Scott v. Barnhart ( 2005 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAR 1 2005
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
CHRISTINE SCOTT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 04-6099
(D.C. No. 03-CV-359-AR)
JO ANNE B. BARNHART, (W.D. Okla.)
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , Chief Judge, HENRY , and O’BRIEN , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff-appellant Christine Scott appeals from an order of the district
court affirming the Social Security Administration’s decision denying her
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
application for disability and supplemental security income benefits. We exercise
jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
Plaintiff claims that she has been unable to work since June 29, 2000, due
to swelling and pain in multiple joints, asthma, back pain, and peripheral
neuropathy. After her application was denied initially and on reconsideration, a
de novo hearing was held before an administrative law judge (ALJ). In a decision
dated November 27, 2001, the ALJ denied plaintiff’s application for benefits,
concluding that plaintiff was not disabled. The ALJ determined that plaintiff
retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform the full range of
medium work and, therefore, was able to perform her past relevant work as a
nurse’s aide, social service aide, donut maker, cashier/checker, and housekeeper.
The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision
of the Commissioner. Doyal v. Barnhart , 331 F.3d 758, 759 (10th Cir. 2003).
In a very thorough nineteen-page opinion, the district court affirmed the
Commissioner’s denial of benefits. Because the district court accurately
summarized plaintiff’s medical history, we do not need to repeat it here.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether the correct
legal standards were applied and whether the Commissioner's factual findings are
supported by substantial evidence in the record. Id. at 760. “Substantial evidence
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is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Id. (quotation omitted). This court may “neither reweigh
the evidence nor substitute our judgment for that of the agency.” Casias v. Sec'y
of Health & Human Servs. , 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir. 1991).
TREATING PHYSICIAN’S OPINION
Plaintiff contends on appeal that the ALJ failed to give appropriate
consideration to her treating physician’s opinion. “In deciding how much weight
to give a treating source opinion, an ALJ must first determine whether the opinion
qualifies for ‘controlling weight.’” Watkins v. Barnhart , 350 F.3d 1297, 1300
(10th Cir. 2003). An ALJ is required to give the opinion of a treating physician
controlling weight when it is both: (1) “well-supported by medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques;” and (2) “consistent with other
substantial evidence in the record.” Id. (quotation omitted). “[I]f the opinion is
deficient in either of these respects, then it is not entitled to controlling weight.”
Id.Even if a treating physician’s opinion is not entitled to controlling weight,
it is “still entitled to deference and must be weighed,” id. at 1300, using the
following factors:
(1) the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of
examination; (2) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship,
including the treatment provided and the kind of examination or
testing performed; (3) the degree to which the physician’s opinion is
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supported by relevant evidence; (4) consistency between the opinion
and the record as a whole; (5) whether or not the physician is a
specialist in the area upon which an opinion is rendered; and
(6) other factors brought to the ALJ’s attention which tend to support
or contradict the opinion.
Id. at 1301 (quotations omitted). “After considering [these] factors, the ALJ must
give good reasons in [his] . . . decision for the weight he ultimately assigns the
opinion.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Here, plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Butcher, drafted a letter expressing
his opinion regarding that plaintiff should lift no more than five pounds
frequently or ten pounds occasionally, should avoid more than occasional
reaching, handling and fingering, would require rest breaks of ten-fifteen minutes
every hour, and must be allowed to alternate between sitting and standing as
needed. Dr. Butcher did not describe any clinical or laboratory findings from
which he derived his opinions concerning plaintiff’s limitations, however.
The ALJ thoroughly discussed all of Dr. Butcher’s medical evidence, but
did not give controlling weight to Dr. Butcher’s opinion as to plaintiff’s
functional limitations because they were “not supported by objective medical
findings,” and were “inconsistent with [other] specific objective clinical and
laboratory findings [in the medical record].” Aplt. App. at 19. The ALJ gave
numerous, specific, and legitimate reasons for this finding, which we conclude are
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supported by the record. We find nothing to support plaintiff’s assertion that the
ALJ was merely making speculative inferences about the medical record.
We further conclude that the ALJ adequately considered the Watkins factors
in his decision. He discussed the length of plaintiff’s treatment relationship with
Dr. Butcher, as well as the nature and extent of that relationship. He thoroughly
discussed the degree to which Dr. Butcher’s opinions were and were not
supported by relevant evidence, as well as the inconsistencies between
Dr. Butcher’s opinions and the record as a whole, and we find ample record
support for the ALJ’s findings in these regards. Nor did the ALJ act improperly
in giving greater weight to the consulting-physician opinion of Dr. Dougherty
regarding plaintiff’s functional limitations than to Dr. Butcher’s opinion, because
the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Dougherty’s opinion was supported by objective
clinical findings is a legitimate reason and is supported by the record. See
Hamilton v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 961 F.2d 1495, 1498
(10th Cir. 1992) (it is within the province of the ALJ to weigh the medical
evidence and discount it for specific and legitimate reasons); Eggleston v. Bowen,
851 F.2d 1244, 1247 (10th Cir. 1988) (ALJ may resolve conflicting medical
evidence).
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We conclude that the ALJ’s decision provides legally sufficient and
factually supported reasons for rejecting Dr. Butcher’s opinions. The judgment of
the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
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