United States v. McNeal (Phinehas) , 663 F. App'x 732 ( 2016 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT November 1, 2016
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 15-1458
(D.C. No. 1:15-CR-00054-RM-1)
PHINEHAS LEE MCNEAL, (D. Colo.)
Defendant - Appellant.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before KELLY, GORSUCH, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
A jury convicted Phinehas McNeal of two counts of being a felon in
possession of ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court
sentenced him to two concurrent 120-month sentences, followed by three years of
supervised release. McNeal now appeals his conviction and sentence, arguing that
the district court violated his rights to self-representation and allocution. Exercising
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
I. Background
Section 922(g)(1) prohibits McNeal from possessing firearms or ammunition
because he is a convicted felon. The police found both, however, after they arrested
McNeal for shoplifting from a sporting goods store and searched his person and a
bedroom in his mother’s home. He was indicted on one count of possession of
firearms by a previously convicted felon and two counts of possession of ammunition
by a previously convicted felon.
Days before trial, McNeal’s counsel moved to withdraw his representation,
citing “irreconcilable differences . . . on how to proceed on this case.” R., Vol. I at
24. The motion stemmed from McNeal’s belief that his attorney should have filed
certain pretrial motions. The district court denied the motion as untimely and
unwarranted.
The morning of trial, before voir dire began, McNeal’s counsel informed the
district court of his client’s desire to proceed pro se. The district judge engaged in a
colloquy with McNeal, which explored McNeal’s knowledge of the law and the
sentencing guidelines, his understanding of his potential sentence, his experience in
prior criminal cases, and his familiarity with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
and Evidence. When the court made clear the trial would begin that day, McNeal
stated that he “need[ed] time to file motions” and “preserve all issues.” Id. at 18.
After this exchange, the district judge advised McNeal of his constitutional
right to represent himself and the risks inherent in invoking that right. The judge
expressed his belief that it would be a “mistake” for McNeal to represent himself and
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“strongly urge[d]” him not to do so, id. at 20; emphasized that McNeal had a trained,
prepared lawyer “ready and willing to proceed” who was more “equipped” to
represent him, id. at 20-21; and advised McNeal of his ability to file, if needed,
post-trial claims against his counsel to challenge the competency of his legal
representation. The judge then concluded by reiterating McNeal’s right to represent
himself and asking for his decision:
Not[]withstanding that, in light of this, in light of the advisement, in
light of the penalty you may suffer, in light of all of the difficulties of
representing yourself, you have the right to proceed to represent
yourself . . . pro se, if that’s what you wish to do.
So my question to you is, understanding all of the things that I have told
you, including the fact that I’m going to bring this jury in, and we’re
going to start this trial in a matter of minutes, do you still desire to
represent yourself and give up your right to be represented by counsel.
Id. at 21. After an off-record discussion with his counsel, McNeal responded, “I’m
going to allow my lawyer to represent me today.” Id. The court then deemed the
motion “moot and withdrawn.” Id.
Ultimately, a jury convicted McNeal on the two counts of being a felon in
possession of ammunition but found him not guilty on the corresponding weapons
charge. After trial, McNeal chose to proceed pro se and filed a series of motions, all
of which were denied.
At sentencing, McNeal was represented by advisory counsel. The district
court invited McNeal to make a statement to the court:
Mr. McNeal this is your opportunity to speak directly to me, without
having your words passed through anyone else. I will tell you that you
can talk to me, and I will listen to anything you have to say, whether it
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be related to sentencing, or any other matter that you think is important
that I consider in trying to decide what the appropriate sentence is for
you. What I tell people, and I tell you, is this, just talk to me the way
you will talk to me if we were out in the street, because, frankly, . . . I’m
going to understand it better, you are going to say it better, and don’t
worry about all of the artificial trappings of the courtroom. I’m not
saying they are not important. They are. But by the same token this is
about communication. So let me hear what you have got to say.
R., Vol. IV at 74-75. McNeal gave a statement, in which he represented he was
getting ammunition for his mother’s weapons and did not know he was prohibited
from doing so because of his convicted-felon status. The district court then gave
McNeal another chance to speak, emphasizing: “I want to make sure that you have
the opportunity to speak to me. . . . [T]his isn’t justice by the clock. I mean, if
there’s something else you want to say, you get to say it.” Id. at 78-79. In response,
McNeal asked for leniency.
The district court noted McNeal’s repeated, dangerous conduct; the
inconsistency between his allocution statement that he bought the bullets for his
mother and his earlier explanation that the salesman gave him bullets instead of
slingshot pellets; his refusal to accept responsibility; the timing of the offense (just
one month after release from prison); his continuing insistence on his right to possess
firearms and ammunition despite his status as a previously convicted felon; and
mitigating factors such as mental health issues and the lack of egregious conduct. It
then imposed two concurrent 120-month sentences, which fell squarely within the
applicable Sentencing Guidelines range of 110-to-125 months.
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II. Analysis
A. Right to Self-Representation
“A criminal defendant has a constitutional and a statutory right to waive his
right to counsel and represent himself at trial.” United States v. Akers, 215 F.3d
1089, 1096 (10th Cir. 2000). These rights derive from Faretta v. California,
422 U.S. 806, 834-36 (1975), and 28 U.S.C. § 1654, respectively. McNeal argues the
district court violated his right to self-representation by (a) overemphasizing the
dangers of proceeding pro se and the benefits of continuing with appointed counsel in
a way that coerced him to forego the right; and (b) not granting him a continuance,
thereby leaving him no choice but to proceed to trial with counsel. We review de
novo whether the district court violated McNeal’s right to self-representation.
See United States v. Mackovich, 209 F.3d 1227, 1236 (10th Cir. 2000).
Typically, a defendant who challenges a conviction based on the right to
self-representation actually invoked that right, only to have the district court deny his
request to proceed pro se. But the context here is different. The district court did not
deny a request for self-representation, contrary to McNeal’s characterization of the
underlying events. See, e.g., Aplt. Opening Br. at 30 (“Because the trial court
impeded Mr. McNeal’s ability to effect a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver
of his right to counsel, it necessarily follows that his right of self-representation was
improperly denied.”). Rather, McNeal withdrew his request after the district court’s
advisement. McNeal thus waived his right to self-representation. See Munkus v.
Furlong, 170 F.3d 980, 984 (10th Cir. 1999) (explaining that a defendant may waive
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his right to self-representation “even after he has unequivocally asserted it”);
cf. United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 51 (10th Cir. 1976) (concluding that the
defendant forfeited his right to self-representation by taking vacillating positions).
This waiver eliminates the need for us to decide whether McNeal satisfied the
requirements to invoke the right to self-representation. See United States v. Tucker,
451 F.3d 1176, 1180 (10th Cir. 2006) (listing those requirements). Rather, our task is to
assess whether the district court somehow violated that right during the formal
advisement that is required in this situation.
We have repeatedly emphasized that a trial judge must make an affirmative
attempt to assess whether a defendant understands the potential negative
consequences of self-representation. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 895 F.2d 1577,
1578 (10th Cir. 1990) (“[B]efore allowing a defendant to proceed pro se, the district
judge must ensure and establish on the record that defendant knows what he is doing
and that his choice is made with eyes open.” (internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted)); United States v. Padilla, 819 F.2d 952, 956 (10th Cir. 1987) (“Faretta
requires a showing on the record that the defendant who elects to conduct his own
defense had some sense of the magnitude of the undertaking and the hazards inherent
in self-representation when he made the election. The task of ensuring that defendant
possesses the requisite understanding initially falls on the trial judge, who must bear
in mind the strong presumption against waiver [of the right to counsel].” (citations
omitted)).
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A district court need not follow a prescribed formula or ask a “precise litany”
of questions to fulfill its obligation here. Padilla, 819 F.2d at 959. But “[i]t is ideal
when the trial judge conducts a thorough and comprehensive formal inquiry
including topics such as the nature of the charges, the range of punishment, possible
defenses, and a disclosure of risks involved in representing oneself pro se.” United
States v. Turner, 287 F.3d 980, 983 (10th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The district court’s advisement closely followed these parameters and
allowed McNeal to make an informed choice. We discern no error.
McNeal argues that the court “arguably inflated” the advantages of
representation and “actively discouraged” self-representation in a way that prevented
him from making an informed choice. Aplt. Opening Br. at 28-29. But his reliance
on Seventh Circuit cases and a law review article is unavailing in light of this court’s
previous approval of an advisement that “repeatedly stressed the importance of
retaining an attorney” and explained that “self-representation could be extremely
detrimental.” See Turner, 287 F.3d at 984 (in which the district judge told the
defendant “that he would not even represent himself in a speeding ticket” and
“analogized self-representation to an untrained person performing a chiropractic
procedure on himself or operating on oneself to remove cancer”). Likewise, the
advisement under scrutiny here did not infringe on McNeal’s right to
self-representation.
Nor did the district court violate McNeal’s right to self-representation by
refusing “to grant a continuance to allow him adequate time to prepare his own
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defense.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 31. As a threshold matter, the record does not even
show that McNeal requested—or the district court denied—a continuance to prepare
for trial. We decline to treat the district court’s preemptive statement that it was not
willing to continue the trial as an affirmative denial of a motion for a continuance
that was never proffered. In any event, McNeal could not satisfy the deferential
standard of review that would apply: “A trial court enjoys broad discretion on
matters of continuances, even when the parties implicate Sixth Amendment issues.”
United States v. Hughes, 191 F.3d 1317, 1324 n.3 (10th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
B. Right to Allocution
McNeal next argues that the district court “effectively penalized [him] for
exercising his right to allocute at sentencing when it relied on statements he made
during the course of the allocution to justify imposition of a sentence towards the top
of the Guidelines range.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 8. Because McNeal did not preserve
this issue by objecting to the district court, we review for plain error. United States
v. Mendoza-Lopez, 669 F.3d 1148, 1150-51 (10th Cir. 2012). “Plain error occurs
when there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, which (3) affects the defendant's substantial
rights, and which (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
There was no error during the allocution phase of sentencing, plain or
otherwise. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) requires a district
court to give a defendant an opportunity to speak before imposing a sentence. The
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court must “address the defendant personally in order to permit the defendant to
speak or present any information to mitigate the sentence.” Fed. R Crim. P.
32(i)(4)(A)(ii). The district court complied with this rule when it gave McNeal two
unfettered opportunities to speak to the court on any topic he wished, and McNeal
took advantage of both opportunities.
Unable to dispute that he received a meaningful opportunity to address the
court before sentencing, McNeal takes issue with how the district court factored the
contents of his statement into his sentence—particularly, his refusal to take
responsibility for his actions and the implausibility of his defense. He contends that
enhancing his sentence on the basis of his allocution statement “effectively punished”
him for exercising that right. Aplt. Opening Br. at 41. But Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) says
nothing about how a district court must evaluate the information it receives during
allocution. And we have made clear that “the privilege against compelled
self-incrimination is not offended when a defendant yields to the pressure to testify
on the issue of punishment in the hope of leniency.” Harvey v. Shillinger, 76 F.3d
1528, 1535 (10th Cir. 1996).
III. Conclusion
The district court’s judgment and sentence are affirmed.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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