Martinez v. Southwest Cheese Co. ( 2015 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT June 18, 2015
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
REBECCA MARTINEZ,
Plaintiff - Appellant/
Cross - Appellee,
v. Nos. 14-2141 & 14-2175
(D.C. No. 2:12-CV-00660-KG-WPL)
SOUTHWEST CHEESE COMPANY, (D. N.M.)
LLC,
Defendant - Appellee/
Cross - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, McKAY and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
Rebecca Martinez brought this action in state court, claiming her former
employer, Southwest Cheese Company (SWC), fostered a hostile work environment
permeated with sexual harassment and discrimination that ultimately compelled her
to resign. SWC removed the case to federal court and moved for summary judgment.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
The district court granted the motion on all but two state-law claims and, in doing so,
excluded portions of three affidavits that Ms. Martinez had submitted in opposition to
summary judgment. The district court remanded the two remaining state-law claims
to state court and denied SWC’s motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) to set aside that
ruling. Both sides appealed, and exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we
now affirm.
I
The district court detailed the facts of this case, so we set forth only a general
description of the events that gave rise to this action. Ms. Martinez is a Hispanic
woman who was born in 1959. She worked for SWC from November 2005 until she
resigned in April 2011. During her tenure, Ms. Martinez was promoted three times
and eventually attained the position of Team Leader. She also earned multiple pay
raises and was subjected to several disciplinary actions.
In September 2008, a coworker, Donnie Romero, grabbed Ms. Martinez’s right
buttock. Several days later he embarrassed her by announcing in the break room that
he had seen her vacuuming at home naked. Ms. Martinez lodged a complaint with
SWC’s human resources director and the next day met with two managers. She
feared losing her job, however, and felt pressured to agree to an oral reprimand of
Mr. Romero. Nevertheless, Mr. Romero was issued a written reprimand and
suspended for five days. Several months later, in July 2009, he left SWC, although
he was rehired in 2011 despite evidence that he had sexually harassed other women
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before leaving. In addition to Mr. Romero’s conduct, Ms. Martinez knew that
another employee, Cody Stewart, had exposed himself to other women.
In August 2010, Ms. Martinez sent a letter of grievance to SWC complaining
of age, gender, and racial prejudice, sexual harassment, unjustified promotions and
dismissals, and biased disciplinary actions. She met with a manager and the director
of human resources and told them that she had documentation from other employees
to substantiate her concerns. But when asked to produce this documentation,
Ms. Martinez admitted that she had none and that she had made a terrible mistake.
Consequently, SWC issued Ms. Martinez a written reprimand and suspended her for
one day. Several months later, she resigned.
Ms. Martinez subsequently initiated this suit in state court, alleging a hostile
work environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) and the
New Mexico Human Rights Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 28-1-1 to -14 (NMHRA);
constructive discharge under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), and a breach-of-contract theory; and state-law claims for
intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and negligent supervision.1 SWC
1
To the extent Ms. Martinez’s opening brief analyzes an independent claim for
retaliation, see Aplt. Br. at 46-47, 57, we do not consider her arguments because she
did not raise a retaliation claim in the district court. See Daniels v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 701 F.3d 620, 640 (10th Cir. 2012) (declining to consider claim raised for
the first time on appeal). Although Ms. Martinez alleged retaliation in her amended
charge of discrimination, see Aplee. App. at 42, she presented no such claim in her
complaint, see id. at 12-29. Hence, the district court evaluated the alleged retaliatory
conduct only in analyzing her constructive discharge claim. See Aplt. App. at 58-61.
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removed the case to federal court and moved for summary judgment. Ms. Martinez
opposed the motion and attached to her response three affidavits purporting to show
material fact issues precluding summary judgment. In an order dated July 1, 2014,
the district court struck portions of the three affidavits, ruling that the excluded
portions either created sham fact issues or were made without personal knowledge.
Then, in a separate order dated July 10, 2014, the district court granted SWC
summary judgment on all but the IIED and negligent supervision claims. The court
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims and instead
remanded them to state court. SWC sought to vacate the remand order by moving to
alter or amend the judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), but on September 22, 2014,
the court denied that motion as well.
Now in appeal number 14-2141, Ms. Martinez challenges the district court’s
exclusion of the portions of the three affidavits that she submitted with her summary
judgment response. She also challenges the grant of summary judgment on her
hostile work environment and constructive discharge claims. For its part, in appeal
number 14-2175, SWC challenges the district court’s orders remanding the IIED and
negligent supervision claims to state court and denying its Rule 59(e) motion.
II
A. Affidavits
Our first task is to determine whether the district court abused its discretion in
striking portions of the three affidavits that Ms. Martinez submitted with her response
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to the summary judgment motion. See Law Co. v. Mohawk Constr. & Supply Co.,
577 F.3d 1164, 1169 (10th Cir. 2009) (reviewing the exclusion of affidavits at the
summary judgment stage for abuse of discretion). The affidavits in question are
those of Ms. Martinez and coworkers Misty English and Felipe Alvarado. Each
affidavit contained specific paragraphs or statements that the district court excluded,
either for creating sham fact issues, see Franks v. Nimmo, 796 F.2d 1230, 1237
(10th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he utility of summary judgment as a procedure for screening
out sham fact issues would be greatly undermined if a party could create an issue of
fact merely by submitting an affidavit contradicting his own prior testimony.”), or for
lack of personal knowledge, see Ellis v. J.R.’s Country Stores, Inc., 779 F.3d 1184,
1201 (10th Cir. 2015) (“Information presented in the nonmovant’s affidavit must be
based on personal knowledge and must set forth facts that would be admissible in
evidence.” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)).
On appeal, Ms. Martinez challenges the exclusion of some twenty-five
different statements and paragraphs, but she fails to demonstrate that the district
court abused its discretion in excluding them. For example, in challenging the
exclusion of specific comments and “jokes” made by Mr. Romero, which are cited in
paragraph nine of her affidavit, Ms. Martinez argues that when was asked at her
deposition whether she could “give any other examples of the inappropriate joking
that went on with either Cody Stuart or others,” she replied, “I would really have to
“sit down and try to remember specifics.” Aplt. Br. at 17 (internal quotation marks
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omitted).2 Ms. Martinez says this testimony does not contradict her affidavit, in
which she attributed several wholly inappropriate remarks to Mr. Romero. But as the
district court recognized, we have upheld the exclusion of affidavits for creating
sham fact issues when the affidavit “provides information which the deponent claims
she could not recall at her earlier deposition.” Aplt. App. at 23 (Dist. Ct. Op. dated
July 1, 2014) (citing Juarez v. Utah, 263 F. App’x 726, 734-36 (10th Cir. 2008)
(affirming the exclusion of a post-discovery affidavit that provided evidence of
alleged racial slurs that plaintiff claimed she could not recall at her deposition)); see
Mitchael v. Intracorp, Inc., 179 F.3d 847, 854-55 (10th Cir. 1999) (affirming the
exclusion of a post-discovery affidavit “in which [the affiant] arguably contradicted
his deposition, or at least more clearly recalled discussions and meetings”). Here,
Ms. Martinez similarly recalled in her post-discovery affidavit specific comments or
jokes made by Mr. Romero that she could not recall at her deposition. Given our
precedent, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the district court’s exclusion of this
portion of her affidavit.
Ms. Martinez’s other arguments fare no better. Indeed, we have examined
each of the challenged statements and paragraphs and conclude that the district court
2
Ms. Martinez quotes the transcript of her video deposition, which was attached
to her response to SWC’s motion to strike. But the appendix she submitted on appeal
contains neither her response to the motion to strike nor the relevant portion of her
deposition transcript. We have confirmed her testimony by examining the record
retained by the district court, but we remind litigants that we are under no obligation
to search for documents that should have been included in the appendix. See Burnett
v. Sw. Bell Tel., L.P., 555 F.3d 906, 907-08 (10th Cir. 2009).
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did not abuse its discretion in excluding them. Consequently, we affirm the district
court’s exclusion of the relevant portions of the affidavits for substantially the same
reasons stated by the district court in its order dated July 1, 2014.
B. Summary Judgment
We next review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment,
applying the same standard as the district court. Ellis, 779 F.3d at 1192. “Summary
judgment is appropriate ‘if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id.
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “If a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party, summary judgment is inappropriate.” Riser v. QEP Energy,
776 F.3d 1191, 1195 (10th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). In
conducting our review, we view the record and any reasonable inferences therefrom
in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Id.
1. Hostile Work Environment3
a. Purported Fact Issues
Ms. Martinez first contends the district court made several adverse factual
findings in granting summary judgment on her hostile work environment claims. To
the extent this argument relies on the stricken portions of the affidavits, however, we
have already determined that the district court acted within its discretion in excluding
3
The same legal standards apply to both Title VII and NMHRA claims. See
Orr v. City of Albuquerque, 531 F.3d 1210, 1213 n.2 (10th Cir. 2008).
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the challenged statements and paragraphs. To the extent Ms. Martinez asserts the
court resolved certain factual disputes against her, the argument is meritless because
on each score the district court actually credited the facts in her favor. Compare,
e.g., Aplt. Br. at 39 (“The [district] court dismisses Cody Stewart’s exposure of his
genitals at a SWC sponsored event because there is no evidence that Plaintiff was
aware of that incident.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), with Aplt. App. at 31-32
(Dist. Ct. Op. dated July 1, 2014) (declining to strike statement that “[i]t was well
known in the Southwest Cheese plant that Cody Stewart had a habit of exposing his
genitals to female employees[]”), and id. at 47 (Dist. Ct. Op. dated July 10, 2014)
(stating that “Plaintiff was also aware that another SWC employee, Cody Stewart,
exposed himself to female employees and she was concerned that Stewart would do
the same to her[]”). Otherwise, Ms. Martinez simply manufactures alleged disputes
where none exist. Compare, e.g., Aplt. Br. at 40 (arguing that the district court
inappropriately found that Ms. Martinez made only one complaint to human
resources when she actually made two—her initial complaint in September 2008 and
a second complaint via her August 2010 grievance letter), with Aplt. App. at 46,
48-49 (Dist. Ct. Op. dated July 10, 2014) (discussing the September 2008 complaint
to human resources and the August 2010 grievance letter).
b. Application of Time-Bar
Next, Ms. Martinez challenges the district court’s determination that her
hostile work environment claims were time-barred. As the district court recognized,
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both Title VII and the NMHRA require a plaintiff to file a charge of discrimination
within three hundred days of an alleged unlawful employment practice. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 28-1-10(A). Ms. Martinez filed her
charge of discrimination on July 6, 2011, meaning that conduct that occurred more
than three hundred days prior to that date, i.e., September 9, 2010, would not be
actionable unless “‘an act’ contributing to [the] hostile work environment took place”
within the filing period, Duncan v. Manager, Dep’t of Safety, City & Cnty. of Denver,
397 F.3d 1300, 1308 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117 (2002)). But as the district court explained, before any
pre-filing period acts may be considered, a “Court must . . . determine whether the
acts outside the filing period and the acts within the filing period ‘are sufficiently
related to constitute the same employment practice.’” Aplt. App. at 55 (Dist. Ct. Op.
dated July 10, 2014) (quoting Tademy v. Union Pac. Corp., 614 F.3d 1132, 1140
(10th Cir. 2008)). “Factors [used] in making that determination include whether ‘the
pre- and post-limitations period incidents involved the same type of employment
actions, occurred relatively frequently, and were perpetrated by the same’
employees.” Id. (quoting Duncan, 397 F.3d at 1309).
Here, almost all of the alleged misconduct occurred before September 9, 2010,
including Mr. Romero’s September 2008 grabbing and embarrassment of
Ms. Martinez, his harassment of other women before his departure in July 2009, and
Ms. Martinez’s complaints in her August 2010 grievance letter, which resulted in
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SWC’s September 7, 2010 disciplinary action against her. Although Ms. Martinez
attempts to avoid the time-bar by tying Mr. Romero’s pre-filing period conduct to
Mr. Stuart’s acts of exposing himself, which apparently occurred in October 2010,
the district court correctly explained that no reasonable jury could conclude that
Mr. Stuart’s conduct was part of the same hostile work environment because it was
not the same type of conduct, i.e., indecent exposure, it occurred infrequently, and it
was committed by a different perpetrator. Cf. Duncan, 397 F.3d at 1309
(distinguishing “frequent instances of threatening physical and psychological
harassment” from “off-color comments and rumor-spreading perpetrated by a
completely different set of actors”). Although Ms. Martinez attempts to predicate her
claims on the alleged misconduct of Mr. Stuart and another coworker, Gilbert Baca,
she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies regarding these individuals. See
Jones v. Runyon, 91 F.3d 1398, 1399 & n.1 (10th Cir. 1996); Luboyeski v. Hill,
872 P.2d 353, 355-56 (N.M. 1994). Indeed, she did not mention Mr. Stuart or
Mr. Baca in her original charge of discrimination, an affidavit attached to it, or her
amended charge of discrimination. Moreover, there was no reference to either person
in her complaint, and, as the district court noted, Ms. Martinez’s summary judgment
response merely cited authority for this theory without actually arguing that the
pre-September 9, 2010 conduct was related to acts that occurred during the filing
period. Under these circumstances, Ms. Martinez’s claims were time-barred, and we
affirm the grant of summary judgment on her hostile work environment claims.
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2. Constructive Discharge
Ms. Martinez also challenges the grant of summary judgment on her
constructive discharge claims brought under Title VII, § 1981, the ADEA, and her
breach-of-contract theory. “A constructive discharge occurs when a reasonable
person in the employee’s position would view her working conditions as intolerable
and would feel that she had no other choice but to quit.” Tran v. Trs. of State Colls.
in Colo., 355 F.3d 1263, 1270 (10th Cir. 2004). Ms. Martinez says she was
constructively discharged because she felt pressured to drop her complaint against
Mr. Romero and she was compelled to resign once she learned he was returning to
SWC. But any pressure she felt to drop her complaint could not have been so great
to force her to quit because she did not resign for another two-and-a-half years. See
Ulibarri v. State of N.M. Corr. Acad., 2006-NMSC-009, ¶ 14, 131 P.3d 43, 49
(N.M. 2006) (finding no constructive discharge where plaintiff waited five months to
resign). And when she finally did resign, she gave SWC no reason to believe it was
because Mr. Romero was being rehired. See West v. Marion Merrell Dow, Inc.,
54 F.3d 493, 498 (8th Cir. 1995) (“An employee who quits without giving her
employer a reasonable chance to work out a problem is not constructively
discharged.”).
In any event, these subjective views held by Ms. Martinez are irrelevant under
our objective standard for evaluating constructive discharge claims. See Lockheed
Martin Corp. v. Admin. Review Bd., 717 F.3d 1121, 1133 (10th Cir. 2013). Here, the
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objective evidence does not reflect a constructive discharge. Rather, as Ms. Martinez
indicated at her exit interview, she decided to leave SWC “to go into a new venture.”
Aplt. App. at 166. Moreover, Ms. Martinez was promoted three times throughout her
tenure, and she earned multiple pay raises, the last of which was commensurate with
performance-based raises given to others in her position, see id. at 311. Although
Ms. Martinez contends she was not promoted as quickly as her male counterparts, she
offers no evidence of a discriminatory animus.4 Likewise, she fails to offer any
evidence demonstrating that she was disciplined more severely than her male
counterparts. For instance, she complains that a male coworker’s negligence caused
an accident similar to one for which she was put on a performance improvement plan,
while the male coworker was not. She fails to mention, however, that the male
coworker was suspended for three days without pay. See id. at 216. Under these
circumstances, no reasonable jury could rule in favor of Ms. Martinez. Accordingly,
4
At her deposition, Ms. Martinez was asked to give the basis for her ADEA
claim. She replied:
Again, I’m not sure why I was being discriminated against. I did
feel I was being discriminated against the entire time, whether it was
because – I felt that it was hostile.
I don’t know whether it was against my gender. I don’t know if it
was against my race or my age or maybe it was because I was heavy.
All I know is I was singled out and made very uncomfortable.
Aplt. App. at 195-96.
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we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on her constructive
discharge claims.
C. Cross-Appeal: Remand of State-Law Claims
In its cross-appeal, SWC contends the district court abused its discretion in
remanding the IIED and negligent supervision claims to state court. See Koch v. City
of Del City, 660 F.3d 1228, 1248 (10th Cir. 2011) (reviewing for abuse of discretion).
But because we affirm the grant of summary judgment on the hostile work
environment and constructive discharge claims, there is no basis for reversing the
remand of the state-law claims. See id.
Still, SWC contends the district court effectively employed a per se rule to
decline supplemental jurisdiction simply because the federal claims were dismissed.
“[W]e have said the court should consider retaining state claims when, given the
nature and extent of pretrial proceedings, judicial economy, convenience, and
fairness would be served by retaining jurisdiction.” Wittner v. Banner Health,
720 F.3d 770, 781 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). We find no
indication that the court failed to consider these factors. In its order denying SWC’s
Rule 59(e) motion, the district court explained its decision to remand the claims,
expressly discussing considerations such as the court’s preparedness to rule on the
merits of the state-law claims, the inevitable delay caused by the denial of
supplemental jurisdiction, and matters of comity. Aplee. App. at 115. SWC insists
that remand is unfair because the state-law claims are time-barred under the
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applicable statute of limitations, but the limitations period was tolled for thirty days
following the grant of summary judgment, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d); Varnell v. Dora
Consol. Sch. Dist., 756 F.3d 1208, 1217 (10th Cir. 2014). Under these
circumstances, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in remanding the
state-law claims to state court. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Engida, 611 F.3d 1209,
1213 (10th Cir. 2010) (“Under the abuse of discretion standard, a trial court’s
decision will not be disturbed unless the appellate court has a definite and firm
conviction that the [district] court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the
bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Nor did the court abuse its discretion in denying SWC’s Rule 59(e)
motion. See Wittner, 720 F.3d at 781 (reviewing denial of Rule 59(e) motion for
abuse of discretion).
III
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Entered for the Court
Gregory A. Phillips
Circuit Judge
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