United States v. Jones , 634 F. App'x 649 ( 2015 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT December 15, 2015
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 15-2128
v. (D.C. No. 2:10-CR-00101-RB-1)
(D. N.M.)
JONATHAN BROOKS JONES,
Defendant - Appellant.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before HARTZ, BALDOCK, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.**
_________________________________
Defendant Jonathan Jones pleaded guilty through a binding plea agreement to
possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine and aiding and
abetting. The district court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced him to the
stipulated 105 months’ incarceration. After the Sentencing Commission reduced the
base offense level for the offense to which Jones pleaded guilty, he moved the district
court to reduce his sentence. Because we conclude Jones’ sentence was not based on
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
the sentencing range that has since been modified, the district court lacked
jurisdiction to consider his motions. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
we remand with instructions to the district court to vacate its previous orders and
dismiss Jones’ motion.
I.
In 2010, Jones pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B), and aiding and abetting, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2. In his plea agreement pursuant to rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Jones and the government stipulated that a
sentence of 105 months was appropriate. The district court imposed the agreed-upon
sentence. In 2015, Jones moved the district court to modify his sentence through
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which authorizes district courts to reduce previously imposed
sentences in limited circumstances, and United States Sentencing Guidelines
§ 1B1.10, which retroactively reduced the base offense level for the amount of
cocaine to which Jones pleaded guilty to possessing. The district court denied Jones’
motion in a brief order, and when Jones moved the district court to reconsider, it
issued an opinion again denying Jones relief, explaining that Jones’ plea agreement
did not expressly indicate that the stipulated term of imprisonment was based on the
Guidelines. Jones appeals the district court’s first order denying his § 3582(c)(2)
motion.
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II.
Although federal courts generally lack jurisdiction to modify a term of
imprisonment after it has been imposed, see United States v. Graham, 704 F.3d 1275,
1277 (10th Cir. 2013), Congress has expressly given courts discretion to reduce a
sentence that was “based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered
by the Sentencing Commission” after considering the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
and the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). In
determining whether a defendant is entitled to have his originally-imposed sentence
reduced, we review the first step de novo: whether a district court has jurisdiction to
consider a particular reduction request, that is, whether the sentence reduction is
authorized. United States v. White, 765 F.3d 1240, 1245 (10th Cir. 2014) cert. denied,
135 S. Ct. 1009 (2015). We review the second step of the analysis for an abuse of
discretion: whether the reduction is warranted considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors and the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements. Id.
Because Jones entered into a rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, we must determine
whether his sentence was based on the sentencing range that has since been lowered, a
question that goes to the first step regarding the district court’s jurisdiction under
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Freeman v. U.S., 131 S.
Ct. 2685 (2011), which we have explained represents the controlling holding, see
Graham, 704 F.3d at 1278, outlines two situations in which a rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea
agreement is based on a Guidelines sentencing range: (1) when the agreement “call[s] for
the defendant to be sentenced within a particular Guidelines sentencing range,” or
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(2) when the plea agreement “provide[s] for a specific term of imprisonment . . . but also
make[s] clear that the basis for the specific term is a Guidelines sentencing range
applicable to the offense to which the defendant pleaded guilty.” Freeman, 131 S. Ct. at
2697–98 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment). In this second situation, the
sentencing range that forms the basis of the specified term should be “evident from the
agreement itself.” Id.
Justice Sotomayor determined that Freeman’s plea agreement fell within the
second situation. Freeman’s agreement stated that he “agrees to have his sentence
determined pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines,” and that the court should impose a
term of 106 months imprisonment. Freeman, 131 S. Ct. at 2699. The plea agreement
provided additional information regarding Freeman’s 60-month mandatory minimum
sentence for his first conviction, as well as his offense level and criminal history category
necessary to calculate the 46 to 57 month range applicable to his second conviction.
Taken together, Justice Sotomayor determined the stipulated term of 106 months in the
plea agreement was his mandatory minimum sentence plus the lowest end of the
guideline range for his second offense. Therefore, Freeman’s term of imprisonment
was “based on” a Guidelines sentencing range. Id. at 2700.
Because Jones’ plea agreement does not state a sentencing range but rather
specifies that a sentence of 105 months is appropriate, we must determine whether the
plea agreement “make[s] clear that the basis for that specific term is a Guidelines
sentencing range applicable to the offense” to which Jones pleaded guilty. Freeman, 131
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S. Ct. at 2697 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment). Jones’ plea agreement
contains the following stipulations:
10. The United States and the defendant stipulate as follows:
a. The defendant and the United States agree, pursuant to Fed.
R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) and U.S.S.G. § 6B1.2(c), that the appropriate
sentence in this case is 105 months. The remaining components of the
defendant’s sentence, including but not limited to any fine or restitution and
the length and conditions of supervised release, shall be imposed by the
Court after the presentation of evidence and/or argument by the parties.
b. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c), the parties stipulate that the
defendant is responsible for 503.7 net grams of cocaine.
c. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), the defendant has clearly
demonstrated a recognition and affirmative acceptance of personal
responsibility for the defendant’s criminal conduct. Consequently, so long
as the defendant continues to accept responsibility for the defendant’s
criminal conduct, the defendant is entitled to a reduction of two (2) levels
from the base offense level as calculated under the sentencing guidelines.
This reduction is contingent upon the defendant providing an appropriate
oral or written statement to the United States Probation officer who
prepares the presentence report in this case in which the defendant clearly
establishes the defendant’s entitlement to this reduction.
d. Provided the defendant meets the requirements of U.S.S.G.
§ 3E1.1(b), the government agrees to move for a reduction of one (1)
additional level from the base offense level as calculated under the
sentencing guidelines.
The stipulations in Jones’ plea agreement certainly mention the Sentencing Guidelines,
including § 2D1.1(c), the Drug Quantity Table that has since been altered. But simply
mentioning the Guidelines in a plea agreement does not “make[] clear” what sentencing
range is applicable. As Justice Sotomayor noted, “in most cases the Government and the
defendant will negotiate the term of imprisonment in a (C) agreement by reference to the
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applicable Guidelines provisions.” Freeman, 131 S. Ct. at 2697 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring in judgment); see also id. (“[P]lea bargaining necessarily occurs in the
shadow of the sentencing scheme to which the defendant would otherwise be subject.”).
Since Freeman, we’ve recognized several instances when sentences stipulated
in rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreements were not based on a sentencing range. See, e.g.,
United States v. Falcon-Sanchez, No. 15-3127, 2015 WL 7567489, at *1 (10th Cir. Nov.
25, 2015) (unpublished) (explaining that the plea agreement stipulated to a sentence of
168 months, did not “clearly indicate that the basis for [the defendant’s] sentence was a
particular guidelines sentencing range,” and contained language disclaiming reliance on
the sentencing guidelines: “because this proposed sentence is sought pursuant to Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C), the parties are not requesting imposition of an advisory guideline
sentence”); United States v. Price, No. 15-3125, 2015 WL 5915954, at *3 (10th Cir. Oct.
9, 2015) (unpublished) (explaining that the defendant’s agreement proposed a specific
sentence of 240 months, did not mention or describe any sentencing range, and
disclaimed reliance on the Guidelines by stating that “because this proposed sentence is
sought pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C), the parties are not requesting imposition
of an advisory guidelines sentence”); Graham, 704 F.3d at 1278 & n.5 (noting that the
defendant’s plea agreement, which was not reduced to writing, stipulated to a 25-year
sentence without any reference to a Guideline sentencing range). Although Jones’ plea
agreement does not specifically disclaim any reliance on the sentencing Guidelines like
the plea agreements in Falcon-Sanchez and Price, it also does not specifically state that
he agreed to have his sentence determined pursuant to the Guidelines like the plea
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agreement in Freeman. Also unlike the plea agreement in Freeman, Jones’ plea
agreement does not provide all the information necessary to independently calculate the
applicable Guidelines sentencing range. Specifically, Jones’ plea agreement does not
state his criminal history category.1 If Jones and the government based his stipulated
sentence on a Guidelines sentencing range, that range is not “evident from the agreement
itself.” Freeman, 131 S. Ct. at 2698 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
III.
Because Jones’ rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement was not based on a sentencing
range that has since been lowered, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Jones’
§ 3582(c)(2) motion and should have dismissed, rather than denied, Jones’ motion.2 We
1
At least two other circuits have determined that a stipulated sentence in a rule
11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement that does not indicate the defendant’s criminal history
category is not based on a Guidelines sentencing range, because that range cannot be
determined from the plea agreement alone. See United States v. Austin, 676 F.3d 924,
930 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that because “the plea agreement does not contain any
information about Austin’s criminal history category,” it was “impossible” to determine
whether the agreement employed a particular sentencing range); United States v. Rivera-
Martinez, 665 F.3d 344, 349 (1st Cir. 2011) (explaining that when the agreement does not
specify the defendant’s criminal history category, that “silence . . . makes it impossible to
conclude from the Agreement alone that the proposed sentence is based on a specific
sentencing range”).
2
We also note the district court’s initial order, which is the only order Jones has
appealed from, is a form “Order Regarding Motion for Sentence Reduction Pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).” This form indicates that the district court denied the
defendant’s § 3582(c)(2) motion after considering the motion, the Sentencing
Commission’s policy statements, and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. This
form may be appropriate to use when the district court has determined that 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2) authorizes a sentence reduction, but it is not appropriate when, as here, the
district court has determined it does not have authority to consider the § 3582(c)(2)
motion. Not only does the form tend to mislead the parties as to the reason for the court’s
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remand to the district court with instructions to vacate its previous orders and dismiss
Jones’ § 3582(c)(2) motion for lack of jurisdiction.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
actions, but the form only allows the court to grant or deny, rather than dismiss, the
motion.
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