Morales v. Holder , 546 F. App'x 762 ( 2013 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT November 5, 2013
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
JAIME MORALES, a/k/a Angel
Hernandez, a/k/a Jaime Morales-Campos,
Petitioner,
v. Nos. 12-9583 & 13-9533
(Petition for Review)
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., United States
Attorney General,
Respondent.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, ANDERSON, Circuit Judge, and BRORBY, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Jaime Morales has filed two petitions for review of orders of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA). In the first petition, No. 12-9583, he seeks review of a
BIA order affirming a decision by an Immigration Judge (IJ) that he is ineligible for
adjustment of status because he made a false claim to United States citizenship that
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
renders him inadmissible. In the second petition, No. 13-9533, he seeks review of a
BIA order denying his motion to reopen. We have consolidated the appeals under
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(6).1 In No. 12-9583, we dismiss the petition for lack of
jurisdiction. In No. 13-9533, we dismiss the petition in part and deny it in part.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Morales is a native and citizen of Mexico. He was born in 1981 and
entered the United States with his parents in 1988. He lived in California until his
family moved to Utah in 1999. He married a United States citizen in 2002 and has
four children who are United States citizens.
In 2011, he was charged with inadmissibility under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as an
alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled. At a hearing
before the IJ, he conceded removability and requested to adjust his status to legal
permanent resident under § 1255(i). Because of a controlled-substance offense that
rendered him inadmissible under § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), he also sought a § 1182(h)
waiver, which gives the Attorney General discretionary authority to waive that basis
of inadmissibility when the offense involves simple possession of 30 grams or less of
marijuana. The relevant provision of § 1182(h) required him to show that “denial of
admission would result in extreme hardship to” his U.S.-citizen wife and children.
§ 1182(h)(1)(B).
1
Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory references (which are denoted by
a “§” symbol or the word “section”) are to Title 8 of the United States Code.
-2-
During the hearing, Mr. Morales testified that, before moving to Utah, his
ex-brother-in-law gave him a copy of a birth certificate bearing the name “Angel
Hernandez” and a social security number belonging to an “Angel Hernandez.” He
stated that he used that alias at times when he was arrested. In response to
questioning by the IJ, Mr. Morales admitted that he used the birth certificate to obtain
work in Utah, apparently in 1999, because it was “the only status [he had] to work.”
R. at 423.2 That caused the IJ to consider whether Mr. Morales was inadmissible
under § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) for having made a false claim to United States
citizenship in order to obtain a benefit under the law.3 To that end, the IJ granted
Mr. Morales’s attorney, Laura Lui, two continuances so that she could gather any
evidence that might assist Mr. Morales in meeting his burden to show that he was
eligible for the relief he had applied for.
Although Ms. Lui searched various sources of employment information, she
was unable to produce any further dispositive evidence. Accordingly, the IJ found
that Mr. Morales had clearly testified that he used a birth certificate to make a false
claim to United States citizenship. Based on that testimony, the IJ concluded that
Mr. Morales failed to meet his burden to show he was not inadmissible under
2
For convenience, all record cites are to the record filed in No. 13-9533, which
contains the complete administrative record.
3
Section 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) provides: “Any alien who falsely represents, or
has falsely represented, himself or herself to be a citizen of the United States for any
purpose or benefit under this chapter (including section 1324a of this title) or any
other Federal or State law is inadmissible.”
-3-
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I). Because there is no waiver of this ground of inadmissibility,
the IJ determined that Mr. Morales was ineligible for adjustment of status, and the IJ
therefore did not make any findings regarding the hardship waiver or whether
Mr. Morales merited that relief as a matter of discretion.
Mr. Morales appealed to the BIA. As relevant to his petitions for review, he
argued that any claim of citizenship occurred when he was a juvenile and living in an
“alcohol daze” and unable to recall the actual details of that claim to citizenship. R.
at 253. He therefore contended that the IJ should have given him more of a chance to
explain “what really happened” and that the alleged false claim “could have been
something much more innocent,” although he did not say what. Id. at 254. He also
argued that his qualifying relatives would suffer extreme hardship if he were
removed.
The BIA upheld the IJ’s decision and dismissed the appeal. The BIA
concluded that there was no clear error in the IJ’s factual findings and no legal error
in the conclusion that Mr. Morales failed to meet his burden of proof to establish that
he is not inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I). The BIA also noted that
Mr. Morales summarily stated in his notice of appeal that the proceedings deprived
him of due process and violated his rights under the immigration laws, but the only
related assertion in his brief was that the IJ should have given him a greater
opportunity to explain the circumstances surrounding the birth-certificate incident.
The BIA determined that the IJ gave Mr. Morales a sufficient opportunity to offer an
-4-
explanation and otherwise did not exhibit any bias. The BIA concluded that the
due-process allegation was unsubstantiated and failed to explain how Mr. Morales
was prejudiced. Therefore, the BIA determined, the claimed due process violation
did not warrant a remand for a new hearing.
After obtaining new counsel, Mr. Morales filed a timely motion to reopen with
the BIA. He asserted that his prior attorney, Ms. Lui, rendered ineffective assistance
of counsel before the IJ by not exploring (1) whether he in fact used a fake green card
and social security number instead of a birth certificate in order to obtain
employment and (2) his minority status when made the false claim to citizenship. He
supported these claims with a sworn declaration stating that he was confused at the
hearing when he said he used a birth certificate to obtain employment and that, if
Ms. Lui had asked follow-up questions when given the opportunity, he would have
clarified that he in fact used a fake green card bearing the name “Angel Hernandez”
to obtain employment. He further stated that after the hearing where he testified, he
told Ms. Lui he had made a mistake—that he had in fact used a fake green card, not a
birth certificate. He also argued that Ms. Lui was ineffective by leading him into
questions about his employment history, neglecting to request post-conclusion
voluntary departure, failing to marshal evidence, failing to present a claim of
ineffective assistance with regard to voluntary departure on appeal to the BIA, and
not fleshing out the due process allegation that the BIA had considered unsupported.
-5-
Finally, Mr. Morales claimed that the IJ did not fulfill his obligation to inform him of
his apparent eligibility for voluntary departure.
The BIA denied the motion to reopen. It first concluded that Mr. Morales did
not submit new or material evidence that Ms. Lui’s representation was ineffective
with regard to whether he had falsely presented a U.S. birth certificate or was a minor
at the time he did so. The BIA stated that Mr. Morales had “unambiguously
testified” before the IJ that he used the birth certificate to obtain employment in
Utah. R. at 4. The BIA refused to give material weight to the conflicting claim in
Mr. Morales’s declaration that he had in fact used a false green card, not a birth
certificate, because of his testimony before the IJ, the lack of any corroborating
evidence, and the IJ’s factual determination that he had presented a false birth
certificate. The BIA further determined that Mr. Morales had presented no new
evidence regarding his age when he first used the birth certificate and concluded that,
in any event, he continued to be employed by the same employer until he was
twenty-two or twenty-three years old, so “he continued to accept the benefit of his
false and unretracted claim of United States citizenship into adulthood.” Id.
Next, the BIA stated that the motion to reopen failed to identify or present any
evidence Ms. Lui allegedly failed to marshal. The BIA also rejected Mr. Morales’s
claim that Ms. Lui was ineffective by failing to present a claim for post-conclusion
voluntary departure. The BIA relied on statements in Ms. Lui’s affidavit, submitted
in support of the government’s response to the motion to reopen, that she discussed
-6-
the possibility of voluntary departure with Mr. Morales but he refused to accept it, so
she did not raise it with the IJ. Finally, the BIA concluded that even if Ms. Lui had
been ineffective, Mr. Morales had failed to “show through new evidence or evidence
already of record that [his] case would satisfy the hardship or discretionary factors
(particularly in light of his criminal history) that are essential to his claim for relief.”
Id. at 5.
II. DISCUSSION
A. No. 12-9583
In No. 12-9583, the petition for review of the BIA’s merits decision,
Mr. Morales primarily argues that his due process rights were violated by Ms. Lui’s
allegedly ineffective assistance. The problem for Mr. Morales is that, prior to
judicial review, an alien must “exhaust[] all administrative remedies available to the
alien as of right,” § 1252(d)(1), and exhaustion is jurisdictional, Sidabutar v.
Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1116, 1118 (10th Cir. 2007). He did not expressly present any
ineffective-assistance claims to the BIA in his appeal from the IJ’s decision, and his
allegation of a due process violation, which the BIA deemed insufficiently developed
to merit remand, did not even imply an ineffective-assistance claim. Accordingly,
the ineffective-assistance issue in No. 12-9583 is unexhausted, and we lack
jurisdiction over it. See Garcia-Carbajal v. Holder, 625 F.3d 1233, 1237 (10th Cir.
2010) (“To satisfy § 1252(d)(1), an alien must present the same specific legal theory
to the BIA before he or she may advance it in court.”). There is a narrow exception
-7-
to the exhaustion requirement where the BIA independently takes up an issue not
appealed to it. Id. at 1238. But in order for that exception to apply, “the BIA’s
ruling must (1) clearly identify a claim, issue, or argument not presented by the
petitioner; (2) demonstrate that the agency chose to exercise its discretion to entertain
that matter; and (3) explicitly decide that matter in a full explanatory opinion or
substantive discussion.” Id. at 1238-39. The BIA’s treatment of the due process
argument does not satisfy any of these requirements.
Mr. Morales also claims the IJ erred because “there are factual discrepancies
on whether [he] falsely and knowingly made a false claim to citizenship, what
document he used to make the false claim and his age at the time of the false claim.”
Pet’r’s Br. at 21. This argument was not presented to the BIA, nor did the BIA
actually consider and rule on it, so we lack jurisdiction to consider it. See
Garcia-Carbajal, 625 F.3d at 1238-39. Furthermore, he bases this argument on the
declaration he submitted in support of his motion to reopen, which was not part of the
record before the BIA when it decided the merits appeal. Hence, we may not
consider it. See § 1252(b)(4)(A) (limiting judicial review to “the administrative
record on which the order of removal is based”).4
4
Mr. Morales also argues that he made the requisite showing of extreme
hardship necessary to the § 1182(h) waiver. That issue is not properly before us in
this petition because neither the IJ nor the BIA, in its merits decision, ruled on
hardship. See Sarr v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 783, 791 (10th Cir. 2007) (stating that we
do not “decid[e] immigration appeals on the basis of grounds not expressly or
impliedly adopted by the BIA”).
-8-
B. No. 13-9533
In No. 13-9533, the petition for review of the BIA’s denial of the motion to
reopen, Mr. Morales argues that Ms. Lui provided ineffective assistance of counsel in
connection with the birth-certificate incident. However, this overlooks the BIA’s
alternate resolution—that even if Ms. Lui was ineffective, Mr. Morales still failed to
show that he would satisfy the hardship or discretionary factors essential to his claim
for relief, which required him to obtain the § 1182(h)(1)(B) waiver in order to adjust
his status under § 1255(i). We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s alternate
determination because, in relevant part, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) bars judicial review of
“any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section 1182(h).” See also
Munis v. Holder, 720 F.3d 1293, 1295 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding “that the hardship
determination required for a waiver of inadmissibility under § 1182(h)(1)(B) is an
unreviewable discretionary decision”). Although § 1252(a)(2)(D) permits judicial
review of constitutional claims or questions of law, it does not apply here because
Mr. Morales has not raised any such claims or questions with regard to the BIA’s
alternate disposition.
Because we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s alternate determination, we
need not decide whether the BIA erred with respect to Ms. Lui’s effectiveness, at
least with regard to the birth-certificate incident and the due process claim the BIA
considered undeveloped in the merits appeal. But Mr. Morales also argues that
Ms. Lui was ineffective before the IJ by failing to request post-conclusion voluntary
-9-
departure and before the BIA by not raising that failure.5 The BIA’s alternate
resolution does not obviate consideration of these arguments because the BIA based
that resolution on Mr. Morales’s failure to show he “satisf[ied] the hardship or
discretionary factors . . . that are essential to his claim for relief,” R. at 5, and the
“claim for relief” the BIA was referring to was the hardship waiver, not
post-conclusion voluntary departure. Hence, we see no jurisdictional impediment to
our review of the BIA’s disposition of these post-conclusion voluntary-departure
arguments.
5
In addition, Mr. Morales argues that Ms. Lui was ineffective by not advising
him of the two types of voluntary departure (pre- and post-conclusion voluntary
departure) and in not pursuing pre-conclusion voluntary departure. However, in the
memorandum supporting his motion to reopen, he acknowledged that pre-conclusion
voluntary departure is a type of relief, see R. at 69-70, but he did not raise either of
the pre-conclusion issues he advances here. Instead, his motion specifically asked for
reopening to consider adjustment of status and post-conclusion voluntary departure.
See id. at 36. In his supporting memorandum, he titled his argument “[Mr. Morales]
did not knowingly waive his right to pursue post-conclusion [voluntary departure]
and counsel was ineffective for not seeking the relief.” Id. at 69 (capitalization,
boldfacing, and underlining omitted). Further, he focused on Ms. Lui’s failure to
pursue post-conclusion voluntary departure. See, e.g., id. at 61 (“[I]t appears that
[Ms. Lui] completely neglected to request voluntary departure as an alternative relief
to adjustment and in lieu of removal”); id. at 70 (“[Mr. Morales] does not recall that
[Ms. Lui] explained the possibility of post-conclusion voluntary departure in the
event that his application for adjustment of status was denied by the [IJ] . . . .”); id.
at 71-72 (stating that he “desired to seek voluntary departure as an alternative relief
to the IJ finding him removable”); id. at 72 (claiming that Ms. Lui “failed to properly
advise [him] of all of the possible options for relief, including the ability to pursue
[the] adjustment application and still receive voluntary departure”). Moreover, the
BIA did not expressly take up or decide the pre-conclusion issues he now raises in
his petition for review. We therefore lack jurisdiction to consider them. See
Garcia-Carbajal, 625 F.3d at 1238-39; Sidabutar, 503 F.3d at 1118-22 (extending
issue-exhaustion requirement to issues that could have been raised in a motion to
reopen or reconsider).
- 10 -
We review the denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion.
Infanzon v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1359, 1362 (10th Cir. 2004). “The BIA abuses its
discretion when its decision provides no rational explanation, inexplicably departs
from established policies, is devoid of any reasoning, or contains only summary or
conclusory statements.” Id. (quotation omitted).
In addressing Mr. Morales’s claim that Ms. Lui was ineffective with regard to
post-conclusion voluntary departure, the BIA relied on a statement in her affidavit
that she had discussed voluntary departure with Mr. Morales but he refused to accept
it. Ms. Lui further stated in her affidavit that Mr. Morales’s refusal to accept
voluntary departure was the reason she did not present it to the IJ. The BIA
apparently did not credit Mr. Morales’s declaration, where he stated that Ms. Lui
failed to discuss voluntary departure with him prior to the hearing where he testified
and did not tell him he could obtain voluntary departure even if the IJ denied his
adjustment application.
Mr. Morales argues that by accepting Ms. Lui’s affidavit over his declaration,
the BIA engaged in factfinding prohibited by regulation. But the relevant regulation
states that the BIA “will not engage in factfinding in the course of deciding appeals.”
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv) (emphasis added). It is inapplicable here because the
BIA evaluated factual evidence in connection with a motion to reopen, not “in the
course of deciding [an] appeal[].” Id. Mr. Morales’s reliance on a number of cases
in support of this argument is similarly misplaced because they all concerned
- 11 -
limitations on the BIA’s factfinding capability during appeals. Moreover, the BIA
also determined that the motion failed to establish Mr. Morales’s eligibility for any
relief, and nowhere in the record or in his petition for review has Mr. Morales made a
showing that he is eligible for post-conclusion voluntary departure. Therefore, he
failed to show the prejudice necessary for a successful claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel. See United States v. Aguirre-Tello, 353 F.3d 1199, 1209 (10th Cir. 2004)
(en banc) (holding that, in order to prevail on a due process claim, an alien must
show there is reasonable likelihood he would have obtained the requested relief had
an IJ specifically advised him about that relief); Matter of Assaad, 23 I. & N. Dec.
553, 562 (BIA 2003) (requiring an alien to show he is eligible for relief in order to
establish the prejudice necessary to a successful ineffective-assistance claim
regarding such relief); see also Akinwunmi v. INS, 194 F.3d 1340, 1341 n.2 (10th Cir.
1999) (per curiam) (stating that “a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a
deportation proceeding may be based only on the Fifth Amendment guarantee of due
process” and requires an alien to “show that his counsel’s ineffective assistance so
prejudiced him that the proceeding was fundamentally unfair”).
Mr. Morales also claims that the IJ did not fulfill his obligation under 8 C.F.R.
§ 1240.11(a)(2) to inform him of his apparent eligibility for either form of voluntary
departure.6 Although he raised this issue in his motion to reopen, the BIA did not
6
In relevant part, 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2) provides: “The immigration judge
shall inform the alien of his or her apparent eligibility to apply for any of the benefits
(continued)
- 12 -
address it. We nonetheless see no error because the purpose of a motion to reopen is
to consider new factual evidence, not mount a collateral attack on an underlying IJ
decision by advancing new claims of legal error that could have been raised (but
were not) in a merits appeal. See § 1229a(c)(7)(B) (“The motion to reopen shall state
the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted, and
shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.”); 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2(c)(1) (prohibiting the BIA from granting a motion to reopen “unless it
appears to the [BIA] that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not
available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing”).
Mr. Morales further asserts that the BIA deviated from its own policy in not
reopening the case and remanding for the IJ to properly advise him of his eligibility
for voluntary departure. However, the case he relies on, In re Mendoza Loera,
2011 WL 6962801 (BIA Dec. 8, 2011) (unpublished), did not involve a motion to
reopen but an appeal from an IJ decision.7
enumerated in this chapter and shall afford the alien an opportunity to make
application during the hearing, in accordance with the provisions of [8 C.F.R.]
§ 1240.8(d).”
7
Mr. Morales also contends that the IJ did not give him a sufficient opportunity
to explain the circumstances surrounding the birth-certificate incident. We lack
jurisdiction to consider this argument because he did not raise it in his motion to
reopen and the BIA did not rule on it. See Garcia-Carbajal, 625 F.3d at 1238-39;
Sidabutar, 503 F.3d at 1118-22. Furthermore, for the reasons just explained in the
body of this decision, alleged error in the underlying IJ decision is not the proper
target of a motion to reopen.
(continued)
- 13 -
Finally, Mr. Morales asks us to remand based on our “inherent authority,”
Pet’r’s Br. at 55, because there is pending legislation in Congress that may eventually
benefit him. In support of his request, he cites Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S.
364 (1939), and Becerra-Jimenez v. INS, 829 F.2d 996 (10th Cir. 1987). But Ford,
on which Becerra-Jimenez relied, involved a remand to an agency, at the agency’s
request, for additional evidence and findings so the agency could reconsider “the
entire case.” Ford Motor Co., 305 U.S. at 367. The Court noted that the purpose of
the remand was to correct a “defect in the record,” id. at 373, so that the agency
could “take further action in accordance with the applicable law.” Id. at 374.
Pending legislation is not “applicable law.” Moreover, the remand in
Becerra-Jimenez concerned previously unavailable evidence and was based on
28 U.S.C. § 2347(c). See 829 F.2d at 1001-02. However, § 2347(c) is no longer an
available basis for judicial remands in reviews of removal orders or orders denying
reopening. See § 1252(a)(1) (providing that, in reviewing removal orders, a “court
may not order the taking of additional evidence under [28 U.S.C. §] 2347(c)”); Ali v.
U.S. Attorney Gen., 443 F.3d 804, 809 n.2 (11th Cir. 2006) (stating that “the
To the extent Mr. Morales claims that Ms. Lui was ineffective before the BIA
in the merits appeal by not raising the IJ’s purported failure to advise him about
voluntary departure, he did not advance such a theory in his motion to reopen;
instead, he claimed that Ms. Lui was ineffective in not requesting post-conclusion
voluntary departure, R. at 61-62; 69-72, and in not raising that failure in the merits
appeal, see R. at 66 (“Further, had the appeal been properly litigated, . . . competent
appellate counsel would have shown that trial counsel was ineffective for not
pursuing voluntary departure . . . .”). Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to consider this
theory. See Garcia-Carbajal, 625 F.3d at 1238-39; Sidabutar, 503 F.3d at 1118-22.
- 14 -
limitations on our jurisdiction to review a final order of removal . . . also control our
jurisdiction to review an order denying a motion to reopen a final order of removal”).
Hence, neither case provides a basis for us to exercise any “inherent authority” we
may possess. And in any event, courts render decisions based on existing law, not
pending legislation. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 431 (2008) (stating
that it is not “sound” for a court “to find contemporary norms based upon [pending]
state legislation”). Accordingly, we deem the remand request frivolous and deny it.
III. CONCLUSION
The petition for review in No. 12-9583 is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The petition for review in No. 13-9533 is dismissed in part for lack of jurisdiction
and denied in part.
Entered for the Court
Wade Brorby
Senior Circuit Judge
- 15 -