Snyder v. The American Kennel Club , 402 F. App'x 397 ( 2010 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
November 24, 2010
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
______________________________
DENNIS SNYDER and
AUDRA SNYDER,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. No. 09-3319
(D.C. No. 5:08-CV-04094-SAC-KGS)
THE AMERICAN KENNEL CLUB, (D. Kan.)
Defendant-Appellee.
______________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
______________________________
Before LUCERO, GORSUCH, Circuit Judges, and ARGUELLO,** District Judge.***
______________________________
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
**
Honorable Christine M. Arguello, District Court Judge, District of Colorado,
sitting by designation.
***
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance in the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The
case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
The legal question raised on appeal is whether the district court erred by granting
summary judgment to the defendant. Another question, unrelated to the legal one, but
equally weighty, is “what happened to Jag?” Jag was (and perhaps still is) a Golden
Retriever owned by Janis Fonceca. Plaintiffs-Appellants Dennis and Audra Snyder are
professional dog handlers. They were hired by Fonceca to show Jag at an American
Kennel Club (“AKC”)-sanctioned event during Memorial Day weekend of 2005.
The Snyders claim that, after that weekend, Jag ran away. The AKC, however,
heard evidence that Jag was accidentally hanged at that event and that the Snyders’ claim
was a cover-up. As a result, it suspended the Snyders from all AKC activities for a period
of ten years, the “standard” penalty for the offense of cruelty under the AKC Discipline
Guidelines. That decision gave rise to this lawsuit.
The Snyders sued the AKC alleging the AKC tortiously interfered with their dog
handling business through its suspension of their AKC privileges. The district court
granted the AKC’s motion for summary judgment.1 We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
BACKGROUND
The district court addressed the facts in detail, as reflected in Snyder v. American
Kennel Club, 661 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1225-30 (D. Kan. 2009). Because the parties do not
1
The Snyders brought a defamation claim that was dismissed by the district court.
They have not challenged that dismissal. Accordingly, we deem the issue waived. See
Finley v. Packard Company Employee Benefits Org. Income Protection Plan, 379 F.3d
1168, 1172 n.4 (10th Cir. 2004).
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take issue with the district court’s recitation of facts, we do not repeat it here. Given the
posture, we view the facts in light most favorable to the Snyders.
The AKC is a national organization that regulates the breeding, registration, and
showing of purebred dogs within the United States. The AKC’s Charter and Bylaws
(“Bylaws”) sets out broad “objects” for the AKC including:
to adopt and enforce uniform rules relating and governing purebred dog
events, to regulate the conduct of persons interested in breeding, registering,
selling, purchasing, exhibiting and running purebred dogs, to prevent, detect
and punish frauds in connection therewith, to protect the interests of its
members, to publish an official kennel gazette, and generally to do
everything to advance the study, breeding, exhibiting, running and
maintenance of purebred dogs.
To carry out these objectives, the AKC has adopted rules that prohibit conduct
prejudicial to the best interests of purebred dogs, purebred dog events, or the AKC itself.
The penalties for such prejudicial conduct by clubs or individuals range from reprimand
to suspension for life from all privileges of the AKC.
Among the offenses prohibited by the AKC are cruelty and neglect. The AKC
defines cruelty as, “conscious action or inaction that may endanger life or cause serious
health consequences to animals.” It defines neglect as, “[i]nadequate care or voluntary
inattention to basic needs, ignoring the safety and well being of animals because of haste
or ignorance.”
Dennis and Audra Snyder are professional dog handlers. During Memorial Day
weekend of 2005 (May 27-30), the Snyders showed dogs at an AKC-sanctioned event
sponsored by the Muskogee Kennel Club in Shawnee, Oklahoma. One of the dogs they
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showed that weekend was a Golden Retriever named “Jag.” Jag was owned by Janis
Fonceca, who had hired the Snyders to show Jag.
Audra Snyder showed Jag on the first day, Friday the 27th, in Dennis Snyder’s
absence. Dennis Snyder arrived that evening and initially intended to show Jag on
Saturday. On Saturday morning, Mr. Snyder asked Nick Nelson, a fifteen-year-old who
was working for the Snyders that weekend, to put Jag on the grooming table inside the
dog containment area in the back of the Snyders’ rig. This area was separated from the
family’s living quarters by a bathroom.
In accordance with Mr. Snyder’s instructions, Nick Nelson carried the grooming
table inside, put Jag on it, and attached him to a noose secured to an arm of the table. The
Snyders’ eleven-year-old son, Kyle, was in the living quarters at the time watching his
three younger siblings, one of whom was seven months old. As Mr. Snyder left the rig,
he instructed Kyle to keep an eye on Jag. Mr. Snyder and Nick Nelson then left to show
other dogs. Nick was to check on Jag, or bring him to the show ring when the time came.
It is undisputed that Jag was left on the grooming table in a noose, without anyone in the
dog containment area of the trailer to supervise him. What happened to Jag afterward is
disputed.
The Snyders left Shawnee, Oklahoma on Monday after the conclusion of the dog
show, and arrived in Topeka, Kansas late that evening. The next day, Tuesday, May 31,
Janis Fonceca received a phone call from Audra Snyder telling her that Jag had run away
while she was exercising him.
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Weeks later, Fonceca received another call, this one in response to a flier seeking
information about Jag’s disappearance. The caller was Donna Nelson, the mother of Nick
Nelson. Ms. Nelson told Fonceca, “I think I know what happened to [your] dog.” Ms.
Nelson explained that just days before Jag supposedly disappeared, she had found him
unconscious, hanging by his neck from a grooming table noose in the Snyders’ trailer at
a dog show in Oklahoma.
Fonceca filed a complaint against the Snyders with the AKC. She claimed that the
Snyders were responsible for Jag’s disappearance and/or death and that, moreover, they
tried to cover up the truth with their story that Jag had run away.
The AKC decided to investigate Fonceca’s complaint. The AKC investigator,
Jack Norton, interviewed Donna and Nick Nelson. He also interviewed the Snyders.
Finally, he solicited written statements from Linda Wilson and Kimber Shields, whom
the Snyders identified as having seen Jag after the alleged hanging.
In September 2006, the AKC’s Management Disciplinary Committee decided to
bring charges against the Snyders. The charges alleged that the Snyders committed
cruelty by not obtaining medical care for Jag while he was in their care. In addition,
Mr. Snyder was charged with neglect for leaving Jag on the grooming table without
appropriate supervision.
In June 2007, a two-day hearing on those charges was held in Topeka by the
AKC’s Northwest Trial Board. The Snyders were represented by counsel, both sides
presented evidence, and various witnesses testified and were cross-examined.
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After the hearing, the Trial Board sustained the charges and suspended the Snyders
from all AKC activities for a period of ten years. The Snyders unsuccessfully appealed
the decision to the AKC Appeals Trial Board. They eventually filed this lawsuit seeking
tort damages for interference with their dog handling business allegedly caused by the
suspension of their AKC privileges. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the AKC, which the Snyders now appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as
the district court.” McKnight v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 149 F.3d 1125, 1128 (10th Cir.
1998). Under FED. R. CIV. P. 56(C)(2), summary judgment should be entered by the
district court “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any
affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” On appeal,
[w]e examine the record to determine whether any genuine issue of material
fact was in dispute; if not, we determine whether the substantive law was
applied correctly, and in so doing we examine the factual record and
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion.
McKnight, 149 F.3d at 1128 (brackets and quotations omitted).
DISCUSSION
The Snyders are appealing the judgment below only as to their tortious
interference claim. To establish a claim of tortious interference with a contract or
prospective business advantage, the Snyders must show:
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(1) the existence of a business relationship or expectancy with the
probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) knowledge of the
relationship or expectancy by the defendant; (3) that, except for the conduct
of the defendant, plaintiff was reasonably certain to have continued the
relationship or realized the expectancy; (4) intentional misconduct by
defendant; and (5) damages suffered by plaintiff as a direct or proximate
cause of defendant’s misconduct. [Both torts] are predicated on malicious
conduct by the defendant.
Turner v. Halliburton Co., 722 P.2d 1106, 1115 (Kan. 1986); Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of
Pittsburg, Inc. v. PepsiCo., Inc., 431 F.3d 1241, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 2005) (applying
Kansas law).
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the AKC because: (1) it
found the record failed to raise a material question of fact regarding the existence of
the Snyders’ contracts or prospective business expectancies, or the AKC’s knowledge
thereof, and because (2) the Snyders failed to show the AKC acted with malice and, thus,
the AKC was entitled to a qualified privilege. Snyder, 661 F. Supp. 2d at 1233-39. The
Snyders dispute each of these grounds. Because we find the AKC’s conduct was
privileged, we do not address the Snyders’ other arguments.
I. Whether The AKC Can Claim A Privilege To Suspend The Snyders
“Kansas recognizes that ‘not all interference in present or future contractual
relations is tortious. A person may be privileged or justified to interfere with contractual
relations in certain situations.’” DP-Tek, Inc. v. AT & T Global Info. Solutions Co., 100
F.3d 828, 832 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Turner, 722 P.2d at 1115). For example, a
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defendant’s interference, although it occurred, may be privileged by reason of the
interests furthered by that interference. Turner, 722 P.2d at 1116.
Here, the Snyders concede that the AKC has a legitimate interest in enforcing its
rules relating to purebred dogs and purebred dog shows, i.e., that it may “interfere” with
relations governed by those rules. They argue instead that the privilege should not attach
in this case because the AKC’s interference was motivated by actual malice.
II. Whether The AKC Waived Its Privilege By Acting With Actual Malice
The concept of malice in this context derives from defamation law. Id. at 1112
(“In any proceeding where the plaintiff complains that he or she has been defamed, a
number of affirmative defenses are available, among them privilege . . . .”). Regarding
this privilege, Kansas recognizes an analogue between defamation actions and actions for
tortious interference. “Occasions privileged under the law of defamation are also
occasions in which interference with contractual relations may be considered justified or
privileged.” Id. at 1116. Thus, under either tort, a “privilege” may exist whereby the
alleged tortious act (be it libel, slander, or interference with contract) is protected, i.e.,
cannot be cause for liability, given a number of factors including the specific interests
involved. Id. at 1116-17; Knudsen v. Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., 807 P.2d 71, 79-80 (Kan.
1991); Reebles, Inc. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 25 P.3d 871, 876 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001).
That privilege, however, is not absolute. It is qualified. See Munsell v. Ideal Food
Stores, 494 P.2d 1063, 1073 (Kan. 1972) (explaining difference between absolute and
qualified privilege). To defeat the privilege, the Snyders must show that the AKC acted
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with actual malice. Turner, 722 P.2d at 1117 (“a qualified privilege . . . requires the
plaintiff to prove actual malice by the defendant[.]”). Malice is defined as acting with
“actual evil-mindedness or specific intent to injure.” Id. (quoting Munsell, 494 P.2d at
1073).
The Snyders argue the AKC’s malice in suspending them can be inferred from
three circumstances: (A) the AKC bringing charges that were previously litigated; (B)
the AKC’s investigator’s conduct, and (C) the manner with which the AKC initiated and
conducted the hearing.
A. The Fonceca Suit
The Snyders first argue that “the AKC has no legitimate justification for
resurrecting a dismissed state court claim, relabeling those charges as ‘animal cruelty,’
and then retrying the same allegations in another forum to reach a desired result.” This is
in reference to a state court proceeding brought by Fonceca against the Snyders. We
perceive a number of problems with the Snyders’ contention.
First, the Snyders cite no legal authority to support this argument. This alone is
grounds for disregarding it. Phillips v. Calhoun, 956 F.2d 949, 953-54 (10th Cir. 1992)
(“‘A litigant who fails to press a point by supporting it with pertinent authority, or by
showing why it is sound despite a lack of supporting authority or in the face of contrary
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authority, forfeits the point.’”) (quoting Pelfresne v. Village of Williams Bay, 917 F.2d
1017, 1023 (7th Cir. 1990)); Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A).
Second, although the Snyders have not asserted claims of collateral estoppel or
res judicata on appeal, this argument implicitly resurrects those theories – previously
presented to the district court – in the context of their argument that the AKC acted with
actual malice. The Snyders’ failure to brief these issues on appeal is also grounds for
disregarding their argument. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mhoon, 31 F.3d 979, 984 n.7
(10th Cir. 1994) (a failure to brief an issue on appeal constitutes waiver).
Finally, the Snyders’ res judicata and collateral estoppel argument rests on the
assumption that these doctrines are available to them. These doctrines, however, apply
only if the successive “court” is a public tribunal. See Steele v. Guardianship and
Conservatorship of Crist, 840 P.2d 1107, 1114 (Kan. 1992); Lyon v. Harrison, 273 P. 429(Kan. 1929). The AKC is a private entity. Thus, we reject the Snyders’ suggestion that
(a) the AKC was bound by these doctrines and (b) “actual malice” can be inferred
because the AKC did not apply them. Because the AKC had no obligation under these
doctrines, we conclude that no reasonable jury could infer that the AKC acted with a
specific intent to injure the Snyders based on the AKC’s decision to bring internal charges
against the Snyders for violations of its rules.
B. Jack Norton’s Conduct
The Snyders also seek to impute the conduct of the AKC investigator, Jack
Norton, to the AKC to show that the AKC acted with actual malice. The Snyders’ theory
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is that Norton botched the investigation into the AKC’s charges by erasing the recordings
he made of the Nelsons’ statements, by destroying notes of his interview with the
Snyders, and by failing to interview two witnesses who claimed they had seen Jag alive
after the alleged hanging. Although they assert he also lied during his testimony at the
hearing, they do not identify any offending testimony. Based on these contentions, the
Snyders conclude that a jury could infer malice from Norton’s conduct and, moreover,
that the conduct should be imputed to the AKC decision makers.
For the sake of discussion, the court assumes, without deciding the issue, that
Norton’s conduct could be imputed to the AKC’s Trial Board and Appeals Trial Board
for purposes of showing that the AKC acted with actual malice when it suspended the
Snyders. As to the investigation, Norton’s failure to preserve his original notes and
recordings from these interviews does not give rise to a reasonable inference of actual
malice. Norton had no personal connection to the Snyders and the Snyders cite no
testimony from the hearing suggesting he bore any personal animus towards them.
Moreover, the fact that Norton did not keep the tapes from the Nelson interviews is
immaterial – both Nelsons testified at the hearing. In the same vein, Norton’s failure to
contact the two witnesses who supported the Snyders’ statements is also immaterial –
because those same witnesses, Linda Wilson and Kimber Shield, testified at the hearing.
Norton’s investigation – even if deficient – could not lead a rational juror to conclude that
the AKC acted with a specific intent to injure the Snyders. Although a deficient
investigation could lead a reasonable jury to infer that Norton was negligent in his
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investigation, it could not reasonably infer that Norton was malicious in his investigation.
Moreover, even if he were, the investigation is not what is being challenged here – rather,
it is the AKC’s suspension of the Snyders, over which Norton’s investigation played only
an introductory role. Accordingly, we reject the Snyders’ contention that a reasonable
jury could infer the AKC acted maliciously in suspending the Snyders because its
investigator may have acted negligently.
C. The AKC’s Conduct
Finally, the Snyders cite the manner in which the AKC conducted its investigation
and hearing as evidence of actual malice. In support they cite a portion of the AKC’s
bylaws and an AKC pamphlet, which essentially state that it is the Event Committee’s
duty to deal initially with acts such as the alleged hanging.2 This would have been the
Muskogee Kennel Club – the local Oklahoma club that sponsored the at-issue dog show.
Because the Muskogee Kennel Club neither investigated the charges nor brought them
against the Snyders, the Snyders suggest this evidences actual malice in the AKC’s
decision to suspend them.
2
Each AKC-sanctioned event must have its own “Event Committee,” which is
tasked with enforcing the AKC’s rules during the event and has the authority to impose
penalties for violations. Event Committees respond to complaints made at the event and
generally conduct hearings on the same day as a complaint is lodged.
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The Snyders, however, ignore other portions of the AKC’s bylaws. In addition to
the Event Committees’ role in handling disciplinary issues that arise at AKC-sanctioned
events, the bylaws allow individuals to make a complaint directly to AKC headquarters.
That is what happened here. Upon receipt of such a complaint, the bylaws provide that
the President of the AKC’s Board of Directors “shall cause the matter to be investigated.”
The decision to bring the charges against the Snyders was made by the AKC’s
Management Disciplinary Committee, which was appointed by the AKC president.
On these facts, no reasonable jury could infer that the AKC acted with a specific intent
to injure the Snyders.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not err in granting summary
judgment to the AKC. We thus affirm its judgment.
Entered for the Court
Christine M. Arguello
District Judge
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