Patterson v. Santini , 631 F. App'x 531 ( 2015 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT November 12, 2015
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
GERALD LEE PATTERSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 15-1147
(D.C. No. 1:11-CV-01899-RM-KLM)
GEORGE SANTINI, M.D.; CAMACHO, (D. Colo.)
P.A.; FIVE JOHN/JANE DOES,
Defendants - Appellees.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before KELLY, LUCERO, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Gerald Lee Patterson appeals from the district court’s order denying his
motion to reopen his Bivens suit, which the district court administratively closed after
the parties entered a conditional settlement. Because the collateral proceedings that
motivated the administrative closure in this case have been resolved and Mr.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Patterson has expressed his desire to litigate his claims that are now ripe for review,
the district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Patterson’s motion to reopen.
Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we therefore reverse the district court
and order it to reopen Mr. Patterson’s administratively closed case.
I. BACKGROUND
While incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Florence,
Colorado, Mr. Patterson filed a pro se complaint in the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado alleging Federal Bureau of Prison (BOP) officials were
deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Specifically, Mr. Patterson argued BOP officials demonstrated an indifference to his
medical issues relating to herniated discs in his neck. After a magistrate judge
recommended denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court held a settlement
conference, during which the parties indicated they had reached a settlement.
The settlement agreement explained that the parties had reached “a conditional
resolution of Plaintiff’s claims.” Under this conditional resolution, the BOP agreed to
“reconsider Plaintiff’s application for compassionate release” and to make a decision
“by September 6, 2014,” in exchange for “the parties moving to administratively
close this case.” The BOP further agreed to “make a good-faith effort to reconsider
all of the applicable grounds on which Plaintiff might be entitled to compassionate
relief, including his medical condition” and to provide Mr. Patterson “appropriate
medical care” in the interim. The settlement agreement contemplated one of two
outcomes to Mr. Patterson’s application for compassionate relief. First, under the
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terms of the settlement agreement, “Should the [BOP] grant Plaintiff compassionate
release, he agrees to dismiss with prejudice all of the claims that were lodged as part
of this lawsuit or that could have been brought as part of it . . . .” The agreement
otherwise contemplated, “If the [BOP] denies Plaintiff’s request for reconsideration
of his application for compassionate release, either party may move to have the Court
reopen the . . . case to request that judicial action be taken with respect to the pending
claims.”
Based on this agreement, the parties filed a stipulated motion for
administrative closure. The district court granted the motion, ordering that the matter
be “administratively closed” pursuant to the District of Colorado Local Civil Rule
41.2. The order further provided, “The parties may reopen this matter upon motion
filed showing good cause.” See D. Colo. Civ. R 41.2 (“A district judge or a
magistrate judge exercising consent jurisdiction may order the clerk to close a civil
action administratively subject to reopening for good cause.”). The district court’s
order did not explain under what circumstances Mr. Patterson’s case could be
considered dismissed.
Less than a month later, Mr. Patterson filed a motion for clarification of the
settlement agreement. He alleged that he misunderstood the meaning of the
agreement, that he had entered into it under duress, and that had he been allowed to
consult competent counsel, he would not have agreed to the settlement agreement
unless it had guaranteed him compassionate release. The district court denied the
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motion, concluding, first, that Mr. Patterson had no right to counsel and therefore no
right to consult and, second, that he failed to substantiate his duress claim.
Mr. Patterson then filed a request for reconsideration for compassionate
release to the BOP. The BOP denied the application.1
As a result of the denial of compassionate release, Mr. Patterson filed a motion
to reopen his case for good cause, arguing the settlement had been procured under
extreme duress. Specifically, he claimed the BOP manipulated the facts, refused to
follow the appropriate policy when reviewing his application for compassionate
release, and failed to provide adequate medical treatment until his promised release
date of September 6, 2014. The district court denied the motion. The court reasoned
that the substance of Mr. Patterson’s duress claim related to the denial of his
application for compassionate release and there was no nexus between that conduct
and the procurement of the settlement agreement.
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Specifically, the BOP concluded that Mr. Patterson did not fit any of the
criteria for compassionate-release eligibility. First, it determined that although
Mr. Patterson was seventy-six years old and had served 67 percent of his sentence,
his overall medical condition was “unremarkable” and he therefore did not qualify
under a category that allows for compassionate release of inmates who are at least
sixty-five years old, who have served at least 50 percent of their sentence, and whose
health is deteriorating based on a chronic or severe medical condition. The BOP also
determined Mr. Patterson did not qualify under a second category of compassionate
release for inmates who are at least sixty-five years old and have served the greater of
ten years or 75 percent of their term of imprisonment. Finally, the BOP considered
whether Mr. Patterson would pose a danger to the community, were he released. It
concluded that his criminal history and the severity of his crime (possession with the
intent to distribute large quantities of methamphetamine and evidence showing he
was the leader of a criminal conspiracy) cut against granting his application for
compassionate release.
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Mr. Patterson then submitted a renewed motion to reopen for good cause and
submitted a sworn declaration substantiating his duress claims. The district court
denied the renewed motion. The court ruled that Mr. Patterson’s duress allegations
had substantially changed, which “undercut[] significantly the credibility of any
single characterization.” And despite Mr. Patterson’s allegation that BOP officials
had assured him that he would be released if he agreed to the settlement, the court
ruled that “[n]othing in [the settlement agreement] can remotely be taken as
suggesting that Plaintiff’s release by September 6, 2014 was guaranteed.” The court
thus concluded that although the settlement agreement permits Mr. Patterson to
request that his case be reopened, “the Local Rules still require good cause,” and,
finding none, the court denied the renewed motion to reopen Mr. Patterson’s case.
Mr. Patterson filed a notice of appeal indicating his intent to appeal the district
court’s denial of his renewed motion to reopen the case. Because the district court
had not entered a final judgment or otherwise indicated that it had dismissed Mr.
Patterson’s case, we issued an order for clarification asking the district court to
indicate whether its order denying the renewed motion to reopen constituted a final,
appealable order. In response, the district court entered a separate order dismissing
Mr. Patterson’s case with prejudice.
II. DISCUSSION
Mr. Patterson argues the district court erred in denying his renewed motion to
reopen his Bivens case for failure to show good cause. Because district courts have
broad discretion in managing their own dockets, United States v. Nicholson, 983 F.2d
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983, 988 (10th Cir. 1993), we review the denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of
discretion, see United States v. Texas, 457 F.3d 472, 476 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding “no
abuse of discretion in the district court’s . . . decision to reopen the [administratively
closed] case”). A court abuses its discretion when it “issues an arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable judgment.” Rocky Mountain Christian Church
v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 613 F.3d 1229, 1239–40 (10th Cir. 2010). Likewise, an abuse
of discretion occurs “where the district court clearly erred or ventured beyond the
limits of permissible choice under the circumstances.” Hancock v. Am. Tel. & Tel.
Co., 701 F.3d 1248, 1262 (10th Cir. 2012).
We also note Mr. Patterson’s pro se status in the district court and on appeal.
“[A] pro se litigant’s [filings] are to be construed liberally and held to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d
1090, 1096 (10th Cir. 2009) (first alteration in original). Viewing Mr. Patterson’s
motion to reopen through this liberal construction, we conclude the district court
abused its discretion in denying the motion and dismissing the case.
When a court administratively closes a case, the closure generally operates as
“the practical equivalent of a stay.” Quinn v. CGR, 828 F.2d 1463, 1465 & n.2 (10th
Cir. 1987). “Unlike a stay however, an administratively closed case is not counted as
active although it remains on the docket . . . .” SEC v. Halek, 537 F. App’x 576, 579
(5th Cir. 2013). Use of the administrative-closure mechanism allows district courts
“to remove from their pending cases suits which are temporarily active elsewhere
(such as before an arbitration panel) or stayed (such as where a bankruptcy is
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pending).” Mire v. Full Spectrum Lending Inc., 389 F.3d 163, 167 (5th Cir. 2004);
see e.g., Quinn, 828 F.2d at 1465 (administrative closure due to pending arbitration);
WRS, Inc. v. Plaza Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 424, 426 (3d Cir. 2005) (administrative
closure due to the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings); Halek, 537 F. App’x at 578
(administrative closure due to conditional settlement). Because an administratively
closed case “still exists on the docket of the district court,” it “may be reopened upon
request of the parties or on the court’s own motion.” Mire, 389 F.3d at 167 (5th Cir.
2004).
Each federal district may promulgate its own rules governing the process for
administratively closing and reopening a case. In the District of Colorado, a district
court “may order the clerk to close a civil action administratively subject to
reopening for good cause.” D. Colo. Civ. R. 41.2. Therefore, in the District of
Colorado, a party seeking to reopen a case that has been administratively closed must
demonstrate good cause. But courts have not viewed this good cause standard as an
onerous one. Instead, good cause to reopen a case exists where “the parties wish to
litigate the remaining issues that have become ripe for review.” Am. Family Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Teamcorp, Inc., 835 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1086 (D. Colo. 2011); see also Crystal
Clear Commc’ns, Inc. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 415 F.3d 1171, 1176 (10th Cir. 2005)
(“Although the district court ordered the proceeding ‘administratively close[d],’ it is
clear from the context of the order that the court contemplated continued litigation
after completion of the administrative proceedings.” (alteration in original));
Frederick v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., No. 11-CV-02306-RM-KLM, 2015 WL
7
1499662, at *1 (D. Colo. Mar. 27, 2015) (“Because administrative closure is a purely
administrative act, it has no effect on the parties’ rights or claims. Here, Defendant
seeks a determination of the parties’ rights and claims. Thus, good cause exists to
reopen the matter.” (citations omitted)); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Cantex, Inc., No. 13-CV-
00507-REB-BNB, 2014 WL 2058106, at *1 (D. Colo. May 19, 2014) (“Generally,
there is good cause to reopen when parties seek to litigate remaining issues that are
ripe for review.”).
In this case, Mr. Patterson’s case was administratively closed after the parties
entered a conditional settlement. The settlement agreement contemplated two
possible outcomes: (1) the BOP would grant Mr. Patterson’s petition for
compassionate release, which would trigger Mr. Patterson’s obligation to seek
dismissal of his case with prejudice, or (2) the BOP would deny Mr. Patterson’s
request for compassionate release, which would trigger Mr. Patterson’s right to seek
a reopening of his case. The second outcome occurred, and, pursuant to the terms of
the settlement agreement, Mr. Patterson moved the district court to reopen his case.
Although Mr. Patterson couched his good cause argument in terms of duress, he also
made clear to the district court that the BOP had denied his petition for
compassionate release and that he wished to litigate the merits of his claims. Because
the condition that would have triggered an obligation to dismiss the case failed to
occur and because Mr. Patterson expressed his desire to litigate his claims, good
cause existed to reopen Mr. Patterson’s case. See, e.g., Halek, 537 F. App’x at 579–
80 (affirming the reopening of an administratively closed case after proposed
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settlement reached an impasse). In requiring proof of something more than a desire to
litigate issues that had become ripe for review, the district court abused its discretion
by applying an incorrect legal standard.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s denial of
Mr. Patterson’s motion to reopen his case and REMAND with instruction to reopen
the case to allow the parties to litigate the merits of Mr. Patterson’s claims. We also
GRANT Mr. Patterson’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis but remind him of his
obligation to make partial payments until the filing fees are paid in full.
Entered for the Court
Carolyn B. McHugh
Circuit Judge
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