Ricardo v. Ray ( 2000 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
AUG 4 2000
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JUAN FRANCISCO RICARDO,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
No. 00-1150
(D.C. No. 00-Z-364)
CHARLES RAY; ATTORNEY
(D. Colo.)
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF
COLORADO,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, EBEL and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
Proceeding pro se, Juan Francisco Ricardo (“Ricardo”), a prisoner at Ben
County Correctional Facility at Las Animas, Colorado, seeks to appeal the district
court’s denial of his habeas corpus petition. Ricardo filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 claiming that: (1) he is being denied
*
After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R.
34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This
Order and Judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be
cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
due process and equal protection by having to serve his entire sentence without
the benefit of credits for presentence confinement, earned time, and good time
because he is an illegal immigrant; (2) he is being subjected to cruel and unusual
punishment because the state correctional system intentionally creates inordinate
delays to keep him incarcerated past his release date; and (3) the D.O.C. and the
parole board are subjecting him to cruel and unusual punishment by requiring him
to serve more of his sentence than other inmates with the same conviction and
sentence. The district court determined that Ricardo had failed to exhaust state
remedies and dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The district court
also denied Ricardo’s requests for a certificate of appealability (“COA”) and for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. Ricardo, reasserting the claims
raised before the district court, now requests this court to grant COA. We deny
Ricardo’s request for a COA.
As a threshold matter, the district court concluded that the action should be
construed under § 2254 presumably because Ricardo is challenging his custody
pursuant to the judgment of the state court. However, as we stated in Montez v.
McKinna, 208 F.3d 862 (10th Cir. 2000), a petition filed by a state prisoner
challenging the execution of a sentence, rather than the validity of a conviction
and/or sentence, is properly brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Id. at 865. Here,
Ricardo is challenging the execution of his sentence, rather than the validity of
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the conviction itself, therefore, this court will treat the petition as one arising
under § 2241.
This court has held that “consistent with the plain language of
§ 2253(c)(1)(A), . . . a state prisoner must obtain a COA to appeal the denial of a
habeas petition, whether such petition was filed pursuant to § 2254 or § 2241.”
Montez, 208 F.3d at 867. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Slack v.
McDaniel, 120 S.Ct. 1595 (2000) controls our analysis of Ricardo’s request for a
COA. Under § 2253(c)(2), a COA may issue “only if the applicant has made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2). When a district court denies a habeas petition on procedural
grounds without reaching the merits of the petitioner’s claim, as the district court
in this case did when it dismissed Ricardo’s petition for failure to exhaust state
remedies, “a COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of
reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the
denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable
whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack, 120 S.Ct.
at 1604. The Court further explained that, “[e]ach component of the § 2253(c)
showing is part of a threshold inquiry, and a court may find that it can dispose of
the application in a fair and prompt manner if it proceeds first to resolve the issue
whose answer is more apparent from the record and arguments.” Id. The Court
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then reiterated the legal principle that courts are encouraged to resolve the
procedural issues if possible and thereby avoid passing upon the constitutional
issue. Id.
In this case, “jurists of reason” would not find it debatable whether Ricardo
exhausted his state court remedies before seeking relief. This court has held that
a habeas petitioner is required to exhaust state remedies under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Montez, 208 F.3d at 866. “The exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the issues
have been properly presented to the highest state court, either by direct review of
the conviction or in a postconviction attack.” Brown v. Shanks, 185 F.3d 1122,
1124 (10th Cir. 1999) (internal quotations omitted). Ricardo does not dispute that
he has failed to raise these issues before a state court on either direct review or in
a postconviction attack. As a result, Ricardo has not presented the issues he
raises in his habeas petition to the Colorado Supreme Court, and therefore has not
satisfied the exhaustion requirement.
Ricardo argues, however, that he should be exempt from the exhaustion
requirement because of the inordinate delays by the “state administrative and/or
court corrective system,” that he alleges will occur if he is required to first
exhaust his claims. While we have held that “[i]nordinate and unjustified delay
by the state in adjudicating a direct criminal appeal can make the state process
ineffective to protect the petitioner’s rights,” Harris v. Champion, 48 F.3d 1127,
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1132 (10th Cir. 1995) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added), this holding
is of no help to Ricardo. First, if Ricardo were to return to state court to exhaust
his state remedies he would be doing so pursuant to state post-conviction
proceedings. Thus, it is unclear whether Harris would even apply given that any
delay would be on state habeas, rather than on direct criminal appeal. Second,
even if we were to extend Harris to cover state habeas proceedings, Ricardo
cannot currently show that the state habeas procedures have resulted in an
“inordinate and unjustified delay” because he has not yet filed anything in the
state courts. Thus, no clock has started to click by which we could measure the
length of a delay. Ricardo’s assertions that there will be a delay are insufficient
to suspend the exhaustion requirement.
Ricardo’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.
Ricardo’s request for a COA is DENIED and the appeal is DISMISSED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
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