United States v. Ruhl ( 2015 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT May 8, 2015
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Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v. No. 14-5023
(D.C. No. 4:12-CR-00063-CVE-1)
BRIAN EDWARD RUHL, (N.D. Okla.)
Defendant – Appellant.
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
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Before MATHESON, McKAY, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
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After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
submitted without oral argument.
Appellant Bryan Edward Ruhl pled guilty to child pornography charges
pursuant to a written plea agreement with prosecutors in July 2012. In February
2014, while serving his sentence, Mr. Ruhl filed a motion for correction of clerical
mistakes under Fed. R. Crim. P. 36 to strike three of the “Special Sex Offender
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Conditions” contained in his plea agreement. The district court denied the motion
and Mr. Ruhl brought this appeal.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 36 provides an avenue for courts to correct clerical mistakes
in judgments. However, Mr. Ruhl does not specify any clerical error in his judgment.
Mr. Ruhl takes issue with the three contested conditions and how they were presented
to him, but he does not tie his opposition to these conditions to a specific clerical
error or omission which a Rule 36 motion would allow a court to correct.
Instead, Mr. Ruhl contests whether he was adequately informed of the terms of
his sentence prior to it being imposed and whether he had the mental capacity to
comprehend and accept the sentence without objection. These challenges raise
constitutional concerns, not concerns about clerical errors, and should have been
brought either through a direct appeal within fourteen days of the district court’s
entry of judgment, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A), or through a 28 U.S.C. § 2255
motion, which allows collateral attacks upon the legality of a prisoner’s sentence by a
prisoner currently in custody within one year of the entry of a final judgment. The
time limit for these challenges has now passed, and Mr. Ruhl cannot circumvent
established channels simply by recharacterizing a substantive challenge to the
legality of his sentence as a motion to correct a clerical error.
We hold each of Mr. Ruhl’s reasons for objecting to the “Special Sex Offender
Conditions” to be challenges to the legality of his sentence, not attempts to correct a
clerical omission or oversight contained within it, making his Rule 36 motion an
improper vehicle for raising these challenges. We therefore AFFIRM the district
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court’s decision to deny the motion. We also DENY Mr. Ruhl’s motion for
appointment of counsel to represent him on appeal.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
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