United States v. Loya-Medina ( 2014 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS January 15, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 12-1042
v. (D.C. No. 1:10-CR-00015-REB-7)
(D. Colo.)
ALPHONSO LOYA-MEDINA,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before LUCERO, Circuit Judge, BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge, and PHILLIPS,
Circuit Judge.
Alphonso Loya-Medina appeals his conviction and sentence for conspiracy to
distribute methamphetamine and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine.
Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), we affirm.
* The case is unanimously ordered submitted without oral argument pursuant to
Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and judgment is not
binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments;
nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
I
In spring 2009, while living in a community corrections facility as part of a state
sentence for drug distribution, Hector Ruiz began a methamphetamine operation. Loya-
Medina supplied Ruiz with drugs, and Ruiz distributed them with the assistance of Jamie
Dominguez, Julio Ibarra, and Sammy Hernandez. Ruiz’s girlfriend, Stephanie Perez,
frequently rented hotel rooms from which Ruiz ran the drug operation.
Ruiz came to the attention of the Northern Colorado Drug Task Force during the
summer of 2009. Law enforcement officers surveilled Ruiz and his associates as part of
an extended investigation of their illegal drug activities. The Task Force also used a
confidential informant and an undercover officer to make controlled drug buys from
Ruiz’s network.
The final controlled buy took place on December 2, 2009. Loya-Medina brought
methamphetamine to a room Perez had rented at the Budget Host motel near the
Johnson’s Corner truck stop in northern Colorado. Ruiz diluted the drug in the motel
room, packaged seven ounces into a raisin box, and asked Hernandez and Ibarra to
deliver it to the buyer at a nearby Starbucks coffee shop. Officers arrested Hernandez
and Ibarra in the Starbucks parking lot. Ruiz was arrested at the Johnson’s Corner truck
stop. Perez and Loya-Medina were arrested inside the motel room. After law
enforcement officers obtained a warrant, they searched the motel room and seized
additional methamphetamine as well as a green notebook identified at trial by Ruiz and
Hernandez as a drug ledger belonging to Loya-Medina.
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Ruiz, Ibarra, Dominguez, Hernandez, Perez, Loya-Medina, and another alleged
supplier named Hector Melendez were included in an indictment charging conspiracy to
distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(viii), & 846. Loya-Medina was also
charged with possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of a mixture or
substance containing methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) &
841(b)(1)(B)(viii) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Most of the co-defendants pled guilty, but Loya-
Medina and Melendez pled not guilty and were tried jointly. Ruiz, Dominguez,
Hernandez, and Perez testified for the government in exchange for the government’s
recommendation of reduced sentences.
Melendez was acquitted but the jury convicted Loya-Medina on both counts. The
Presentence Report (“PSR”) concluded that the offense involved more than fifteen
kilograms of methamphetamine, determined his criminal history to be Category I, and
calculated his Guidelines recommended sentencing range to be 235-293 months. The
district court adopted the PSR’s drug quantity calculation and Sentencing Guidelines
computation but granted Loya-Medina’s motion for a variance, imposing concurrent
sentences of 180 months’ imprisonment on each count.
II
Loya-Medina contends that the district court committed reversible error under
Fed. R. Evid. 106 and the common law rule of completeness by admitting some, but not
all, of the notebook alleged to be his drug ledger. The court ordered the redaction of two
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pages it deemed irrelevant because they “appear[ed] to be the work of a child practicing
his penmanship, grammar and art.” We review the district court’s evidentiary ruling for
an abuse of discretion. United States v. Batton, 602 F.3d 1191, 1196 (10th Cir. 2010).
“[W]e will not disturb the district court’s ruling absent a distinct showing [that] it was
based on a clearly erroneous finding of fact or an erroneous conclusion of law or
manifests a clear error of judgment.” Id. (quotation omitted).1
Rule 106 partially codifies the common law rule of completeness. United States v.
Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d 716, 734 (10th Cir. 2010). It provides that “[i]f a party
introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may require the
introduction, at that time, of any other part—or any other writing or recorded
statement—that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time.” Fed. R. Evid. 106.
“In determining whether a disputed portion of a statement must be admitted . . . the trial
court should consider whether (1) it explains the admitted evidence, (2) places the
admitted evidence in context, (3) avoids misleading the jury, and (4) insures fair and
impartial understanding of the evidence.” Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d at 735 (quotation
omitted). The rule does not necessarily require admission of the entire writing or
statement, only those parts that are relevant and “necessary to clarify or explain the
portion already received.” Id. (quotation omitted).
1
The government urges us to adopt a plain error standard of review, arguing that
Loya-Medina asserts for the first time on appeal that the specific basis for admitting the
redacted pages was Rule 106 or the common law rule of completeness. Because Loya-
Medina’s claim of error fails under either standard, we do not address this argument.
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Loya-Medina fails to adequately develop the argument that Rule 106 required
admission of the redacted notebook pages. After citing defense counsel’s vague
statement at trial that “the cartoons and that sort of thing in the notebook . . . will show
really where the origin of that notebook came from,” Loya-Medina simply asserts that the
redacted pages would have proved that the entirety of the notebook belonged to a child.
To invoke the rule of completeness, it is necessary that “misunderstanding or distortion
can be averted only through presentation of another portion” of the document at issue.
Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 172 (1988). Loya-Medina has made no
such showing. See United States v. Wright, 826 F.2d 938, 946 (10th Cir. 1987) (rule of
completeness does not require admission of “portions of a writing which are neither
explanatory of the previously introduced portions nor relevant to the introduced
portions”). Loya-Medina provides no reason to believe that the unredacted majority of
the notebook was something other than a drug ledger, and the evidence at trial uniformly
supported the conclusion that it was. Given Loya-Medina’s failure, both at trial and on
appeal, to explain how the redaction caused “misunderstanding or distortion,” we hold
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering redaction of the document.
III
Loya-Medina also argues that the district court should have granted his motion for
a mistrial after the Assistant U.S. Attorney improperly referenced, in the jury’s presence,
the court’s finding that a conspiracy existed for purposes of Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).
We review the denial of a motion for a mistrial for abuse of discretion. United States v.
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Ivory, 532 F.3d 1095, 1099 (10th Cir. 2008). “The district court has discretion to grant a
mistrial only when a defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial has been impaired.”
United States v. Meridyth, 364 F.3d 1181, 1183 (10th Cir. 2004).
Early in the trial and outside the presence of the jury, the district court ruled that
statements made by co-defendants would be admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E),
concluding that sufficient evidence supported the existence of a conspiracy. Later in the
trial, the government attempted to introduce testimony from a law enforcement officer
about the confidential informant who bought drugs from Ruiz’s operation during the
police investigation, and Melendez’s counsel objected on relevance grounds. In
response, the prosecutor stated on the record and in the presence of the jury: “Your
Honor, this court has previously found a conspiracy existed and that [the confidential
informant], though uncharged, was a part of the conspiracy.” Both defendants
immediately moved for a mistrial.
In evaluating prosecutorial misconduct, “reversal is required only if the improper
conduct influenced the verdict.” United States v. Maynard, 236 F.3d 601, 606 (10th Cir.
2000) (quotation omitted). We must “consider three factors within the context of the case
as a whole: (1) the curative acts of the district court, (2) the extent of the misconduct, and
(3) the role of the misconduct.” United States v. Portillo-Quezada, 469 F.3d 1345, 1352
(10th Cir. 2006).
After briefing by all parties and a hearing outside the presence of the jury, the
district court denied the motions for a mistrial. It found that the prosecutor had
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misspoken unintentionally and that the statement was not part of a pattern of misconduct.
“We ordinarily will not reverse if the misconduct was merely singular and isolated.”
United States v. Ivy, 83 F.3d 1266, 1288 (10th Cir. 1996) (quotation omitted). The trial
judge also found that the comment’s impact on the jury was minimized because it was
uttered without undue emotion, it was directed to the court rather than the jury, it was
made in the discrete context of an evidentiary objection, and it focused on the
confidential informant without referencing either defendant. Additionally, the motions
for mistrial were made discreetly, without drawing further attention to the remark.
Finally, the district court noted that its initial instruction to the jury included an
explanation of what does and does not constitute evidence and an admonition that the
jury should not be influenced by the judge’s rulings on objections. All of these factors
support the conclusion that the role of the government’s misconduct was minor and did
not merit declaration of a mistrial.
Under these circumstances, the district court determined that a curative instruction
to the jury would alleviate any prejudice to either defendant. When trial resumed, the
court reminded the jury that neither the attorneys’ statements nor the court’s evidentiary
rulings are evidence, and that such rulings are based upon a lower standard of proof than
that needed for criminal conviction. The court instructed the jury to disregard the
government’s response to Melendez’s objection and admonished them not to conclude
from the judge’s statements or actions that he held any view on the proper verdict.
“[C]onsider[ing] the trial as a whole,” Maynard, 236 F.3d at 606, we conclude that the
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district court judge permissibly determined that the defendants’ right to a “fair and
impartial trial [was not] impaired,” Meridyth, 364 F.3d at 1183, by the prosecutor’s
remark.
Although we have not addressed this precise circumstance, a number of our
sibling circuits have ruled similarly. See, e.g., United States v. Tampas, 493 F.3d 1291,
1302-03 (11th Cir. 2007) (prosecutor’s remark that government had established the
elements of a conspiracy was not prejudicial when addressed to court rather than jury,
made in context of an evidentiary objection, and “rendered harmless by [a] curative
instruction”); United States v. Birges, 723 F.2d 666, 673 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Any error
which may have occurred in permitting the discussion concerning the admissibility of a
co-conspirator’s statement to occur in the presence of the jury was harmless in light of
the court’s conspiracy instruction.”); United States v. Fellabaum, 408 F.2d 220, 226-
27 (7th Cir. 1969) (district court did not err in denying mistrial after prosecutor argued in
the jury’s presence that evidence was admissible because government had shown prima
facie case of conspiracy, and court admitted the evidence). Our ruling aligns with the
holdings of these circuits.
Loya-Medina relies on a Fifth Circuit case in which the court recognized the
prejudicial nature of a trial judge’s comment affirming the existence of a conspiracy
during an evidentiary ruling in the jury’s presence. United States v. Lance, 853 F.2d
1177, 1182 (5th Cir. 1988). The court in Lance, however, affirmed the denial of a
mistrial even though the comment was potentially more prejudicial than the one at issue
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here because it came from the judge rather than the prosecutor. Id. at 1184; see also
United States v. Hester, 140 F.3d 753, 758 (8th Cir. 1998) (“The district court’s sua
sponte ruling on the admissibility of coconspirator evidence before the jury, which
included a statement that the evidence was sufficient to find by a preponderance of the
evidence that Hester and Allen were members of the conspiracy . . . was not so
prejudicial as to require a mistrial or reversal.”). Loya-Medina suggests that the failure to
include a specific curative statement in the final jury instructions distinguishes this case
from Lance and requires reversal. We note that Loya-Medina made no objection to the
final jury instructions, which repeated the court’s frequent warning that statements made
by the court and the attorneys are not evidence. Given that Loya-Medina has not directed
us to a single case in which a court ruled that statements similar to the one at issue
required a mistrial, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
the motion for a mistrial.
IV
Finally, Loya-Medina argues that the district court erroneously computed the drug
quantity attributable to him and the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, and thus
based his downward sentencing variance on an inaccurate base offense level. In general,
we review the district court’s drug quantity calculation “under a clearly erroneous
standard, and we will not disturb it unless it has no support in the record or unless, after
reviewing all the evidence, we are firmly convinced that an error has been made.” United
States v. Nieto, 60 F.3d 1464, 1469 (10th Cir. 1995). In the instant case, the district court
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relied on the undisputed drug quantity calculation in the PSR. Loya-Medina stated in his
“Request for Downward Departure” that he had no objection “to the general statements in
the presentence report,” and concedes that he did not object to the probation officer’s
drug quantity calculation. We are unconvinced that his vague arguments requesting a
minimum sentence due to lack of serious involvement in the crimes of conviction
constituted a proper objection to the PSR under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(f).
This Court has “repeatedly held that if a defendant fails to object to his
presentence report, he waives his right to challenge the district court’s reliance on it,
unless the district court’s decision to do so amounts to plain error.” Ivy, 83 F.3d at 1297.
Plain error exists “when there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, which (3) affects substantial
rights, and which (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.” United States v. Hinson, 585 F.3d 1328, 1333 (10th Cir. 2009)
(quotation omitted).
Loya-Medina contends that the PSR’s drug quantity calculation was incorrect and
that the district court erred by failing to make specific factual findings regarding the
applicable drug quantity. He maintains that trial testimony and the jury verdict found
him responsible for much lower quantities of drugs than the fifteen kilograms ascribed to
him in the PSR. However, a district court may enhance a defendant’s sentence using
facts found by the judge, as long as such findings do not mandatorily increase the
sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Bustamante, 454 F.3d 1200, 1202 (10th Cir. 2006).
Additionally, the sentencing judge “may accept any undisputed portion of the presentence
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report as a finding of fact.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(A). The jury found Loya-Medina
guilty of conspiring to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine and possession
with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, indicating only the
minimum quantity of drugs attributable to him for each count. See United States v.
Lawrence, 405 F.3d 888, 907 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s holding in
Booker would not have prohibited the district court from making the same factual
findings and applying the same enhancements and adjustments to [the defendant’s]
sentence as long as it did not apply the Guidelines in a mandatory fashion.”). The district
court was therefore free to find that Loya-Medina was responsible for a specific drug
quantity above those amounts or, as it did in this case, to adopt the PSR’s findings.
Loya-Medina also contends that although he may be held responsible for the
“reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance” of the conspiracy,
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), the district court was required to make specific findings that
the total drug quantities involved were foreseeable to him. The government responds that
the district court did not attribute all of the conspiracy-related methamphetamine to Loya-
Medina, and thus no foreseeability finding is necessary. We agree that in selecting his
base offense level, the district court attributed to Loya-Medina only the “quantities of
contraband with which he was directly involved.” § 1B1.3 cmt. n.2.
“When the actual drugs underlying a drug quantity determination are not seized,
the trial court may rely upon an estimate to establish the defendant’s guideline offense
level so long as the information relied upon has some basis of support in the facts of the
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particular case and bears sufficient indicia of reliability.” United States v. Dalton, 409
F.3d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted); see also U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.5
(“Where there is no drug seizure or the amount seized does not affect the scale of the
offense, the court shall approximate the quantity of the controlled substance.”). Police
seized the methamphetamine that Loya-Medina distributed the day of his arrest.
Additionally, Ruiz testified that Melendez sold him two to six ounces daily or every two
days, with Loya-Medina supplying “about the same amount,” and the jury found Loya-
Medina guilty of the conspiracy charged in the first count of his indictment, which
spanned approximately six months (June 2009 through December 3, 2009). We conclude
that the drug quantity calculation has sufficient support in the record. Therefore, any
error by the district court in failing to make more specific findings about drug quantity
did not negatively affect Loya-Medina’s substantial rights or seriously undermine the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.
V
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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