Harmon v. Gallegos , 158 F. App'x 87 ( 2005 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                     November 30, 2005
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    Clerk of Court
    JAMES BOYCE HARMON,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                                          No. 05-3209
    E. GALLEGOS, and HARRY A.                            (D.C. No. 05-3163-SAC)
    LAPPIN,                                                     (D. Kan.)
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
    Before BRISCOE, LUCERO, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
    appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered
    submitted without oral argument.
    Plaintiff James Harmon, a federal prisoner appearing pro se, appeals from an order
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
    law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
    citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
    the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    of the district court dismissing without prejudice his civil rights complaint for failure to
    exhaust administrative remedies. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    and affirm.
    At the time he filed his complaint, Harmon was housed at the United States
    Penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas (USP-Leavenworth).1 In his complaint, Harmon
    challenged as unconstitutional a no-smoking policy in place at USP-Leavenworth, and
    sought both injunctive relief and damages. The district court dismissed Harmon’s
    complaint without prejudice, noting that Harmon had failed to establish, or even allege,
    that he had exhausted the administrative remedies available to him at USP-Leavenworth.
    Harmon responded by filing a combined motion to alter or amend the judgment and to
    amend his complaint to add additional claims concerning the conditions of confinement at
    USP-Leavenworth. Notably, however, Harmon made no attempt to establish that he had
    exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to the claims asserted in his original
    complaint, or with respect to the new claims he sought to add. Indeed, Harmon’s motion
    essentially conceded that he had not exhausted his administrative remedies. The district
    court therefore denied Harmon’s motion.
    Under federal law, prisoners must exhaust “such administrative remedies as are
    available” before suing over prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The exhaustion
    requirement applies even if the prisoner only requests monetary damages unavailable
    1
    Since filing his notice of appeal, Harmon has submitted a pleading to this court
    indicating that he has been transferred from USP-Leavenworth to the United States
    Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania.
    2
    through administrative channels. Booth v. Churner, 
    532 U.S. 731
    , 741 (2001) (holding
    that § 1997e(a) requires a § 1983 prisoner-plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies
    before filing suit, even when only requesting monetary damages); see also Yousef v.
    Reno, 
    254 F.3d 1214
    , 1216 n. 1 (10th Cir. 2001) (applying Booth in a Bivens case). In
    this case, the district court concluded, and we agree, that Harmon failed to exhaust the
    administrative remedies available to him before filing suit. Thus, we agree with the
    district court that the proper course was to dismiss Harmon’s complaint without
    prejudice.
    AFFIRMED.
    Entered for the Court
    Mary Beck Briscoe
    Circuit Judge
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-3209

Citation Numbers: 158 F. App'x 87

Judges: Briscoe, Lucero, Murphy

Filed Date: 11/30/2005

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024