Trujillo v. Board of Education of Albuquerque Public Schools , 307 F. App'x 149 ( 2009 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
January 9, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
LOURDES E. TRUJILLO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 08-2029
(D.C. Nos. 1:02-cv-01509-JAP-RLP;
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE 1:04-cv-00646-JAP-RLP)
ALBUQUERQUE PUBLIC (D. N.M.)
SCHOOLS; ANTHONY GRIEGO,
individually and in his official
capacity as Principal of Valley High
School, Albuquerque Public Schools,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before O’BRIEN, PORFILIO, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
Pro se plaintiff-appellant Lourdes E. Trujillo appeals from the district
court’s grant of summary judgment to the Board of Education of the Albuquerque
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Public Schools and Anthony Griego in two separate district court cases. In the
first case, No. 1:02-cv-01509-JAP-RLP, Ms. Trujillo, who is originally from
Puerto Rico, argued defendants discriminated against her on the basis of gender
and national origin when they failed to hire her for a instructor position at Valley
High School in 2001. In the second, No. 1:04-cv-00646-JAP-RLP, Ms. Trujillo
claimed she was discriminated against when she was again not hired to fill the
same position in 2002 and 2003. The district court granted summary judgment in
both cases. Ms. Trujillo’s appellate briefs fail to show reversible error. We
affirm. 1
I.
Since Ms. Trujillo is appealing from the district court’s grant of summary
judgment, we view the evidence, and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom, in
the light most favorable to her. Swackhammer v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co.,
493 F.3d 1160, 1167 (10th Cir. 2007). Although Ms. Trujillo’s briefs violate the
Federal Rules of Appellate procedure by not including a statement of the facts of
the case supported by appropriate record references, 2 see Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(7),
1
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2
“Although a pro se litigant’s pleadings are to be construed liberally and
held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, this
court has repeatedly insisted that pro se parties follow the same rules of procedure
that govern other litigants.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d
836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotation and citations omitted).
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the following facts are either undisputed or viewed in the light most favorable to
Ms. Trujillo. Because the parties are familiar with the facts of the case, we
discuss only those necessary for resolution of this appeal.
Valley High, located in Albuquerque, New Mexico, had an agreement with
the United States Air Force to offer a Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps
program. The program was taught by a Senior Aerospace Science Instructor
(SASI) and an Aerospace Science Instructor (ASI). In August of 2000, the new
principal at Valley High was Anthony Griego, the SASI was Col. Richardson
Crook, and the ASI was Ms. Trujillo’s husband, Transito Trujillo.
Col. Crook informed Mr. Trujillo as early as January 2000 that he was
thinking of retiring, but did not specify a time. In August 2000, Ms. Trujillo
provided her resume and some type of application to Mr. Griego expressing her
interest in being considered for Col. Crook’s SASI position if it ever came open.
She did not contact the Albuquerque Public Schools (APS) human resources
department or submit the standard APS application. In the Spring of 2001,
Col. Crook informed Mr. Griego that he intended to retire in October 2001.
Utilizing a “by name” selection process authorized by the Air Force, Valley High
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hired Colonel Mark Mayerstein, a Caucasian, for the position in March 2001. 3
Ms. Trujillo’s first lawsuit alleged discrimination in this hiring decision.
Col. Mayerstein was only employed by Valley High for one year. When
the time came to fill his position, Valley High utilized a competitive selection
process. According to Mr. Griego’s affidavit the school abandoned the previously
used “by name” process and instead asked the Air Force provide a qualified
candidate pool in an attempt to avoid lawsuits. The Air Force provided Valley
High with the names of three pre-screened candidates. Ms. Trujillo subsequently
contacted the Air Force asking to be considered for the position and was told
candidates had already been forwarded to the school. She then contacted Valley
High directly. Acknowledging the Air Force had already forwarded a slate of
candidates she, nevertheless, asked the school to consider her for the position–
essentially requesting that it revert to the “by name” process in order to select
her. The school refused and hired one of the applicants forwarded by the Air
Force.
When that instructor also left after a year, the school once again asked the
Air Force for a slate of qualified candidates. Ms. Trujillo applied for the job with
3
The Air Force allowed Valley High and other schools with JROTC
programs two methods for hiring instructors. The school could specifically
request a certain instructor (“by name” selection process), asking the Air Force to
approve its choice; or the school could utilize a selection process under which it
notified the Air Force of a vacancy and the Air Force posted the vacancy on its
website and then provided the school with the names of qualified candidates
(competitive selection process).
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the Air Force. The Air Force informed her that under its rules she would have to
resign her current position as a SASI in Georgia to be considered for the Valley
High SASI position. Ms. Trujillo did not resign her position. She also sent
letters directly to two APS board members asking them to consider her letters as
applications for the SASI position; they forwarded her letters to the APS Human
Resources Department. She eventually filled out an employment application. A
form letter in the application packet informed Ms. Trujillo she would have to
contact Valley High directly regarding an interview. The Air Force again
forwarded names of three candidates to Valley High, one of whom was hired.
Ms. Trujillo’s name was not on the Air Force list. Her second lawsuit alleged
discrimination in the 2002 and 2003 hiring decisions.
II.
“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and
must apply the same legal standard used by the district court.” Swackhammer,
493 F.3d at 1167 (quotation omitted). Summary judgment “should be rendered if
the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
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A.
Ms. Trujillo’s first lawsuit alleged gender and national origin
discrimination under Title VII, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), and racial
discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 4 “Without direct evidence of
discrimination, we apply the burden-shifting scheme of McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), in Title VII and § 1981 cases.” Antonio v. Sygma
Network, Inc., 458 F.3d 1177, 1181 (10th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). Under
the McDonnell Douglas analysis, a plaintiff must first make a prima facie case of
discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 802.
In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court enumerated the elements
required in order for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case in the
failure to hire context. These are: (I) plaintiff belongs to a protected
class; (ii) plaintiff applied and was qualified for a job for which the
employer was seeking applicants; (iii) despite being qualified, the
plaintiff was rejected; and (iv) after plaintiff’s rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from
persons of plaintiff’s qualifications.
4
Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), it is unlawful for an employer “to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.” Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and to no other.
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Garrison v. Gambro, Inc., 428 F.3d 933, 937 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotation and
alteration in original omitted).
After the plaintiff makes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
employer to give a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
employment decision. If the employer comes forward with a
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, the burden then reverts to
the plaintiff to show that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as
to whether the employer’s proffered reason for the challenged action
is pretextual–i.e., unworthy of belief. A plaintiff who demonstrates
pretext gets over the hurdle of summary judgment.
Sanders v. Sw. Bell Tel., L.P., 544 F.3d 1101, 1105 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotations
and citations omitted). Pretext can be shown by “such weaknesses,
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the
employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder
could rationally find them unworthy of credence and hence infer that the
employer did not act for the asserted non-discriminatory reasons.” Id. at 1106(quotation omitted).
B.
The district court initially refused to grant summary judgment to
defendants, concluding Ms. Trujillo had raised a genuine issue of pretext as to
Mr. Griego’s argument that he had simply chosen Col. Mayerstein from two
candidates provided by Col. Crook. Citing Tyler v. ReMax, the court said “the
genuine issue on the second reason casts enough doubt on the other two reasons
that a jury might still find in Trujillo’s favor.” 410 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1047.
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Upon reconsideration, and with the guidance of this court’s recently
published opinion in Jaramillo v. Co. Judicial Dep’t, 427 F.3d 1303 (10th Cir.
2005), the district court granted summary judgment to defendants. In doing so, it
concluded Ms. Trujillo was unqualified for the SASI position, mooting her initial
success in raising an issue of fact as to the possibly pretextual nature of one of
defendants’ proffered reasons for its employment decision. She responded with a
Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend judgment accompanied by additional
material, which was denied.
C.
On appeal, Ms. Trujillo raises one issue in regard to the court’s rulings in
her first lawsuit:
The court erred by failing to find and hold that Defendant Griego’s
own admission to the Defendant[s’] [Equal Opportunity] Director
was a pretext for unlawful violation of [Ms.] Trujillo’s constitutional
rights. Griego admitted to Defendant[s’] [Equal Opportunity]
Director, in response to [Ms.] Trujillo’s EEOC charges, that he did
not interview Trujillo when he selected [Col.] Mayerstein “by name”
to replace [Col.] Crook before Crook had retired.
Aplt. Opening Br. at 1-2. She therefore asserts Mr. Griego discriminated against
her by failing to interview her during the hiring process, thus treating her
differently than Col. Mayerstein. That fact, however, does nothing to refute the
basis of the district court’s judgment–Ms. Trujillo was not qualified for the SASI
position. On that point, Ms. Trujillo maintains her lack of credentials is not a
valid non-discriminatory reason for not hiring her because Col. Mayerstein also
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lacked his FAA certification but was hired because he was in the process of
obtaining it. She claims she could have become FAA certified by the time
Col. Crook departed but “[Mr.] Griego did not offer the same opportunity [to
obtain certification] to [her] in March 2001.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 2.
Her argument assumes Mr. Griego was considering two equally facially
unqualified candidates but allowed the Caucasian male an opportunity for
certification while denying the same opportunity to her, the Hispanic female. But
the evidence presented in the summary judgment materials showed Col.
Mayerstein misrepresented in his application that he would be FAA certified and
therefore qualified to teach the class. Moreover, Col. Crook told Mr. Griego in
writing that Col. Mayerstein would “soon” be qualified to teach the zero-hour
class. In granting summary judgment, the district court decided “[Mr.] Griego
may have used poor judgment in selecting [Col.] Mayerstein without proof of his
FAA certification, but that does not establish or infer discrimination or pretext in
his decision not to select an applicant who admittedly did not have, and who
never asserted that she was in the midst of obtaining, the FAA certification.”
R., Vol. II, Doc. 98 at 9. The summary judgment materials did not demonstrate
that Mr. Griego offered Col. Mayerstein an opportunity to become certified, it
showed that the application materials asserted that he was in the process of
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meeting that qualification. 5 See Young v. Dillon Cos., 468 F.3d 1243, 1250
(10th Cir. 2006) (holding that relevant inquiry is whether the reasons behind the
employer’s employment decision were held in good faith, even if they later
proved to be untrue); Rivera v. City & County of Denver, 365 F.3d 912, 924-25
(10th Cir. 2004) (same).
D.
Ms. Trujillo’s second lawsuit, alleging gender and national origin
discrimination under Title VII, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), also resulted in
summary judgment in favor of defendants. In appealing from this decision,
Ms. Trujillo raises two points. She first claims retaliation against her for
complaining about the hiring of Col. Mayerstein. According to her the retaliation
took the form of abandoning the “by name” selection process in favor of asking
the Air Force to present qualified candidates for subsequent job openings. Her
second point is that
[t]he court again erred when it disregarded the Board of Education
directions to [Ms.] Trujillo, which direct[ed] her to apply to the
5
Ms. Trujillo has also filed a reply brief. In it she reprises the argument
raised in her opening brief. But she also apparently tries to raise a new argument
reciting various pieces of evidence presented on summary judgment, quoting
various portions of the district court’s initial denial of summary judgment, and
then generally asserting these pieces prove discrimination. To the extent she is
trying to raise a new issue, we decline to address it. We generally refuse to
address issues raised for the first time in a reply brief, and our independent
review of the record reveals no plain error. See Headrick v. Rockwell Int’l Corp.,
24 F.3d 1272, 1277-78 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding the court would not address
arguments raised for the first time in the reply brief).
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school’s Human Resources Office, rather than [the] Air Force, as
[Mr.] Griego did. Thus, the court disregarded the fact that the Board,
not the school principal [Mr.] Griego, has the sole authority to
establish hiring policies.
Aplt. Opening Br. at 9.
These arguments verge on being frivolous. First, the record does not
support the conclusory assertion that Mr. Griego lacked the authority to
discontinue using the “by name” hiring process. Mr. Griego averred the school
made the change to essentially take itself out of the hiring process to the greatest
extent possible in order to avoid lawsuits. And no reasonable jury could believe
the clearly routine actions by the APS board members and the form letter from the
APS Human Resources Department did anything more than direct Ms. Trujillo
back to Valley High as the appropriate party to contact regarding interviews.
Ms. Trujillo’s assertion that these actions amounted to a board decision that
Valley High had to use the “by name” hiring process misrepresents the evidence.
Second, even if Ms. Trujillo is correct and Mr. Griego flouted APS policy
by only hiring from pre-screened candidates provided by the Air Force,
Ms. Trujillo presents no argument as to how such action could be discriminatory.
She makes no claim that she has any less opportunity than any other candidate to
be nominated by the Air Force. If anything, such a practice would seem to
provide Valley High with less opportunity to discriminate, as Mr. Griego averred
was the purpose for the policy change.
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III.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Terrence L. O’Brien
Circuit Judge
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