Sanchez v. Hartley , 810 F.3d 750 ( 2016 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
PUBLISH Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS January 11, 2016
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
_________________________________
TYLER SANCHEZ,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 14-1385
JOE RYAN HARTLEY, Detective,
in his individual capacity; RYAN
WOLFF, Detective, in his individual
capacity; MIKE DUFFY, Detective,
in his individual capacity;
HEATHER MYKES, Detective, in
her individual capacity; MICHAEL
DICKSON, Investigator, in his
individual capacity; BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF
DOUGLAS COUNTY, COLORADO;
DOUGLAS COUNTY SHERIFF’S
OFFICE,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT
ATTORNEY FOR THE
EIGHTEENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT,
Defendant.
_________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado
(D.C. No. 1:13-CV-01945-WJM-CBS)
_________________________________
Kelly Dunnaway (Christopher K. Pratt, with him on the briefs), Douglas
County Attorney’s Office, Castle Rock, Colorado, for Mike Duffy,
Detective Heather Mykes, The Board of County Commissioners of Douglas
County, and Douglas County Sheriff’s Office, Defendants-Appellants.
Keith M. Goman (Andrew David Ringel, with him on the briefs), Hall &
Evans, LLC, Denver, Colorado, for Michael Dickson, Defendant-Appellant.
Gordon L. Vaughan, and Ann B. Smith, Vaughan & DeMuro, Colorado
Springs, Colorado, on the briefs, for Joe Ryan Hartley and Ryan Wolff,
Defendants-Appellants.
John A. Culver (Seth J. Benezra, with him on the brief), Benezra & Culver,
Lakewood, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
_________________________________
Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, MURPHY, and BACHARACH,
Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
BACHARACH, Circuit Judge.
_________________________________
Mr. Tyler Sanchez sued state detectives and an investigator, alleging
that they had used a confession to obtain legal process even though they
knew the confession was untrue. The defendants moved to dismiss based in
part on qualified immunity and expiration of the limitations period. The
district court rejected both grounds, and the defendants brought this
interlocutory appeal. We affirm the district court’s denial of the
defendants’ motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity; and we
dismiss the defendants’ appeal of the district court’s ruling on the statute
of limitations, holding that we lack jurisdiction on this part of the appeal.
2
I. Mr. Sanchez’s Claim
This appeal grew out of an investigation into a 2009 burglary and
sexual assault of an 8-year-old girl. Four detectives (Joe Ryan Hartley,
Ryan Wolff, Mike Duffy, and Heather Mykes) and an investigator (Michael
Dickson) participated in the investigation. In carrying out the
investigation, the detectives and investigator interviewed Mr. Sanchez, an
18-year-old with substantial cognitive disabilities. After lengthy
interviews, Mr. Sanchez confessed to the burglary but not the sexual
assault. The confession led the district attorney to charge Mr. Sanchez with
burglary and sexual assault. Based in part on this confession, multiple
judges found probable cause, resulting in pretrial detention.
Mr. Sanchez alleges that his confession was false, explaining that he
confessed only because his disabilities prevented him from understanding
what was happening during the interviews. A subsequent medical
examination supported Mr. Sanchez’s explanation, and the district attorney
dropped the charges in April 2012.
After dismissal of the charges, Mr. Sanchez sued under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, arguing that the defendants had committed malicious prosecution
in violation of the Fourth Amendment by using a false confession to
institute legal process and cause continued pretrial detention.
The defendants moved for dismissal, and the district court denied the
motion. The defendants then brought this interlocutory appeal, arguing that
3
the district court should have ordered dismissal based on qualified
immunity and the statute of limitations. These arguments do not justify
reversal. Mr. Sanchez’s factual allegations are sufficient to overcome
qualified immunity at the pleadings stage, and we lack appellate
jurisdiction on the issue involving the statute of limitations.
II. We engage in de novo review of the district court’s denial of
qualified immunity.
In considering the defense of qualified immunity, we engage in de
novo review. Peterson v. Jensen, 371 F.3d 1199, 1201-02 (10th Cir. 2004).
This review is based on our standards for dismissal and qualified
immunity.
Under the standard for dismissal, we assume that all of the
allegations in the complaint are true and view the reasonable inferences in
the light most favorable to Mr. Sanchez. Anderson v. Suiters, 499 F.3d
1228, 1232 (10th Cir. 2007). In applying this standard to the defense of
qualified immunity, we consider whether Mr. Sanchez’s factual allegations
and related inferences show the violation of a clearly established
constitutional right. Lybrook v. Members of Farmington Mun. Sch. Bd. of
Educ., 232 F.3d 1334, 1337 (10th Cir. 2000).
4
III. Mr. Sanchez adequately pleaded the violation of a clearly
established constitutional right.
Mr. Sanchez argues that the complaint stated a constitutional
violation by alleging that the detectives and investigator had used a
confession that they knew was untrue. We agree.
A. Mr. Sanchez alleged the violation of a constitutional right.
In the complaint, Mr. Sanchez brings a § 1983 claim against the
defendants for malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. In our view, Mr. Sanchez adequately pleaded the violation of
a constitutional right. 1
According to Mr. Sanchez, the detectives and investigator sought
legal process based on the confession even though they either knew the
confession was untrue or recklessly ignored that possibility. If Mr.
Sanchez’s allegation is credited, it would involve a constitutional
violation, for we have held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits officers
from knowingly or recklessly relying on false information to institute legal
process when that process results in an unreasonable seizure. Pierce v.
Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1292, 1298-99 (10th Cir. 2004). Therefore, Mr.
1
“Under our cases, a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim includes the
following elements: (1) the defendant caused the plaintiff’s continued
confinement or prosecution; (2) the original action terminated in favor of
the plaintiff; (3) no probable cause supported the original arrest, continued
confinement, or prosecution; (4) the defendant acted with malice; and (5)
the plaintiff sustained damages.” Wilkins v. DeReyes, 528 F.3d 790, 799
(10th Cir. 2008).
5
Sanchez’s factual allegations, if proven, would entail a Fourth Amendment
violation.
The defendants do not dispute that in the abstract, the Constitution is
violated when an officer knowingly or recklessly uses false information to
institute legal process. See Appellants’ Reply Br. at 19 (conceding that the
defendants “do not argue it is constitutional to knowingly use false
statements”). Instead, the defendants present five reasons that the
complaint fails to allege violation of a constitutional right for purposes of
Section 1983 2:
1. Section 1983 does not permit recovery for malicious
prosecution under the Fourth Amendment.
2. In the complaint, Mr. Sanchez did not adequately allege
knowledge or recklessness.
3. Mr. Sanchez’s only possible claim is for false imprisonment,
not malicious prosecution.
4. A malicious-prosecution theory could implicate the District
Attorney, but not the detectives or the investigator because
they could not have decided to prosecute Mr. Sanchez.
5. Mr. Sanchez has not alleged conduct that would shock the
conscience.
2
The appeal was brought by all defendants, including the Douglas
County Board of County Commissioners and the Douglas County Sheriff’s
Office. But qualified immunity is available only to defendants sued in their
individual capacities. Langley v. Adams Cty., 987 F.2d 1473, 1477 (10th
Cir. 1993). Thus, the district court’s ruling on qualified immunity affected
only the individual defendants, not the board of county commissioners or
the sheriff’s office.
6
We reject each argument.
1. Under § 1983, an arrestee can recover for malicious
prosecution under the Fourth Amendment.
The defendants argue that § 1983 might allow recovery for malicious
prosecution based on violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, but not the
Fourth Amendment. We disagree, for we have repeatedly recognized a
cause of action under § 1983 for malicious prosecution under the Fourth
Amendment. See, e.g., Myers v. Koopman, 738 F.3d 1190, 1194 (10th Cir.
2013) (discussing a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution under the
Fourth Amendment); Wilkins v. DeReyes, 528 F.3d 790, 797 (10th Cir.
2008) (same); Taylor v. Meacham, 82 F.3d 1556, 1560-61 (10th Cir. 1996)
(same).
The defendants point to two opinions in arguing that § 1983 does not
allow recovery for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment:
Mondragón v. Thompson and Rehberg v. Paulk. The defendants’ reliance
on these opinions is misguided.
The defendants first argue that under Mondragón v. Thompson, 519
F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 2008), a malicious prosecution resulting in legal
process is actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment as a deprivation of
procedural due process, but is not actionable under the Fourth Amendment.
It is true that Mondragón recognized the existence of a § 1983 malicious-
prosecution claim based on the Fourteenth Amendment. Mondragón, 519
7
F.3d at 1083. In dictum, we questioned whether the same claim could also
be based on the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1083 n.4. In subsequent cases,
however, we squarely addressed this question, recognizing a cause of
action under § 1983 for malicious prosecution based on the Fourth
Amendment. See, e.g., Myers v. Koopman, 738 F.3d 1190, 1194 (10th Cir.
2013). Our dictum in Mondragón does not negate our more recent
pronouncements recognizing such a cause of action under § 1983.
The defendants also argue that reliance on the Fourth Amendment is
precluded by Rehberg v. Paulk, U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 1497 (2012). But
Rehberg does not bear on our issue. There the Supreme Court held only
that “a grand jury witness,” including a law-enforcement officer, “has
absolute immunity from any § 1983 claim based on the witness’
testimony.” Rehberg, 132 S. Ct. at 1506. Mr. Sanchez’s allegations relate
to the defendants’ conduct before Mr. Sanchez was charged, not testimony
before a grand jury. Thus, Rehberg does not undermine our precedents
allowing recovery under § 1983 for malicious prosecution based on
violation of the Fourth Amendment.
In our view, a cause of action exists under § 1983 for malicious
prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
8
2. The complaint contains sufficient allegations of knowledge
or recklessness.
To state a claim for a Fourth Amendment violation, Mr. Sanchez
bears the burden of alleging facts indicating not only that the confession
was untrue, but also that the defendants either knew that the confession
was untrue or recklessly disregarded that possibility. See Wolford v.
Lasater, 78 F.3d 484, 489 (10th Cir. 1996) (“It is a violation of the Fourth
Amendment for an arrest warrant affiant to ‘knowingly, or with reckless
disregard for the truth,’ include false statements in the affidavit.” (quoting
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155 (1978))). Relying on this burden,
the defendants argue that Mr. Sanchez failed to allege facts indicating
knowledge that the confession was untrue or reckless disregard of this
possibility. We disagree.
On this issue, we must determine whether Mr. Sanchez has plausibly
alleged the defendants’ knowledge or reckless disregard for the truth. See
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (holding that to
survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must “state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face”). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Thus, “a well-pleaded complaint may
proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of [the alleged]
9
facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.’”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236
(1974)).
Mr. Sanchez satisfied this standard. In the complaint, he provided
factual allegations and details that would plausibly indicate that the
defendants either knew the confession was untrue or acted in reckless
disregard of the truth. For example, Mr. Sanchez alleged these six facts in
the complaint:
1. The victim of the sexual assault gave a description of her
attacker that did not suggest Mr. Sanchez. According to the
victim, the attacker was roughly 40 years old, weighed about
190 pounds, had no tattoos, and had brown hair parted down the
middle. See Appellants’ App’x at 109. Mr. Sanchez was only 18
years old, weighed only about 130 pounds, had prominently
displayed tattoos on both arms, and had buzz-cut red hair. See
id. The detectives and investigator knew that Mr. Sanchez did
not fit the victim’s description of the perpetrator. See id. at 111
(Detectives Wolff and Hartley), 114 (Detectives Duffy and
Mykes), 118 (Investigator Dickson).
2. Mr. Sanchez has pronounced cognitive and developmental
disabilities and IQ test scores in the 60s and 70s. These
disabilities cause Mr. Sanchez to engage in noticeably unusual
behavior. See id. at 108-09.
3. In interviews with the defendants, Mr. Sanchez had significant
difficulty understanding and responding to questions. See, e.g.,
id. at 110-12, 114-15.
4. Mr. Sanchez’s unusual behavior in the interviews was amplified
by fatigue. He had been awake for over 30 hours by the end of
the interviews, and he repeatedly told the defendants that he
was tired and spoke with his eyes closed. See id. at 113-14, 117.
10
5. The detectives and investigator noticed Mr. Sanchez’s unusual
behavior. At one point, two detectives asked Mr. Sanchez if he
was simply saying what they wanted to hear. See id. at 112
(Detectives Wolff and Hartley). One of the detectives wrote
that Mr. Sanchez had difficulty remembering details of his
supposed crimes and had given vague answers. See id.
(Detective Wolff). Two other detectives suspected
intoxication, asking Mr. Sanchez to take a urine test to verify
that he was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol. See id.
at 116 (Detectives Mykes and Duffy). And the investigator
observed that Mr. Sanchez was behaving unusually and
experiencing difficulty answering questions. See id. at 119
(Investigator Dickson).
6. Mr. Sanchez was unable to give any details regarding his
involvement in the crime. Instead, Mr. Sanchez simply agreed
to the details suggested to him. At one point, Mr. Sanchez
agreed to an untrue detail that the investigator had posed (that
Mr. Sanchez had climbed into the victim’s second-story
window with a ladder). As the investigator knew, no ladder was
found at the scene. See id. at 122.
These alleged facts plausibly support the required inference of the
defendants’ knowledge or recklessness.
In oral argument, defense counsel suggested that the complaint does
not contain sufficient factual allegations to support an inference of
knowledge or recklessness against the investigator. Oral Argument at
31:40-33:10. We disagree. The complaint alleges that (1) the investigator
noticed Mr. Sanchez’s abnormal behavior and inability to provide any
detail about the burglary and sexual assault and (2) Mr. Sanchez agreed to
a detail about the crime that the investigator knew was untrue. These
allegations plausibly support the required inference that the investigator
11
knew that the confession was untrue or recklessly disregarded this
possibility.
3. The initial warrantless arrest of Mr. Sanchez does not ``
invalidate Mr. Sanchez’s claim of malicious prosecution.
Our case law distinguishes between seizures based on whether they
are imposed with or without legal process. Though both types of seizures
implicate the Fourth Amendment, seizures imposed pursuant to legal
process generally trigger claims for malicious prosecution, while seizures
imposed without legal process generally trigger claims for false
imprisonment. Myers v. Koopman, 738 F.3d 1190, 1194 (10th Cir. 2013).
Based on this distinction, the defendants argue that Mr. Sanchez could
assert only a false-imprisonment claim because he was arrested and
detained without a warrant.
This argument is foreclosed by Wilkins v. DeReyes, 528 F.3d 790(10th Cir. 2008). There we recognized a cause of action under § 1983 for
malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment for seizures
that occur after a warrantless arrest. Wilkins, 528 F.3d at 798. “If arrested
without a warrant . . . a plaintiff can challenge the probable cause
determination made during the constitutionally-required probable cause
hearing,” which must occur after the initial warrantless arrest. Id. (citation
omitted). A plaintiff who brings such a challenge “would state a Fourth
12
Amendment violation sufficient to support a § 1983 malicious prosecution
cause of action.” Id. at 799.
Our holding in Wilkins forecloses the defendants’ argument that Mr.
Sanchez is confined to a false-imprisonment claim because he was arrested
without a warrant. It is true that the defendants initially arrested Mr.
Sanchez without a warrant and, therefore, without legal process. But after
this warrantless arrest, there were multiple judicial determinations of
probable cause to detain Mr. Sanchez on all of the pending charges. Based
on this legal process, Mr. Sanchez spent an additional 125 days in jail.
Under Wilkins, Mr. Sanchez’s theory states a valid claim under
§ 1983 for malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment,
and Mr. Sanchez’s initial warrantless arrest is immaterial to the validity of
this claim. See id. 3
4. The malicious-prosecution theory is not confined to the
District Attorney.
The defendants also argue that the malicious-prosecution claim must
be confined to the District Attorney because he was the official who
decided to prosecute. The defendants provide no support for this argument,
and it is invalid under Pierce v. Gilchrist. There we held that a malicious-
3
After releasing Mr. Sanchez, the district court imposed pretrial
restrictions. The defendants argue that restrictions on movement did not
qualify as a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. We need not address this
argument because the jailing for 125 days constituted a seizure.
13
prosecution theory would lie against a forensic analyst even though she did
not (and could not) decide to prosecute:
[The forensic analyst] cannot “hide behind” the fact that she
neither initiated nor filed the charges against [the plaintiff].
The actions of a police forensic analyst who prevaricates and
distorts evidence to convince the prosecuting authorities to
press charges is no less reprehensible than an officer who,
through false statements, prevails upon a magistrate to issue a
warrant. In each case the government official maliciously
abuses a position of trust to induce the criminal justice system
to confine and then to prosecute an innocent defendant.
Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1293 (10th Cir. 2004); see also
Stonecipher v. Valles, 759 F.3d 1134, 1147 (10th Cir. 2014) (“Of course,
the fact that a government lawyer makes the final decision to prosecute
does not automatically immunize an officer from liability for malicious
prosecution.”).
Like the forensic analyst in Pierce, the four detectives and
investigator would incur liability under a malicious-prosecution theory if
they knowingly or recklessly used false information to institute legal
process.
5. The shock-the-conscience standard does not bear on Mr.
Sanchez’s Fourth Amendment claim.
The defendants argue that Mr. Sanchez has not pleaded facts that
would shock the conscience. But this argument is irrelevant because Mr.
Sanchez did not need to plead facts that shock the conscience.
14
The “shock the conscience” standard governs claims involving
substantive due process. Ruiz v. McDonnell, 299 F.3d 1173, 1183 (10th
Cir. 2002). Reliance on this standard is mistaken because Mr. Sanchez has
not invoked substantive due process. Instead, he invokes the Fourth
Amendment. For a claim under the Fourth Amendment, Mr. Sanchez need
not plead facts that shock the conscience. See Frohmader v. Wayne, 958
F.2d 1024, 1027 (10th Cir. 1992) (“The due process standard is more
onerous than the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard since the
former requires, in addition to undue force, personal malice amounting to
an abuse of official power sufficient to shock the conscience.”).
* * *
Because Mr. Sanchez has pleaded facts reflecting a constitutional
violation, we must determine if the underlying right was clearly
established when the alleged violation took place.
B. The underlying right under the Fourth Amendment was
clearly established when the violation occurred.
Mr. Sanchez alleges that the defendants either knowingly or
recklessly used an untrue confession to initiate legal process. As we have
explained, this conduct would violate the Fourth Amendment. But to
overcome qualified immunity, Mr. Sanchez must also show that the
underlying right was clearly established in 2009, when the events took
place. He has made that showing.
15
1. The underlying constitutional right was clearly established
at the time of the alleged conduct.
By 2009, our precedents had clearly established that the defendants’
alleged actions would have violated the Fourth Amendment. Five years
earlier, we had held in Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004),
that “[n]o one could doubt that the prohibition on falsification or omission
of evidence, knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth, was firmly
established as of 1986, in the context of information supplied to support a
warrant for arrest.” 359 F.3d 1279, 1298 (10th Cir. 2004). Under Pierce,
the four detectives and investigator should have known by 2009 that the
knowing or reckless use of a false confession would violate the Fourth
Amendment.
2. The defendants’ arguments to the contrary are invalid.
The defendants present three arguments that Mr. Sanchez’s asserted
constitutional right was not clearly established in 2009:
1. The Fourth Amendment did not require accommodation of a
cognitive disability.
2. The contours of a malicious-prosecution claim were ill defined.
3. It was not clearly established that a seizure imposed pursuant
to wrongful legal process would violate the Fourth Amendment
(as opposed to the Fourteenth Amendment).
Each argument is invalid.
First, the defendants contend that the Fourth Amendment did not
clearly require interrogators to (1) determine whether a suspect had
16
cognitive disabilities or (2) accommodate these disabilities. But this
contention reflects confusion on Mr. Sanchez’s claim. Mr. Sanchez claims
that the defendants either knew that his confession was untrue or recklessly
disregarded that possibility. If that was the case, the defendants would
have violated the Fourth Amendment, regardless of whether they had a
specific duty to ascertain and accommodate Mr. Sanchez’s cognitive
difficulties.
Second, the defendants argue that the contours of a § 1983 claim for
malicious prosecution were not clearly defined in 2009. But this argument
confuses the alleged constitutional violation with the underlying cause of
action that provides a remedy for the violation. Section 1983 merely
provides a cause of action; the substantive rights are created elsewhere.
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979); see also Taylor v.
Meacham, 82 F.3d 1556, 1561 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[O]ur circuit takes the
common law elements of malicious prosecution as the ‘starting point’ for
the analysis of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, but always reaches
the ultimate question . . . of whether the plaintiff has proven a
constitutional violation.” (emphasis in original)). As a result, the contours
of a malicious-prosecution claim do not help resolve the material question
in this appeal: whether the Constitution would clearly have prohibited the
knowing or reckless use of a false confession in 2009. As discussed above,
our precedents had clearly recognized this prohibition by 2009.
17
Third, the defendants argue that in 2009, it was not clearly
established whether the underlying constitutional violation would involve
the Fourth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment’s right to procedural
due process. For this argument, the defendants rely on Mondragón v.
Thompson, 519 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 2008). In Mondragón, we held that if
a defendant “has been imprisoned pursuant to legal but wrongful process,
he has a claim under the procedural component of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause analogous to a tort claim for malicious
prosecution.” Mondragón, 519 F.3d at 1082. In dictum we added that we
did not “foreclose the additional, though unlikely, possibility” that such
wrongful process could also give rise to a separate violation of the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 1083 n.4.
We reject the defendants’ argument for two reasons.
First, we said in Pierce v. Gilchrist, which preceded Mondragón, that
it was a Fourth Amendment violation to knowingly or recklessly use false
information to initiate legal process when that process leads to an
unreasonable seizure. Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1298-99 (10th
Cir. 2004).
Second, after our dictum in Mondragón, we held in Wilkins v.
DeReyes that an arrestee can bring a malicious-prosecution claim when
legal process is initiated and results in an unreasonable seizure under the
Fourth Amendment. Wilkins v. DeReyes, 528 F.3d 790, 797 (10th Cir.
18
2008). 4 Thus, by 2009, our holding in Wilkins would have provided notice
to the detectives and the investigator that their alleged conduct would
violate the Fourth Amendment. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,
640 (1987) (holding that for a constitutional right to be clearly established,
“[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable
official would understand that what he is doing violates that right”).
In these circumstances, we conclude that the defendants should have
realized that the knowing or reckless use of a false confession to institute
legal process would violate a clearly established constitutional right. The
purported uncertainty did not involve the constitutionality of the conduct;
instead, the purported uncertainty involved whether the violation would
● constitute malicious prosecution or false imprisonment
and
● involve the Fourth Amendment or the Fourteenth
Amendment’s right to procedural due process.
4
The defendants characterize this conclusion in Wilkins as dictum
rather than a holding. We respectfully disagree with this characterization.
In Wilkins, the plaintiffs asserted a cause of action for malicious
prosecution after the initiation of legal process. Wilkins v. DeReyes, 528
F.3d 790, 799 (10th Cir. 2008). In light of this characterization of the
claim, we analyzed it as a malicious-prosecution claim under the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 797; see also Myers v. Koopman, 738 F.3d 1190, 1194-
95 (10th Cir. 2013) (relying on Wilkins and holding that “[u]nreasonable
seizures imposed with legal process precipitate Fourth Amendment
malicious-prosecution claims”). Thus, our recognition of a Fourth
Amendment malicious-prosecution claim, after the initiation of legal
process, was necessary to Wilkins’s disposition. See Seminole Tribe of Fla.
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67 (1996) (distinguishing holdings from dicta).
19
In our view, the defendants misread our precedents, which by 2009 had
clearly recognized malicious-prosecution claims under the Fourth
Amendment after the initiation of a legal process resulting in an
unreasonable seizure.
* * *
The district court properly held that Mr. Sanchez had adequately
alleged the violation of a clearly established constitutional right. As a
result, we uphold the denial of the defendants’ motion to dismiss on the
basis of qualified immunity.
IV. We decline to assert pendent appellate jurisdiction on the issue
involving the statute of limitations.
The defendants also argue that the malicious-prosecution claim is
barred by the statute of limitations. We have discretion over whether to
address this argument at the interlocutory stage. Exercising this discretion,
we decline to decide whether the claim is time-barred.
The threshold issue is whether we can consider this issue. Although
an interlocutory appeal is ordinarily available upon the denial of qualified
immunity, an interlocutory appeal for the statute of limitations is
ordinarily not appealable. See Wilkins v. DeReyes, 528 F.3d 790, 796 (10th
Cir. 2008) (“A statute of limitations defense is ordinarily not appealable as
part of an interlocutory qualified immunity appeal.”). Therefore, we can
decide whether Mr. Sanchez’s claim is time-barred only if we first exercise
20
pendent appellate jurisdiction over that issue. Moore v. City of
Wynnewood, 57 F.3d 924, 929 (10th Cir. 1995).
But the exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction is both
discretionary and “generally disfavored.” Id. Using this discretion, we
decline to decide the issue of timeliness.
Although we have rejected the defendants’ arguments for qualified
immunity, our analysis of that issue may not fully resolve the defendants’
argument on the statute of limitations. See id. at 930 (holding that pendent
appellate jurisdiction is appropriate only “when the appellate resolution of
the [appealable issue] necessarily resolves the [otherwise non-appealable
issue] as well” (emphasis in original)).
Because we decline to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over
the defendants’ argument on the statute of limitations, we dismiss this
portion of the defendants’ appeal based on a lack of appellate jurisdiction.
See Cox v. Glanz, 800 F.3d 1231, 1257 (10th Cir. 2015).
V. Disposition
We affirm the district court’s denial of the defendants’ motion to
dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity; and we dismiss the portion of
the appeal relating to the statute of limitations, holding that we lack
appellate jurisdiction.
21