Mackey v. Lyons ( 2002 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DEC 9 2002
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
WALDO MACKEY,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 02-1063
D.C. No. 01-Z-1666
KATHLEEN LYONS, Librarian; MR. (D. Colorado)
BARNES, Case Manager; MR.
SMELTZER, Investigator; JIM DAY,
Major,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY , BALDOCK , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
Waldo Mackey, an inmate at the Fremont Correctional Facility, appeals
from the district court’s dismissal of his civil rights complaint as frivolous. He
also seeks leave to proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs or fees,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. That request is granted; appellant is reminded of
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
his obligation to continue making partial payment until the entire appellate filing
fee is paid. We have jurisdiction over this appeal by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 1
We review the district court’s dismissal on frivolousness grounds for abuse
of discretion, taking into account appellant’s pro se status, and considering
whether the district court applied erroneous legal standards. See Denton v.
Hernandez , 504 U.S. 25, 33, 34 (1992). Appellant complains that the district
court wrongly denied his attempts to amend his original complaint and argues that
his claims have merit and should not have been dismissed. Upon consideration of
his arguments in light of applicable standards and legal principles, and after a
careful review of the appellate record, we agree. For the reasons stated below,
this case will be remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
Procedural History
Appellant and a co-plaintiff filed the underlying suit against prison
officials, along with a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO), claiming
violation of their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in
connection with their participation in an investigation of a prison staff member at
1
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
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the Limon Correctional Facility. See Rec. Vol. I, doc. 5. They also generally
alleged retaliation. After the motion for a TRO was denied, appellant filed a
motion to amend the original complaint by adding a First Amendment claim,
signing the motion on behalf of himself and his co-plaintiff. Id. , doc. 24. The
district court denied this motion because appellant’s co-plaintiff had not signed
the motion and because appellant’s First Amendment claim was vague and failed
to name a defendant. Id. , doc. 25. The court gave plaintiffs thirty days to cure
these deficiencies. Id.After filing a request to represent his co-plaintiff pursuant to a power of
attorney, but before receiving the court’s denial of that request, appellant filed an
amended complaint on behalf of both plaintiffs. Id. , doc. 28 (First Amended
Complaint). The First Amended Complaint was filed within the thirty-day
deadline set by the district court and appears to have cured the deficiencies the
court noted with regard to appellant’s First Amendment claim. See id. at 4. A
week later, appellant sent a letter to the court acknowledging that the court had
denied his request to represent his co-plaintiff, and concluding that, therefore, the
court would not review his First Amended Complaint. In his letter, appellant
stated that “this turns out for the best because the original complaint was more
thorough.” Id. , doc. 31. He also requested copies of the original complaint and
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the First Amended Complaint. Id. The court granted his request for copies. Id. ,
doc. 33.
Next, appellant filed a motion to “sever” his co-plaintiff from the case so
that he could proceed alone. Id. , doc. 32. He again noted his assumption that the
court had denied his First Amended Complaint, id. at 2, and requested that the
court allow him to amend the original complaint to add new claims of retaliation
and religious discrimination. Id. at 2-3. Without addressing appellant’s request
to amend his complaint, the court denied the motion to “sever,” noting that the
co-plaintiff had not sought to dismiss himself voluntarily from the case. Id. , doc.
34. Ultimately, upon receipt of a motion to withdraw from appellant’s
co-plaintiff, the court dismissed the co-plaintiff from the suit. See id. , docs. 35,
36. Appellant then filed a motion seeking reconsideration of the court’s denial of
his request to amend the original complaint, recognizing that the court had
dismissed his co-plaintiff. See id. , doc. 37. The court summarily denied this
motion. Id. , doc. 38.
Appellant subsequently filed a “Motion to Withdraw Amended Complaint,”
noting his confusion about which complaint the court was going to review. He
requested that the court give him an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in his
original complaint or, if the court was going to review the First Amended
Complaint, that he be allowed to amend it further after the defendant s were
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served and had answered. Id. , doc. 39 at 2. Three days later, the court filed an
order and judgment of dismissal. Id. , doc. 40. The court noted that the First
Amended Complaint was signed only by appellant, and stated that appellant had
not filed another amended complaint since the dismissal of his co-plaintiff.
Therefore, the court concluded, it would review only his original complaint. Id.
at 2. In this ruling, the court also dismissed appellant’s original claims as
frivolous. Id. at 5. On the same day, the court denied appellant’s “Motion to
Withdraw Amended Complaint” as moot. Id. , doc. 41.
In response, appellant filed another amended complaint, reiterating his
original claims and including new claims alleging retaliation, due process
violations and religious discrimination. Id. , doc. 43 (Second Amended
Complaint). He also filed a motion to vacate the district court’s judgment,
attaching a memorandum setting out facts in support of his claims, accompanied
by exhibits, and arguing the legal merits of those claims. Id. , doc. 42. The
district court denied his motion, concluding that appellant was adding new claims
not previously considered, and that he failed to show that the court misapplied the
law. Id. , doc. 44 at 3. This appeal followed.
Leave to Amend
Reviewing the above chronology, it is clear that appellant consistently
sought to amend his original complaint. During the short time this case was
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before the district court, appellant filed pleadings containing no fewer than four
requests to amend and two amended complaints. The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provide that a litigant may amend his pleading “once as a matter of
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
“Otherwise, a party may amend the party’s pleading only by leave of court . . .
and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Id. Although the
district court properly denied appellant’s attempts to add claims on behalf of his
co-plaintiff, represent his co-plaintiff, and voluntarily dismiss his co-plaintiff, the
district court erred in failing to allow appellant to amend his own claims. Once
appellant had cured the deficiencies in his proposed First Amendment claim by
filing his First Amended Complaint, the district court should have considered that
complaint insofar as it set out appellant’s claims.
Further, the court erred in failing to rule on the subsequent request for
leave to amend which was included in appellant’s motion to “sever” his former
co-plaintiff. When appellant sought reconsideration of the denial of that motion
insofar only as it related to his request to amend, the court denied the
reconsideration motion in a minute order without explanation. See Rec. Vol. I,
doc. 38. “[O]utright refusal to grant . . . leave [to amend] without any justifying
reason appearing for the denial is not an exercise of discretion; it is merely abuse
of that discretion and inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal Rules.” Foman v.
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Davis , 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Similarly, the court erred in refusing to
consider the motion to amend contained in appellant’s “Motion to Withdraw
Amended Complaint,” and in its subsequent denial of the motion as moot after
dismissing his original complaint.
We recognize that appellant was not actually required to seek leave of court
to amend his complaint initially, because no responsive pleading was ever served.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). However, he did so in light of the court’s rulings in
connection with his attempts to include his co-plaintiff in his first motion to
amend and his confusion about whether the court was going to consider the First
Amended Complaint. Also, after filing his First Amended Complaint, the record
indicates appellant continued to seek leave to amend to include additional claims
of retaliation and religious discrimination. The district court should have
considered these requests. Appellant did file one letter and a motion that
requested withdrawal of his First Amended Complaint, but only in the event that
he would be allowed to further amend his original complaint. In light of
appellant’s pro se status, the district court erred in failing to rule on his requests
for leave to amend. Therefore, its conclusion that it would review only the
original complaint was an abuse of the court’s discretion.
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Plaintiff’s Claims
The district court dismissed appellant’s claims as frivolous. We conclude
that, in reviewing appellant’s pleadings, the district court failed to apply correct
legal standards, resulting in an abuse of its discretion. Because we believe that
the district court failed to liberally construe appellant’s pleadings, and because
appellant’s pleadings state cognizable claims for relief, we reverse the court’s
dismissal of appellant’s case.
Appellant’s first claim, stated in his original complaint and maintained
throughout his additional pleadings, is that defendant Lyons, the library
supervisor under whom he worked while at the Limon facility, violated his rights
under the Eighth Amendment when she told other inmates that appellant was a
snitch, resulting in his being assaulted, put in segregation, and, he alleges, being
in fear for his life. See Rec. Vol. I., doc. 5 at 2. Deliberate indifference by a
prison official to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the
Eighth Amendment. Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). In this
circuit, “labeling an inmate a snitch . . . constitutes deliberate indifference to the
safety of that inmate.” Benefield v. McDowall , 241 F.3d 1267, 1271-72 (10th Cir.
2001) (citing Northington v. Marin , 102 F.3d. 1564, 1567 (10th Cir. 1996)).
Appellant’s factual allegations, taken as true as they must be at this stage of the
proceeding, support his Eighth Amendment claim. The district court failed to
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recognize this claim, despite the detailed factual allegations in appellant’s
original complaint and his citation to both Farmer and Northington in the
accompanying motion for a TRO. See Rec. Vol. I, doc. 7 at 3.
Appellant also alleged a retaliation claim in connection with his transfer
from Limon to the Sterling Correctional Facility and complained about the loss of
his job at the Limon facility library. The district court concluded that he failed to
assert facts in support of his retaliation claim and stated that inmates are not
entitled to a specific placement or degree of liberty. See id. , doc. 40 at 4-5. The
court also noted that “loss of a prison job does not rise to the level of an Eighth
Amendment claim.” Id. at 4. However, subsequent pleadings filed by appellant
demonstrate that his job claim was a retaliation claim. As noted above, the
district court erred in considering appellant’s subsequent attempts to amend his
complaint. Those pleadings include further factual allegations about his claim of
retaliatory transfer, which may have cured the deficiencies in his original
complaint. This court has held that retaliation claims are cognizable even where
the alleged retaliatory action would be otherwise permissible. See Peterson v.
Shanks , 149 F.3d 1140, 1144 (10th Cir. 1998).
Conclusion
“We reiterate that the district court should allow a plaintiff an opportunity
to cure technical errors or otherwise amend the complaint when doing so would
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yield a meritorious claim.” Curley v. Perry , 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied , 122 S. Ct. 274 (2001). At the very least, appellant’s Eighth
Amendment claim is cognizable on the facts already alleged. On remand, in light
of appellant’s pro se status and the fact that no responsive pleading has yet been
entered in the case, the district court should consider appellant’s attempts to
amend his complaint not only to cure the deficiencies in his original complaint,
but to add further claims, see, e.g., Rec. Vol. I, doc. 43 (Second Amended
Complaint). The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado is REVERSED, and the case REMANDED for further proceedings.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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