at 22. These findings are
deserving of substantial deference, see Collins , 122 F.3d at 1303, and correct.
Moving on to the third part of the analysis, the record is replete with
evidence of the extreme nature of Ms. Hadden’s psychological injuries and that
the trauma inflicted is greater than normal. See United States v. Okane, 52 F.3d
828, 835-36 (10th Cir. 1995). Section 5K2.3 lays out the appropriate standard in
this regard.
[P]sychological injury would be sufficiently severe to
warrant application of this adjustment only when there is
a substantial impairment of the intellectual,
psychological, emotional, or behavioral functioning of a
victim, when the impairment is likely to be of an
extended or continuous duration, and when the
impairment manifests itself by physical or psychological
symptoms or by changes in behavior patterns.
In addition to the evidence related in the PSR, the court also noted the extreme
psychological impact on Ms. Hadden from losing her job, losing her home
because of her inability to make payments on it, her inability to appear or eat in
public because of her appearance, and other impacts of the serious wounds she
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received. See V R. (Sent. Tr) at 18-22.
The record also can support extreme conduct. Section 5K2.8 lays out the
appropriate standard in this regard.
If the defendant’s conduct was unusually heinous, cruel,
brutal, or degrading to the victim, the court may increase
the sentence above the guideline range to reflect the
nature of the conduct. Examples of extreme conduct
include torture of a victim, gratuitous infliction of
injury, or prolonging pain or humiliation.
The PSR indicates that Mr. Millet heard the victim’s voice and saw her, firing two
shots at her head and several more at her chest. The district court determined that
the conduct was cruel and brutal beyond the ordinary offense, and implied that
gratuitous infliction of injury may have been involved. See United States v.
Checora, 175 F.3d 782, 793 (10th Cir. 1999). The district court did not abuse its
discretion in relying upon § 5K2.8.
Finally, the district court’s degree of departure was reasonable given our
deferential review. See United States v. Whiteskunk, 162 F.3d 1244, 1253 (10th
Cir. 1998). A district court must “specifically articulate reasons for the degree of
departure using any reasonable methodology hitched to the Sentencing
Guidelines, including extrapolation from or analogy to the Guidelines.” Bartsma,
198 F.3d at 1196 (citation and internal quotations omitted). Here, the court
specifically analogized to another, more appropriate guideline as discussed above.
AFFIRMED. Defendant’s motion to file a reply brief out of time is
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DENIED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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