United States v. Teague ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                                  FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         Tenth Circuit
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                         August 17, 2016
    _________________________________
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.                                                           No. 16-7056
    (D.C. No. 6:99-CR-00079-FHS-1)
    CHIP J.W. TEAGUE,                                            (E.D. Okla.)
    Defendant - Appellant.
    _________________________________
    ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
    _________________________________
    Before LUCERO, MATHESON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________
    Chip Teague seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) to challenge the
    district court’s denial of his 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     motion. We deny a COA. Because the
    district court lacked jurisdiction over Teague’s motion, we vacate and remand to the
    district court with instructions to dismiss.
    I
    Teague was convicted on numerous drug and gun charges in 2000. We
    affirmed his convictions on direct appeal. See United States v. Teague, 12 F. App’x
    759 (10th Cir. 2001) (unpublished). Teague filed a § 2255 motion in 2001, which
    was denied. We rejected Teague’s request for a COA.
    *
    This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the
    case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
    persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    Teague filed a second § 2255 motion in April 2016, claiming that his
    conviction and sentence are unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court’s decision
    in Johnson v. United States, 
    135 S. Ct. 2551
     (2015). The district court denied the
    motion for failure to comply with a local procedural rule and did not issue a COA.
    Teague now seeks a COA from this court.
    II
    When a district court denies a § 2255 motion on procedural grounds, a movant
    may obtain a COA only if he shows “that jurists of reason would find it debatable
    whether the [motion] states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and
    that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in
    its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 
    529 U.S. 473
    , 484 (2000). We conclude
    that Teague has not shown he has a debatably valid claim. “[A] second or successive
    § 2255 motion cannot be filed in district court without approval by a panel of this
    court.” United States v. Nelson, 
    465 F.3d 1145
    , 1148 (10th Cir. 2006); see also
    § 2255(h) (requiring authorization). Accordingly, a “district court does not even
    have jurisdiction to deny the relief sought in” a second or successive motion. Nelson,
    465 F.3d at 1148. Because Teague filed his motion without authorization from this
    court, the district court lacked jurisdiction.
    But we may construe an appeal from the denial of a second or successive
    motion as an application to file such a motion. See Spitznas v. Boone, 
    464 F.3d 1213
    , 1219 n.8 (10th Cir. 2006). A second or successive habeas motion will be
    authorized if it is based on “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to
    2
    cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.”
    § 2255(h). Teague claims that his sentence is unconstitutional under Johnson, which
    held that the residual clause of the definition of “violent felony” in the Armed Career
    Criminal Act (“ACCA”) is unconstitutionally vague. 
    135 S. Ct. at 2557
     (interpreting
    
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e)(2)(B)(ii)). This rule was made retroactive to cases on collateral
    review in Welch v. United States, 
    136 S. Ct. 1257
     (2016).
    Teague states that he was sentenced under 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c) for using or
    carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. A portion of the
    definition of “crime of violence” contained in 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(3)(B) is similar to
    ACCA’s residual clause. However, Teague was actually convicted of possessing a
    firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime under § 924(c)—not a
    “crime of violence.” Accordingly, even if Johnson extends to § 924(c), Teague’s
    sentence is unaffected and he is not entitled to authorization.
    III
    We DENY a COA, VACATE the district court’s denial of Teague’s § 2255
    motion, and REMAND to the district court with instructions to dismiss for lack of
    jurisdiction.
    Entered for the Court
    Carlos F. Lucero
    Circuit Judge
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-7056

Judges: Lucero, Matheson, Bacharach

Filed Date: 8/17/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024