Brooks v. Archuleta , 621 F. App'x 921 ( 2015 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT July 22, 2015
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
JASON BROOKS,
Petitioner - Appellant,
No. 15-1209
v. (D.C. No. 1:14-CV-02276-CBS)
(D. Colorado)
LOU ARCHULETA, Warden; CYNTHIA
COFFMAN, the Attorney General of the
State of Colorado,
Respondents - Appellees.
_________________________________
ORDER DENYING
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
_________________________________
Before KELLY, LUCERO, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Jason Brooks filed a federal habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254
seeking relief from his Colorado state court conviction for securities fraud. A United
States Magistrate Judge, sitting pursuant to the consent of the parties, dismissed in
part and denied in part the petition. Proceeding pro se,1 Mr. Brooks now asks this
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the
case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive
value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
1
Because Mr. Brooks is proceeding pro se, we construe his filings liberally.
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). But we will not
undertake the role of advocate. See United States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d 972, 975 (10th
Cir. 2009) (“[W]e must construe [a pro se litigant’s] arguments liberally; this rule of
court for a certificate of appealability (COA) to allow him to appeal these decisions.
For the reasons we explain, we deny Mr. Brooks a COA and dismiss the matter.
I. BACKGROUND
The state of Colorado indicted Mr. Brooks on twenty-five counts of securities
fraud and one count of theft. He pled guilty to four of the securities fraud counts and
agreed to pay a set amount of restitution. In exchange, the state agreed to dismiss the
remaining charges. Immediately before sentencing, Mr. Brooks, who claimed to be
unaware that evidence related to the dismissed counts could be used against him at
sentencing, advised his attorney that he wished to withdraw his plea agreement.
According to Mr. Brooks, his attorney advised him that he could not do so. Thus,
Mr. Brooks did not move to withdraw his plea and the court sentenced him to 32
years’ imprisonment.
Mr. Brooks filed a direct appeal with the Colorado Court of Appeals, but
subsequently dismissed it. He then filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant
to Rule 35(c) of the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure, in which he asserted five
claims for relief: (1) “Counsel was ineffective by misadvising Defendant of the effect
of the plea;” (2) “Counsel was ineffective for failing to consult or employ a
Securities Fraud, Business Law, and/or Contract Law expert;” (3) “Counsel was
ineffective at Sentencing;” (4) “Counsel was ineffective when the errors are
liberal construction stops, however, at the point at which we begin to serve as his
advocate.”).
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considered cumulatively;” and (5) the trial court erred in the advisement of penalties.
Mr. Brooks also alleged his trial counsel erroneously told him he could not withdraw
his guilty plea prior to the sentencing hearing.
The state trial court denied Mr. Brooks’s motion and Mr. Brooks appealed this
denial to the Colorado Court of Appeals. On direct review, the Colorado Court of
Appeals determined that Mr. Brooks had appealed only the trial court’s rejection of
his claim that trial counsel was deficient for erroneously advising him he could not
withdraw his plea, and limited its inquiry accordingly. Turning to the merits, the
court determined Mr. Brooks was not entitled to relief on this claim because he could
not establish that, but for counsel’s allegedly erroneous advice, the result of the
proceeding would have been different as required by Strickland v. Washington, 446
U.S. 668 (1984). The court reasoned that under Colorado law, a defendant is
permitted to withdraw his or her plea only where there exists “a fair and just” reason
for withdrawal. See Kazadi v. People, 291 P.3d 16, 21 (Colo. 2012); see also Colo. R.
Crim. P. 32(d).2 Although Mr. Brooks claimed he was “under the impression that the
only victims that would be allowed to file victim impact statements were the victims
of the charges he was pleading to and not . . . the victims of the charges that were
dismissed,” the Colorado Court of Appeals credited the state trial court’s finding that
2
For example, “Such a showing includes instances where a defendant was
surprised or influenced into a plea of guilty to which the person had a defense; where
a plea of guilty was entered by mistake or under a misconception of the nature of the
charge; where such plea was entered through fear, fraud, or official
misrepresentation; where it was made involuntarily; or where ineffective assistance
of counsel occurred in the process.” Kazadi v. People, 291 P.3d 16, 21 (Colo. 2012).
3
Mr. Brooks was aware that harm to victims of dismissed counts could be used at
sentencing. Thus, the Colorado Court of Appeals concluded that even if Mr. Brooks
had filed a motion to withdraw his plea, the motion would not have been granted. As
a result, it held Mr. Brooks’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed because he
could not establish that, but for counsel’s alleged deficient performance, the result of
the proceeding would have been different.
Mr. Brooks then filed an application for habeas relief in the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado, reasserting the claims raised in his initial
motion for postconviction relief. Specifically, he brought eight claims:
(1) trial counsel was ineffective by “failing to consult or employ a securities
fraud, business fraud, business law, or contract law expert because counsel
was not proficient in the . . . applicable substantive and procedural laws of
securities fraud” (Claim One);
(2) trial counsel was ineffective by “misadvising the applicant of the effect of
his plea” (Claim Two);
(3) trial counsel was ineffective by “providing inadequate representation at
sentencing” (Claim Three);
(4) trial counsel was ineffective and violated due process by “erroneously
telling the applicant he could not withdraw his guilty plea prior to
sentencing” (Claim Four);
(5) the trial court violated due process by “failing to properly advise the
applicant of the effect of his plea” (Claim Five);
(6) the state trial court violated due process “by denying [Mr. Brooks]
postconviction relief based on inaccurate and incomplete information”
(Claim Six);
(7) the Colorado Court of Appeals violated due process by “deciding to
deny . . . postconviction relief based on inaccurate and incomplete
information” (Claim Seven); and
(8) trial counsel was ineffective “when the errors are considered cumulatively”
(Claim Eight).
4
In a thorough and well-reasoned opinion, the Magistrate Judge dismissed all of
Mr. Brooks’s claims, with the exception of the portion of Claim Four alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel in advising Mr. Brooks he could not withdraw his
plea. Specifically, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Claims One, Two, Three,
Five, Eight, and the due process portion of Claim Four were procedurally barred
because, after the state trial court dismissed these claims, Mr. Brooks failed to fairly
present them to the Colorado Court of Appeals for appellate review. The Magistrate
Judge further held that Claims Six and Seven should be dismissed because there is no
federal constitutional right to postconviction review in the state courts. Then, turning
to the merits of the ineffective assistance portion of Claim Four, the Magistrate Judge
concluded Mr. Brooks was not entitled to habeas relief because the Colorado Court of
Appeals had reasonably determined he was not prejudiced by counsel’s alleged
deficiencies. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge dismissed in part and denied in part
Mr. Brooks’s habeas petition. Mr. Brooks sought reconsideration, which the
Magistrate Judge denied. Mr. Brooks now seeks a COA from this court to appeal
these decisions.
5
II. ANALYSIS
To obtain a COA, Mr. Brooks must make a “substantial showing of the denial
of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Under this standard, he must show
“that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the
petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented
were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529
U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). In his request for a COA,
Mr. Brooks asserts that reasonable jurists would debate the Magistrate Judge’s
resolution on the merits of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim contained in
Claim Four, as well as the Magistrate Judge’s exhaustion ruling with respect to
Claims One, Two, Three, Five, and Eight.3 We consider each contention in turn.
A. Reasonable jurists would not debate whether Mr. Brooks is entitled to
habeas relief on Claim Four.
We turn first to the merits of the ineffective assistance portion of Claim Four,
the only claim the Magistrate Judge considered to be exhausted. In this claim,
Mr. Brooks persists in his contention that trial counsel was ineffective for
“erroneously telling . . . [him] he could not withdraw his guilty plea prior to
sentencing.” But Mr. Brooks is entitled to habeas relief only if he can show the state
court’s resolution of this claim (1) “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as
3
Mr. Brooks does not challenge the Magistrate Judge’s dismissal of Claims
Six and Seven, nor does he contest the district court’s dismissal of the due process
claim contained in Claim Four. Therefore, we do not consider these claims further.
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determined by the Supreme Court;” or (2) “resulted in a decision that was based on
an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In evaluating the state court’s
resolution, we presume its factual determinations are correct “absent clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003)
(citation omitted). “[A]nd a decision adjudicated on the merits in a state court and
based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless
objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court
proceeding.” Id. (citation omitted).
In challenging the Colorado Court of Appeals’ resolution of this claim, Mr.
Brooks argues that the relevant clearly established federal law is the framework set
forth in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985). In Hill, the Supreme Court held that to
establish prejudice under Strickland in challenging a guilty plea based on ineffective
assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s alleged errors, he would not have pled guilty but would instead have
insisted on going to trial. Id. at 59. According to Mr. Brooks, he would not have pled
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial had he known the sentencing court
could consider victims of dismissed counts. Thus, he contends the Colorado Court of
Appeals unreasonably determined he was not prejudiced.
But as the Magistrate Judge explained, Hill is not applicable here because Mr.
Brooks’s allegation in Claim Four is that he would have attempted to withdraw his
7
guilty plea if counsel had not advised him—post plea agreement—that he could not
do so. For this reason, the relevant prejudice inquiry is not whether Mr. Brooks
would have pled guilty in the first place, but whether Mr. Brooks could have
successfully withdrawn his plea.4 By focusing its analysis accordingly, the Colorado
Court of Appeals unquestionably applied the correct legal standard.
Likewise, we agree with the Magistrate Judge that the Colorado Court of
Appeals’ determination that Mr. Brooks was not prejudiced because he did not
establish a “fair and just” reason to withdraw his plea is supported by sufficient facts.
Indeed, the state trial court specifically found Mr. Brooks was aware that evidence
related to the dismissed counts could be introduced at sentencing because, among
other things, (1) the signed plea agreement provided that additional evidence could
be submitted to the trial court prior to sentencing; (2) Mr. Brooks specifically agreed
to a restitution amount that included sums owed to individuals on dismissed counts,
and; (3) before being sentenced, Mr. Brooks submitted a letter to the court indicating
awareness that his actions had impacted all victims reflected in the restitution
agreement, which included victims of the dismissed charges.
In an effort to discredit these factual findings, Mr. Brooks argues two facts
show he was not aware the court could consider evidence from victims of dismissed
counts at sentencing. First, he notes he previously rejected a different plea agreement
4
Hill could have relevance to Claim Two, in which Mr. Brooks asserts counsel
failed to advise him of the effect of his plea. But as we explain below, Mr. Brooks
failed to exhaust Claim Two, thereby precluding review of this claim in federal court.
8
that included counts related to some of these victims. Second, he directs our attention
to the following statement he made at sentencing:
However, they do not sit behind me as victims. They sit behind me as
my parents, yes, but also as investors who’re yet to be paid back. Just as
the other 61 people who are not listed in any of the charges that I am
pleading to today. . . . I need to remind everyone in this courtroom that
I’m pleading to four individual counts of securities fraud involving four
people.
Even if this evidence could be viewed as supporting Mr. Brooks’s claim he
was not aware the court could consider evidence related to the dismissed counts at
sentencing, they fall far short of overcoming the statutory presumption of correctness
we afford the state court’s contrary finding. Thus, the Colorado Court of Appeals’
determination that the result of the proceeding would not have been different,
irrespective of counsel’s alleged deficient performance, was not objectively
unreasonable in light of the evidence. For this reason, reasonable jurists would not
debate that the Magistrate Judge correctly denied Mr. Brooks habeas relief on Claim
Four for ineffective assistance of counsel, and Mr. Brooks is not entitled to a COA on
this issue.
B. Reasonable jurists would not debate that Mr. Brooks failed to exhaust
Claims One, Two, Three, Five, and Eight.
We now consider whether reasonable jurists could debate whether Mr. Brooks
properly exhausted his remaining claims. “A party exhausts a claim in state court
when it has been ‘fairly presented.’” Williams v. Trammell, 782 F.3d 1184, 1210
(10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)). “‘Fair
9
presentation,’ in turn, requires that the petitioner raise in state court the ‘substance’
of his federal claims.” Id. (quoting Picard, 404 U.S. at 278). To have properly
presented his claim in state court, the petitioner must have presented his claim
through one “complete round of the State’s established appellate review process.”
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92 (2006) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). Although the exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional, it is “strictly
enforced.” Hernandez v. Starbuck, 69 F.3d 1089, 1092 (10th Cir. 1995). It may be
avoided only if “the petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice or a fundamental
miscarriage of justice.” Smith v. Workman, 550 F.3d 1258, 1274 (10th Cir. 2008).
We have carefully considered Mr. Brooks’s Opening Brief to the Colorado
Court of Appeals, in which he challenged the state trial court’s denial of his request
for postconviction relief. We think it beyond reasonable debate that Mr. Brooks did
not fairly present Claims One, Two, Three, Five, or Eight.5 For instance, in Claim
Two, Mr. Brooks asserts that counsel was deficient by failing to instruct him that the
sentencing court could consider victims of dismissed charges. Although Mr. Brooks
raised this claim in his initial motion for postconviction relief, he did not fairly
reassert the substance of it to the Colorado Court of Appeals as required to properly
5
In reaching this conclusion, we note that Mr. Brooks was appointed legal
counsel in his appeal of the denial of postconviction relief. Accordingly, the
Colorado Court of Appeals was under no obligation to read his Opening Brief with
any special liberality. Cf. People v. Bergerud, 223 P.3d 686, 696–97 (Colo. 2010)
(broadly construing a pro se defendant’s papers “to ensure he is not denied review of
important constitutional issues simply for his inability to articulate his concerns
within the legal lexicon”).
10
exhaust it. To the contrary, the only substantive legal analysis contained in Mr.
Brooks’s Opening Brief relates to Claim Four: that counsel was deficient for
erroneously advising him that he could not withdraw his plea.6 Mr. Brooks’s Opening
Brief did contend—as a factual matter—that he was not aware the court could
consider the impact on victims of dismissed offenses at sentencing and this
discussion was relevant to Claim Four because, if true, might provide Mr. Brooks
with a “fair and just” reason for withdrawing his plea. See Kazadi, 291 P.3d at 21.
But Mr. Brooks’s reference to these facts in arguing the merits of Claim Four does
not constitute fair presentment of Claim Two, a related but wholly different claim for
relief.7 See, e.g., Schempp v. Lucre Mgmt. Grp., LLC, 75 P.3d 1157, 1161 (Colo.
App. 2003) (holding that a party must inform the court as to the specific errors relied
upon, supporting facts in the record, and legal authority supporting claims, and
refusing to consider an issue that was inadequately briefed). Compare Robertson v.
6
Mr. Brooks’s Opening Brief states that in his motion for postconviction
relief, Mr. Brooks “claimed he was denied his constitutional right to counsel by the
public defender’s failure to advise him that the unproven allegations charged in the
dismissed counts would be used against him at sentencing.” But mere recitation of a
claim previously raised, without corresponding legal analysis, is insufficient to fairly
present the issue to the Colorado Court of Appeals. Cf. Wilkinson v. Timme, 503 F.
App’x 556, 560 (10th Cir. 2012) (unpublished opinion) (holding that referencing or
implicitly incorporating a supplemental motion filed in the trial court fails to satisfy
the fair presentation requirement).
7
Similarly, we reject Mr. Brooks’s argument that the Magistrate Judge erred
when he, like the Colorado Court of Appeals, considered facts related to Claim Two
in resolving Claim Four. As explained, whether Mr. Brooks was aware that victims of
dismissed counts would be considered at sentencing is relevant to the resolution of
Claim Four, and the Magistrate Judge was therefore correct in considering the
Colorado Court of Appeals’ findings of fact on this issue.
11
Roberts, 386 F. App’x 797, 805 (10th Cir. 2010) (unpublished opinion) (holding that
raising a related theory before a state court is insufficient to meet the fair
presentation standard), with Berg v. Foster, 244 F. App’x 239, 245 (10th Cir. 2007)
(holding that a claim was exhausted where the opening brief included sufficient facts
and argument to fairly present the issue to the appellate court).8
Likewise, Mr. Brooks’s Opening Brief is devoid of any argument related to the
substance of Claims One, Three, Five, and Eight. Mr. Brooks seems to concede as
much, but nevertheless argues these claims were exhausted because the Colorado
Court of Appeals necessarily considered them when affirming the denial of
postconviction relief. Not so. In fact, the Colorado Court of Appeals specifically
addressed only Claim Four, reasoning that “[o]n appeal, [Mr. Brooks] challenge[d]
only the district court’s summary dismissal of his allegation that counsel told him he
could not withdraw his plea.” And it expressly considered abandoned any other issue
not asserted on appeal. Thus, Mr. Brooks’s argument that the court implicitly
addressed these claims is unavailing.
In sum, Mr. Brooks failed to fairly present Claims One, Two, Three, Five, and
Eight to the state court, and reasonable jurists would not debate that the Magistrate
Judge was entitled to dismiss them as unexhausted. And Mr. Brooks has made no
8
Though not binding, we find unpublished decisions from this court to be
persuasive. See 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A) (“Unpublished decisions are not precedential,
but may be cited for their persuasive value.”).
12
effort to demonstrate an exception to the exhaustion requirement. Thus, he is not
entitled to a COA on this issue.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we deny a COA and dismiss the matter.
Entered for the Court
Carolyn B. McHugh
Circuit Judge
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