Montez v. Hickenlooper ( 2018 )


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  •                                                            FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS         Tenth Circuit
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                  January 22, 2018
    _________________________________
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    LEWIS ROGER MOORE,
    Claimant - Appellant,
    and
    No. 17-1115
    JESSE F. MONTEZ; DAVID                      (D.C. No. 1:92-CV-00870-CMA-
    BRYAN; GEORGE KARL; GILPIN                               MEH)
    EUGENE; JOHN ARMINTROUT;                               (D. Colo.)
    KENNETH GARCIA; RICHARD K.
    ALLEN; JIMMY R. BULGIER, as
    representatives of themselves and
    all others similarly situated,
    Plaintiffs,
    v.
    JOHN HICKENLOOPER; FRANK
    GUNTER, Former Executive
    Director of the Colorado Department
    of Corrections; BEN JOHNSON,
    Former Warden of Colorado
    Territorial Correctional Facility;
    CHERYL SMITH, Medical
    Administrator at CTCF; ARI
    ZAVARAS, Executive Director of
    Colorado Department of
    Corrections; BOB FURLONG,
    Warden of Limon Correctional
    Facility; DEPARTMENT OF
    CORRECTIONS; BILL PRICE,
    Warden of the Arkansas Valley
    Correctional Center; R. MARK
    MCDUFF, Warden of the Arrowhead
    Correctional Center, the Four Mile
    Correctional Facility, the Skyline
    Correctional Center, and the Pre-
    Release Correctional Center; GARY
    NEET, Warden of the Buena Vista
    Correctional Facility; WARREN
    DIESSLIN, Former Warden of the
    Buena Vista Correctional Facility;
    FRANK MILLER, Warden of the
    Centennial Correctional Facility;
    DONICE NEAL, Warden of the
    Colorado State Penitentiary; MARK
    WILLIAMS, Warden of the
    Colorado Women’s Facility; MARK
    MCKINNA, Warden of the Colorado
    Territorial Correctional Facility; J
    FRANK RICE, Warden of the
    Denver Reception and Diagnostic
    Center; LARRY EMBRY, Warden of
    the Fremont Correctional Facility;
    TOM COOPER, Former Warden of
    the Fremont Correctional Facility;
    BILL BOGGS, Warden of the Rifle
    Correctional Facility; BILL
    BOKROS, Warden of the Pueblo
    Minimum Center; DAVID HOLT,
    Medical Administrator; JEAN
    MOLTZ, Medical Administrator;
    RON JOHNSON, Medical
    Administrator; DON LAWSON,
    Administration Director; BOB
    MOORE, Medical Supervisor;
    RONALD G PIERCE; JOHN DOES,
    Current and Former Wardens of any
    correctional facility maintained,
    operated or controlled by the
    Colorado Department of
    Corrections; JOHN ROES,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    2
    _________________________________
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    _________________________________
    Before LUCERO, BACHARACH, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________
    This appeal arises out of a class action, Montez v. Hickenlooper. This
    class action resulted in presentation of individual damage claims to a
    special master. One of these claims was decided twelve years ago. The
    claimant, Mr. L.R. Moore, obtained a monetary award, but he has never
    been paid. He complains not only of the nonpayment but also of the failure
    to replace a stolen wheelchair and the inability to participate in settlement
    talks involving the class as a whole. The district court denied relief, and
    we affirm in part and reverse in part. 1
    I.    Background
    In a 2003 remedial plan, the parties in the class action agreed that a
    special master would decide class members’ individual damage claims,
    subject to review by the district court. In a 2005 claim, Mr. Moore asserted
    claims for (1) replacement of a custom-made wheelchair allegedly stolen
    *
    This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except
    under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
    But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value under Fed.
    R. App. P. 32.1(a) and 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
    1
    Jurisdiction exists under the collateral order doctrine. See Montez v.
    Hickenlooper, 
    640 F.3d 1126
    , 1132-33 (10th Cir. 2011).
    3
    by prison staff and (2) damages for diminished wheelchair access to a
    prison dining hall.
    The special master did not order the defendants to provide Mr. Moore
    with a new wheelchair, but the special master did award Mr. Moore $50 for
    diminished access to the dining hall. In 2008, Mr. Moore complained to the
    special master that the defendants had not paid the $50 and again raised an
    issue involving the wheelchair. But the special master declined to address
    these complaints. 2
    In 2016, Mr. Moore again filed objections in the district court,
    alleging nonpayment and failure to provide a wheelchair equivalent to the
    one that was allegedly stolen. In these objections, Mr. Moore also sought
    to participate in the ongoing negotiations involving class issues, insisting
    that his participation was necessary to protect the interests of himself and
    other class members. The district court overruled the objections and denied
    reconsideration in 2017, leading Mr. Moore to appeal.
    2
    And in 2010, Mr. Moore mentioned in a district court filing that the
    defendants had not paid his $50 damage award. But the district court did
    not address this issue.
    4
    II.   Enforcement of the $50 Award
    In part, Mr. Moore seeks enforcement of the $50 award. The
    defendants acknowledge that they have not paid the award and do not
    question the enforceability of the award or the court’s authority to order
    payment. Instead, the defendants contend that they can wait to pay until
    Mr. Moore completes an accurate W-9 tax form, which he has not done.
    The district court agreed with the defendants, and we engage in de novo
    review. See Woodruff v. Herrera, 
    623 F.3d 1103
    , 1109-10 (10th Cir. 2010)
    (de novo review on matters of law).
    In conducting this review, we conclude that the district court erred.
    The W-9 is an IRS form submitted to a payee by an individual or entity
    “who is required to file an information return with the IRS.” R. Vol. II,
    at 147. But the defendants have not identified any requirement to file an
    information return for the payment to Mr. Moore. Cf. IRS Pub. 583,
    Information for Business Taxpayers, 
    1988 WL 485178
    , at *6 (rev.
    Nov. 1988) (stating circumstances in which an information return is
    required).
    5
    But let’s assume that an information return is required and that the
    payment is reportable. In these circumstances, the Internal Revenue Code
    identifies steps that the payor can take in the absence of a W-9 form. These
    steps include actions such as adding backup withholding in certain
    circumstances. See 26 U.S.C. § 3406(a); see IRS Pub. 1281 (Rev. 3-2017),
    Backup Withholding for Missing and Incorrect Name/TIN(s), 
    2017 WL 4317150
    , at *3. Instead of taking these steps, however, the defendants
    unilaterally disobeyed the special master’s order without explaining the
    need for a W-9 form before paying the award. In the absence of such an
    explanation, the district court erred in failing to order enforcement of the
    $50 award.
    III.   Replacement of the Wheelchair
    In the 2005 proceeding, Mr. Moore complained that his custom-made
    wheelchair had been stolen by prison staff and was never replaced with an
    equivalent model. The defendants responded that they were in the process
    of providing Mr. Moore with a new wheelchair, and the special master
    declined to order relief on Mr. Moore’s complaint about his wheelchair.
    The defendants provided a wheelchair, but Mr. Moore alleges that the
    replacement was inadequate.
    With the passage of twelve years, it is too late for Mr. Moore to
    appeal the special master’s 2005 order on the ground that it should have
    specified the type of wheelchair to be provided. See Order, filed Mar. 23,
    6
    2010, ECF No. 4381 (setting April 16, 2010, as the deadline for “any pro
    se compliance/enforcement claims for individual . . . injunctive or
    equitable relief” under the 2003 remedial plan). And he cannot obtain
    relief by enforcing the 2005 award because that award did not include
    relief on the claim involving the wheelchair. Thus, the district court did
    not err in sustaining the 2016 objection involving the wheelchair.
    IV.   Notice and an Opportunity to Participate in Settlement Talks
    The class action is ongoing, and the district court is apparently
    conducting settlement talks on classwide issues. Mr. Moore requested
    notice and an opportunity to participate, and the district court denied this
    request. This ruling was not erroneous. 3
    We have approved a protocol that prevents individual claimants from
    pursuing their own equitable claims relating to a class action while the
    class action is proceeding. McNeil v. Guthrie, 
    945 F.2d 1163
    , 1165-66
    (10th Cir. 1991). The district court followed this approach here, preventing
    disruption of the class-wide settlement discussions. This approach was not
    erroneous.
    3
    We need not decide the standard of review on this claim. The claim
    fails under any standard.
    7
    V.    Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
    Mr. Moore requests leave to proceed without prepayment of costs.
    This request is granted, though Mr. Moore remains obligated to pay the
    filing and docketing fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).
    VI.   Deletion of Parties
    Mr. Moore also requests deletion of irrelevant parties. We deny this
    request because the appeal is part of the Montez class litigation. As a
    result, the other parties must be included in the caption.
    VII. Redaction of Medical Records
    Mr. Moore asks us to remove the redactions on the medical records
    submitted by the defendants. These records proved immaterial for our
    analysis; thus, we deny Mr. Moore’s request.
    VIII. Mr. Moore’s Amended Opening Brief and Addendum
    Mr. Moore has filed an unauthorized “Amended Opening Brief” and a
    separate “Addendum.” Both are stricken.
    After successfully requesting an extension of time, Mr. Moore filed
    his opening appeal brief on July 18, 2017, and the defendants responded on
    August 11, 2018. He then requested an extension of time for his optional
    reply brief based in part on alleged restrictions to law library access. We
    extended the deadline to September 8, 2017, for the reply brief.
    But the clerk’s office received nothing from Mr. Moore for over
    three months. Then, on December 28, 2017, the clerk’s office received a
    8
    document purporting to be an amended opening brief. In this document,
    Mr. Moore stated that he was late in filing it because of restrictions on
    access to research books and word processors.
    This explanation is unconvincing. In the amended brief and his
    subsequent addendum, Mr. Moore purports to add multiple claims based on
    numerous events post-dating the deadline for his reply brief. Allowing the
    amended brief and addendum would require the defendants to respond to
    the new allegations, creating even further delay.
    Mr. Moore knew that he needed to seek an extension of time, as he
    has filed multiple motions for extensions. Indeed, in the last order granting
    an extension of time, the clerk’s office stated that “[n]o further extensions
    will be granted on the Clerk’s authority.” Order (Aug. 21, 2017).
    Because an extension of time is unwarranted, we direct the clerk to
    strike the amended brief and the addendum.
    Entered for the Court
    Robert E. Bacharach
    Circuit Judge
    9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-1115

Filed Date: 1/22/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/22/2018