McCormick v. Parker , 821 F.3d 1240 ( 2016 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
PUBLISH Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS May 3, 2016
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
_________________________________
ROBERT CLAUDE MCCORMICK,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 14-7095
DAVID PARKER, Warden,
Respondent - Appellee.
_________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Oklahoma
(D.C. No. 6:10-CV-00117-JHP-KEW)
_________________________________
Ryan A. Ray, Norman Wohlgemuth Chandler Jeter, Barnett & Ray, P.C., Tulsa,
Oklahoma, for Petitioner-Appellant.
Keeley L. Miller, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the
State of Oklahoma, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (E. Scott Pruitt, Attorney General of
Oklahoma, Jay Schniederjan, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General
for the State of Oklahoma, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, with her on the briefs), for
Respondent-Appellee.
_________________________________
Before HOLMES, MATHESON, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
MORITZ, Circuit Judge.
_________________________________
Robert McCormick appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ
of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. McCormick seeks relief from his
conviction for child sexual abuse, alleging the State of Oklahoma violated his due
process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), when the prosecution
suppressed evidence regarding the credentials of a witness who testified falsely that
she was a certified sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE nurse) at the time of trial.
We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the SANE nurse was a
member of the prosecution team. As such, we impute her knowledge of her own lack
of credentials to the prosecutor, who was obligated to disclose this impeachment
evidence to the defense. Accordingly, we hold the prosecution suppressed favorable,
material evidence in violation of McCormick’s rights under Brady. We reverse the
district court and grant McCormick’s § 2254 petition.
BACKGROUND
Robert McCormick started dating M.K.’s mother and moved in with her family
just outside Bokchito, Oklahoma, when M.K. was 7. McCormick kept a motor home
on the property, and M.K. began staying in the motor home with him when she was
almost 8. When M.K. was 11, she went to live with her grandmother.
Five months after moving in with her grandmother, M.K. told a child services
worker that McCormick raped her. M.K. repeated this to a child services investigator
in January 2002. During an interview with a sheriff’s investigator two days later,
M.K. accused McCormick of touching her with his hands and penis. The next day,
the child services investigator brought M.K. to Texoma Medical Center in Denison,
Texas, to be examined. There, SANE nurse Carolyn Ridling conducted a sexual-
assault examination on M.K.
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The state ultimately charged McCormick with child sexual abuse and child
abuse. The state named Ridling as a potential witness but didn’t provide defense
counsel with any information about her credentials.
McCormick went to trial in January 2007. During jury selection, one eventual
juror said M.K.’s testimony, even if credible, “wouldn’t be enough” for her to
convict McCormick. R. vol. 2, 560. Similarly, the eventual jury foreperson said it
“would help” him decide whether to convict if a SANE nurse testified that she
examined M.K. and found genital trauma consistent with M.K.’s story. R. vol. 2,
561-62. And during opening statements, the prosecutor characterized Ridling as
“probably the most important corroborating witness” the state would present. R. vol.
2, 613.
At trial, M.K., then 17, testified that McCormick put his hands in her pants
when she was about 7 and a half years old. She said McCormick put his penis inside
her vagina for the first time when she was 8 and sexually assaulted her “at least one
time a day” after that. R. vol. 2, 739. And she said McCormick “didn’t stop until
[she] was 11,” when she left to live with her grandmother. R. vol. 2, 701.
Ridling testified she was certified as a SANE nurse. In answering a question
about her training, Ridling testified:
I have continuing ed that you have to have, because I’m certified by the
Attorney General’s office in the State of Texas to do exams on adults
and pediatrics. And in order to do that, you have to have 50-something
hours every two years—which I have more than that, but you have to
have continuing ed to keep it going.
3
R. vol. 2, 948-49. On cross-examination, counsel asked, “And are you current on
your certification through Texas?” Ridling answered, “Yes.” R. vol. 2, 971.
Based on her examination, Ridling testified she found evidence of two tears in
M.K.’s hymen and opined, “The only way you can get these kind[s] of tears is from
some kind of penetration.” R. vol. 2, 965. On cross-examination, Ridling added, “I
can prove that penetration occurred, I just can’t tell you how.” R. vol. 2, 990-91. She
also authenticated three photographs of M.K.’s vaginal and anal areas.
Ridling, the two child services workers, and M.K.’s brother testified for the
state as to statements M.K. made to them about the alleged sexual abuse. But only
Ridling offered any independent direct evidence to corroborate M.K.’s allegations.
The prosecutor emphasized Ridling’s testimony during the state’s closing argument,
telling the jurors Ridling showed them “pictures that don’t lie” and asserting that
Ridling’s exam was consistent with M.K.’s version of the events. R. vol. 2, 1057.
The jury found McCormick guilty of child sexual abuse and child abuse, and
the trial court sentenced McCormick to two consecutive life sentences. In his direct
appeal, McCormick asserted only a single issue—that his convictions violated the
Double Jeopardy Clause. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed
McCormick’s convictions but modified his life sentences to run concurrently.
McCormick then sought state post-conviction relief, alleging he received ineffective
assistance of trial counsel. The state district court summarily rejected his arguments
as waived based on McCormick’s failure to raise those arguments in his direct
appeal. The OCCA affirmed. In support, it cited Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22 § 1086,
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which generally prohibits courts from granting post-conviction relief based on
grounds the petitioner failed to raise on direct appeal.
In 2010, McCormick filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In
his opening brief, McCormick renewed his double jeopardy argument and further
alleged Ridling committed perjury, although he did not characterize this claim as a
Brady violation. In support, McCormick supplemented his brief with an affidavit
from the Office of the Texas Attorney General showing that, contrary to Ridling’s
testimony, she wasn’t certified as a SANE nurse in Texas when she testified at his
trial. McCormick also submitted an agreed order from the Texas Board of Nursing
finding that Ridling misrepresented herself as a certified SANE nurse “to patients,
court officials and the public” from October 2006 to April 2007.1 R. vol. 1, 284. The
order reflects that Ridling admitted as much, stating, “In April 2007 I did erroneously
respond to questions on cross-examination that I was certified by the Texas Attorney
General’s office.” R. vol. 1, 284. In a later filing, McCormick reframed his allegation
against Ridling as a Brady claim.
The federal district court granted habeas relief on double jeopardy grounds and
vacated McCormick’s conviction and life sentence for child abuse. But it found his
remaining claims moot. We granted McCormick a certificate of appealability on his
1
In addition, McCormick submitted a letter from a Texas defense attorney
who said that Ridling similarly testified falsely in three Texas trials, two of which
resulted in convictions, one in Grayson County and one in Fannin County.
McCormick also submitted a Texas Court of Appeals opinion ordering a new trial in
the Grayson County case based on Ridling’s false testimony about her certification.
And he submitted a letter from a county district attorney advising area defense
attorneys that Ridling testified falsely in a Fannin County trial about being certified.
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Brady claim. We then reversed the district court’s mootness determination, pointing
out McCormick “could be granted a new trial or other relief” from his remaining
child sexual abuse conviction if he succeeded on his Brady claim. McCormick v.
Parker, 571 F. App’x 683, 686 (10th Cir. 2014) (unpublished).
In the same order, we also ruled that the state expressly waived its defense that
McCormick failed to exhaust his Brady claim in state court. Id. at 686-88. But we
noted that “the state did raise in district court a procedural default defense based on a
state procedural bar arising from the OCCA’s determination” that McCormick
waived all issues he could have raised on direct appeal but didn’t raise. Id. at 688.
Accordingly, we ruled the state could “reassert this procedural default defense” on
remand. Id.But the state concedes it failed to reassert this procedural default defense on
remand. Instead, it defended against McCormick’s Brady claim on the merits,
arguing there was no indication the prosecution suppressed information related to
Ridling’s credentials. The district court agreed and rejected McCormick’s Brady
claim, concluding McCormick failed to establish that the prosecutor suppressed any
evidence. Specifically, the district court found that the prosecutor had no obligation
to provide information about Ridling because she was neither a state employee nor
under the prosecutor’s control. We subsequently granted McCormick’s request for a
6
certificate of appealability on the issue of whether the prosecution withheld favorable
evidence under Brady.2
DISCUSSION
I. The state waived its affirmative defense of procedural default.
Before we consider McCormick’s Brady claim, we first must determine if it is
properly before us. McCormick didn’t raise this claim before the OCCA, and
ordinarily we can’t grant relief on unexhausted claims. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b)(1)(A). But we previously ruled the state expressly waived its exhaustion
defense. See McCormick, 571 F. App’x at 688. Accordingly, McCormick’s failure to
exhaust his Brady claim doesn’t preclude us from reaching the merits of this claim.
See DeRosa v. Workman, 679 F.3d 1196, 1208 (10th Cir. 2012).
Undeterred, the state now argues we shouldn’t reach the merits of
McCormick’s Brady claim because of his alleged procedural default, a similar but
distinct defense. Under the procedural default doctrine, we ordinarily won’t review
the merits of a claim the state court declined to consider based on a petitioner’s
failure to follow that state’s procedural rules. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309,
1316 (2012). As the state points out, Oklahoma has a procedural rule that deems
waived all issues the petitioner could have raised on direct appeal but didn’t raise.
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22 § 1086. And in affirming the state district court’s denial of
post-conviction relief, the OCCA invoked this rule generally to bar all claims
2
We also granted review of a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
Because we reverse on Brady grounds, we need not address this claim.
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McCormick failed to raise on direct appeal. Thus, the state insists, McCormick’s
failure to raise his Brady claim on direct appeal necessarily bars our consideration of
that claim.
But procedural default is an affirmative defense, and the state must either use
it or lose it. See Hooks v. Ward, 184 F.3d 1206, 1216 (10th Cir. 1999) (“There is no
doubt that ‘state-court procedural default . . . is an affirmative defense,’ and that the
state is ‘obligated to raise procedural default as a defense or lose the right to assert
the defense thereafter.’” (quoting Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 165-66 (1996))).
We previously—and explicitly—invited the state to reassert its procedural default
defense when we remanded to the district court with directions to address
McCormick’s Brady claim. See McCormick, 571 F. App’x at 688.
Yet the state conceded at oral argument that it failed to take advantage of our
invitation. And the state’s decision to abandon a defense we explicitly invited it to
raise in favor of challenging the merits is a textbook example of waiver. See Wood v.
Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826, 1835 (2012) (describing waiver as the “intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right” and noting that state’s choice to
deliberately steer court away from procedural defense towards merits fits this
description (quoting Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 458 n.13 (2004))). Accordingly,
we decline to address the state’s procedural default argument and instead proceed to
the merits of McCormick’s Brady claim. See United States v. McGehee, 672 F.3d
860, 873 (10th Cir. 2012) (concluding party isn’t entitled to appellate relief when
attempting to reassert argument it previously raised and abandoned below).
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II. The prosecution suppressed material evidence favorable to McCormick.
McCormick argues he is entitled to habeas relief because the prosecution’s
failure to disclose the truth about Ridling’s credentials violated his due process rights
under Brady. Specifically, McCormick challenges the district court’s finding that the
prosecutor didn’t suppress any evidence related to Ridling’s credentials because
Ridling was neither a state employee nor under the prosecutor’s authority.
Ordinarily, the standard of review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act presents a “formidable barrier to federal habeas relief” when a state court
rejects a claim on the merits. White v. Wheeler, 136 S. Ct. 456, 460 (2015) (quoting
Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 16 (2013)). But if the state court never evaluated the
merits of a claim and that claim isn’t otherwise procedurally barred, we will
“exercise our independent judgment in deciding the claim.” Hain v. Gibson, 287 F.3d
1224, 1229 (10th Cir. 2002). “In doing so, we review the federal district court’s
conclusions of law de novo and its findings of fact, if any, for clear error.” Id.Accordingly, because the OCCA never addressed McCormick’s Brady claim on the
merits and because the state waived any argument that the claim is procedurally
barred, we exercise de novo review of the district court’s rejection of McCormick’s
Brady claim.
In Brady, the Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of
the prosecution.” 373 U.S. at 87. To establish a Brady violation, McCormick must
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prove by a preponderance that (1) the prosecution suppressed evidence, (2) the
evidence was favorable to him, and (3) the evidence was material. See United States
v. Garcia, 793 F.3d 1194, 1205 (10th Cir. 2015). The state doesn’t dispute that
evidence showing Ridling testified falsely about her Texas certification is favorable
to McCormick. Instead, the state argues that McCormick fails to demonstrate that (1)
the prosecution suppressed evidence or (2) the evidence was material.
A. The prosecution suppressed evidence.
McCormick doesn’t point to any evidence that indicates the prosecutor
actually knew about Ridling’s lapsed credentials. Nevertheless, he argues that
Ridling was a member of the prosecution team and that, as such, we must impute
Ridling’s own knowledge of her lack of current certification to the prosecutor as “the
party who is ultimately accountable for the nondisclosure of evidence.” Smith v.
Sec’y of N.M. Dep’t of Corr., 50 F.3d 801, 824 (10th Cir. 1995).
Under Brady, the prosecution has a duty to disclose material impeachment
evidence that is favorable to the defense. Id. at 825. But that duty arises even if the
prosecutor has no “actual knowledge of the existence of the evidence at issue”
because—for Brady purposes—the “prosecution” includes “not only the individual
prosecutor handling the case, but also . . . the prosecutor’s entire office, as well as
law enforcement personnel and other arms of the state involved in investigative
aspects of a particular criminal venture.” Id. at 824 (internal citation and footnote
omitted). Accordingly, we impute knowledge of material impeachment evidence to
the prosecutor for Brady purposes when that knowledge is in the possession of other
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“agents of the prosecution.” See id. at 824-25 (quoting Fero v. Kerby, 39 F.3d 1462,
1472 n.12 (10th Cir. 1994)); see also Avila v. Quarterman, 560 F.3d 299, 307 (5th
Cir. 2009) (“It is well settled that if a member of the prosecution team has knowledge
of Brady material, such knowledge is imputed to the prosecutors.”).
This court hasn’t addressed whether a SANE nurse is a member of the
prosecution for Brady purposes,3 and we’ve found only one other court that has. In
People v. Uribe, the California Court of Appeal found a Brady violation when the
prosecution didn’t disclose a videotape of a sexual assault exam. 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d
829, 832 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). The court characterized the exam as investigative in
nature, noting that a “major purpose of the examination was to determine whether the
allegation could be corroborated with physical findings.” Id. at 844. The court also
noted that police initiated the exam as part of a criminal investigation, concluding
those conducting the exam acted on the government’s behalf. Id. at 845-46. Under
those circumstances, the court ultimately imputed the hospital personnel’s knowledge
of the video’s existence to the prosecution because those responsible for conducting
3
Several courts addressing claims in non-Brady contexts have concluded that
SANE nurses who conduct sexual abuse exams are acting as agents of law
enforcement. See, e.g., State v. Miller, 264 P.3d 461, 488 (Kan. 2011) (“We conclude
the SANE was acting as an agent of law enforcement when performing the role of
collecting evidence.”); aff’g 208 P.3d 774, 786 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009) (concluding
primary purpose of SANE nurse examination “was to collect and preserve evidence
for later use in the prosecution of a crime, not for medical diagnosis or treatment”);
Hartsfield v. Commonwealth, 277 S.W.3d 239, 244 (Ky. 2009) (“The SANE nurse
under KRS 314.011(14) is made available to ‘victims of sexual offenses,’ which
makes the SANE nurse an active participant in the formal criminal investigation.”);
Medina v. State, 143 P.3d 471, 476 (Nev. 2006) (concluding SANE nurse “was a
police operative” because she gathered evidence for prosecution).
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the exams “were part of the ‘prosecution team’ for Brady purposes.” Id. at 846; see
also State v. Farris, 656 S.E.2d 121, 126 (W. Va. 2007) (concluding that forensic
psychologist who interviewed child sex abuse victim at police’s request “became part
of the prosecutor’s investigation team” for Brady purposes).
Here, as in Uribe, Ridling examined M.K. “at the behest of” law enforcement
as part of a criminal investigation into M.K.’s allegation that McCormick sexually
abused her. Aplee. Br. 20. Moreover, Ridling explicitly testified that she kept a
record of the exam to prepare herself to testify later. Under these circumstances, we
agree that Ridling was part of the prosecution team for Brady purposes. Accordingly,
we must impute her knowledge of her own lack of certification to the prosecutor. See
Smith, 50 F.3d at 824; Uribe, 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 846. And because the prosecutor
didn’t disclose Ridling’s lack of certification to the defense, we conclude the
prosecution suppressed evidence.
In reaching this conclusion, we emphasize its essence—i.e., that Ridling was
part of the prosecution team because she acted at the request of law enforcement in
the pre-arrest investigation of a crime. See Uribe, 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 845-46. We do
not hold today that all medical professionals treating survivors of sexual abuse are
automatically members of the prosecution team for Brady purposes. Nor have we
been asked to decide whether an expert who had no pre-charge investigatory role may
be a member of the prosecution team for Brady purposes. See United States v. Skelly,
442 F.3d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 2006) (concluding prosecution’s duty to disclose “does not
12
extend to the knowledge of an ordinary expert witness who was not involved with the
investigation of the case”). In short, our holding is limited to the facts before us.
B. The suppressed evidence was material.
McCormick argues the suppressed evidence was material, asserting that if the
jurors had known about Ridling’s false testimony, they “might not have believed her
at all.” Aplt. Br. 39. The state disagrees, arguing that Ridling’s expired certification
isn’t material because her testimony was “a small part of the evidence” against
McCormick. Aplee. Br. 26.
Evidence is material if there’s a reasonable likelihood the evidence could have
affected the jury’s judgment. Wearry v. Cain, 136 S. Ct. 1002, 1006 (2016). Thus, to
prevail on his Brady claim, McCormick doesn’t have to prove it’s “more likely than
not” that the jury would have acquitted him had it known about the suppressed
evidence. See id. (quoting Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 630 (2012)). Rather, he only
has to show that the new evidence demonstrating Ridling’s lack of certification is
enough to undermine confidence in the verdict. See id.Under the facts of this case, we agree there’s a reasonable likelihood the
suppressed evidence would have affected the jury’s judgment because Ridling had a
critical role in the trial and her credibility was essential to the state’s case.
First, there’s no question that Ridling bolstered her own credentials and
credibility to the jury by testifying that her certification was current and she had
completed the continuing education hours necessary to keep it current. This was
false. The record includes a finding by the Texas Board of Nursing that Ridling
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misrepresented herself as a certified SANE nurse. In fact, Ridling admitted as much
in her response to the board, stating that in a different 2007 trial she “erroneously”
testified that she “was certified by the Texas Attorney General’s office.” R. vol. 1,
284. If McCormick could have used the suppressed evidence to expose Ridling’s
false testimony about her credentials, the jury likely would have given Ridling’s
other testimony less weight, or even disregarded it entirely.
Had it done so, it likely would have affected the jury’s decision. Ridling’s
testimony was critical because she purported to provide an expert’s opinion of the
only physical evidence presented. Ridling—who the prosecutor touted as “probably
the most important corroborating witness”—was in fact the only witness who
provided direct evidence to corroborate M.K.’s testimony. R. vol. 2, 613. Other
witnesses simply repeated the allegations M.K. made to them when she was 12.
Ridling, on the other hand, provided the type of forensic evidence that’s particularly
significant in “he-said-she-said” cases like this one. Most significantly, Ridling
testified she found evidence of two tears in M.K.’s hymen, and Ridling maintained
the only possible cause of those tears was “some kind of penetration.” R. vol. 2, 965.
And on cross-examination, she adamantly reiterated that her exam proved penetration
occurred. Finally, Ridling authenticated three photographs and derived from them
incriminating conclusions that wouldn’t necessarily have been obvious to the jury. In
short, Ridling’s testimony wasn’t a small part of the state’s case.
Finally, while certainly not dispositive, we note that two jurors essentially said
they needed Ridling’s testimony to help them decide whether to convict McCormick.
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During jury selection, one juror indicated that M.K.’s testimony alone wouldn’t be
enough for her to convict McCormick and that she would expect corroborating
testimony. And another juror said it would help if Ridling’s examination was
consistent with M.K.’s account. These comments, considered in connection with
Ridling’s testimony, lend additional support to our conclusion that Ridling’s
credibility was essential to the state’s case and that the suppressed evidence was
material.
Under these circumstances, there’s a reasonable likelihood that the suppressed
evidence of Ridling’s lack of certification affected the jury’s judgment. See Wearry,
136 S. Ct. at 1006. In fact, we’re not the first court to reach that conclusion. See
Nguyen v. State, No. 05-07-01775-CR, 2009 WL 755412, at *3 (Tex. App. Mar. 24,
2009) (unpublished) (concluding there’s a reasonable likelihood that Ridling’s false
testimony about her credentials as an expert “could have affected the judgment of the
jury” when Ridling was the only prosecution witness who provided independent
evidence beyond alleged child victim’s version of events). Because the suppressed
evidence was material,4 we hold the prosecutor’s failure to disclose that evidence to
defense counsel violated McCormick’s due process rights under Brady.
4
The state urges us to find that Ridling’s false testimony wasn’t material as we
did in another habeas case. See Pruitt v. Parker, 388 F. App’x 841, 846 (10th Cir.
2010) (unpublished) (denying certificate of appealability sought by a habeas
petitioner convicted of child sexual abuse based, in part, on Ridling’s testimony). But
in Pruitt, we incorporated AEDPA deference into our review of the OCCA’s
determination that evidence of Ridling’s lapsed credentials wasn’t material in light of
the state’s other evidence. Id. at 844, 846. Because we’re not bound by such
deference here, see Hain, 287 F.3d at 1229, Pruitt isn’t persuasive.
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CONCLUSION
We conclude that (1) the prosecution suppressed evidence of Ridling’s lack of
certification, (2) the evidence was favorable to McCormick, and (3) the evidence was
material. Because the state violated McCormick’s due process rights under Brady, we
reverse the district court’s decision denying relief and grant McCormick’s § 2254
petition for a writ of habeas corpus as to his conviction for child sexual abuse,
subject to the state’s right to retry him within a reasonable time. See Sharp v.
Rohling, 793 F.3d 1216, 1240-41 (10th Cir. 2015).
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