United States v. Chadwick , 554 F. App'x 721 ( 2014 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSFebruary 6, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 13-1262
(D.C. No. 1:12-CR-00345-CMA-1)
PHILLIP CHADWICK, (D. of Colo.)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TYMKOVICH, ANDERSON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges. **
Phillip Chadwick was convicted of selling a firearm to a felon in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1). At trial, Chadwick asked the court to instruct the jury
on his theory of the case—that he was unaware the purchaser to whom he sold the
firearm was a convicted felon. The court rejected Chadwick’s proposed
instructions and the jury returned a guilty verdict. At the sentencing stage, the
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
court assessed a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice based on the
court’s finding that Chadwick committed perjury at trial.
Chadwick has appealed the judgment and sentence, and, exercising
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we AFFIRM.
I. Background
Chadwick sold a .45 caliber semi-automatic handgun to Everol Palmer, a
convicted felon who was then working as a confidential informant for the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. Law enforcement officials
recorded the transaction on videotape and audiotape. Before completing the sale,
Palmer told Chadwick that he was a convicted felon. He related to Chadwick a
story about the last time he was in court and both the prosecutor and the judge
reminded him that he was a felon. Palmer wondered, “‘Why does everybody keep
reminding me that I’m a [expletive] felon. Like I don’t [expletive] know.’ You
know what I mean.” R., Vol. I at 298. Chadwick responded, “Yeah. This ain’t
news to me, right?” Id. At trial, Chadwick testified that he did not hear Palmer
tell him that he was a convicted felon.
Chadwick proposed five jury instructions on his theory of the case. The
final version stated:
It is the Defendant Chadwick’s theory of the defense
that he did not know that Palmer was a “prohibited
person” at the time he sold the handgun to him.
Moreover, the Defendant Chadwick did not have reason
to believe that Palmer was a prohibited person because
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he could not hear Palmer clearly enough if Palmer had in
fact effectively told him that he was a convicted felon.
Id. at 252. The district court rejected the proposed instructions, characterizing
them as “essentially just summaries of the evidence in the light most favorable to
the defense.” R., Vol. III at 731. A jury then found Chadwick guilty of the
charged offense.
In its sentencing statement, the government asserted that Chadwick
committed perjury during his trial testimony and recommended a two-level
enhancement for obstruction of justice under USSG § 3C1.1. Chadwick had
testified at trial that he did not hear Palmer’s statement that he was a convicted
felon. He averred that he could not hear Palmer because of background noise and
the pitch, volume, and tone of Palmer’s voice. He also claimed he was distracted
by a tractor-trailer pulling into his driveway. The court agreed with the
government’s recommendation and supported the enhancement with an explicit
finding that Chadwick willfully gave false testimony at trial.
II. Analysis
On appeal, Chadwick seeks reversal of his judgment and sentence. He
argues that the district court erred in failing to give an instruction on the theory of
defense and in assessing a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice.
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A. Theory of Defense Instruction
We review jury instructions as a whole to determine whether they
accurately convey the governing law and review a court’s refusal to grant a
proposed jury instruction for abuse of discretion. United States v. Bowling, 619
F.3d 1175, 1183–84 (10th Cir. 2010). “While a defendant is entitled to an
instruction on his theory of defense where some evidence and the law supports the
theory, such an instruction is not required if it would simply give the jury a
clearer understanding of the issues.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). A theory of defense instruction is required “only if, without the
instruction, the district court’s instructions were erroneous or inadequate.”
United States v. Williams, 403 F.3d 1188, 1195 (10th Cir. 2005) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
Instructions on the theory of defense “must adequately instruct the jury on
the legal principles underlying the defense; it is not enough to present the defense
in wholly factual terms.” United States v. Migliaccio, 34 F.3d 1517, 1523 (10th
Cir. 1994). Granting an instruction that simply recounts the facts in a light
favorable to the defendant effectively puts the court’s imprimatur on the
defendant’s factual theory of the case. United States v. Grissom, 44 F.3d 1507,
1513 (10th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Davis, 953 F.2d 1482, 1492 (10th
Cir. 1992) (“[S]ummaries of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
defense . . . [are] more appropriate for closing argument.”).
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The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to instruct the
jury on Chadwick’s theory of defense. The court’s instructions as a whole
adequately conveyed the governing law on the defendant’s required state of mind
under the statute. Section 922(d) makes it a crime to “knowingly” sell a firearm
to a convicted felon “when the seller or transferor knows or has reasonable cause
to believe that such a person is a convicted felon.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(d).
Instruction Thirteen expressed to the jury that to find Chadwick guilty, the
government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he “knew or had
reasonable cause to believe that Everol Palmer was a convicted felon.” R., Vol. I
at 235. The instruction further defined “reasonable cause to believe” as “knowing
facts that would cause a reasonable person to conclude that the other person is a
convicted felon.” Id. Instruction Fourteen articulated the legal requirements for
satisfying the statute’s knowledge requirement.
The district court properly rejected the proposed theory of defense
instruction because it was a summary of the evidence in a light favorable to
Chadwick. The instruction simply reiterated Chadwick’s interpretation of the
evidence—that he did not know Palmer was a convicted felon and had no reason
to believe Palmer was a felon because he could not hear Palmer clearly—and
presented the defense’s theory in wholly factual terms. The jury instructions were
clear and adequate on § 922(d)’s knowledge requirement, and Chadwick’s
instruction offered no further explanation of the legal principles underlying his
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defense. His proposed instruction on the theory of defense would have served no
purpose but to put the court’s imprimatur on Chadwick’s interpretation of the
evidence.
B. Obstruction of Justice Enhancement
We review a sentence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Burgess,
576 F.3d 1078, 1101 (10th Cir. 2009). When considering challenges to
sentencing enhancements under USSG § 3C1.1, we review the district court’s
factual findings as to the obstruction of justice for clear error and review de novo
the district court’s legal interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines. United
States v. Hawthorne, 316 F.3d 1140, 1145 (10th Cir. 2003).
A defendant is subject to a two-level enhancement under § 3C1.1 if he
“willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the
administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or
sentencing of the instant offense of conviction, and . . . the obstructive conduct
related to . . . [his] offense of conviction.” The court may apply this enhancement
when the defendant violates the federal perjury statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1621, by
giving “false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to
provide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty
memory.” United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993), abrogated on other
grounds, United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482 (1997). The district court must
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make explicit findings as to which representations constitute perjury. United
States v. Hawthorne, 316 F.3d 1140, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003).
Chadwick suggests that the district court applied the enhancement solely
because the jury declined to believe his testimony and returned a guilty verdict.
The district court, however, made detailed factual findings that established
Chadwick committed perjury when he testified that he could not hear Palmer tell
him he was a convicted felon because of the pitch, volume, and tone of Palmer’s
voice, as well as background noise. The court relied on video evidence that
demonstrated Chadwick had no apparent issues hearing what Palmer was telling
him. The court also credited the testimony of a law enforcement agent charged
with monitoring Chadwick’s property during the firearm transaction, who flatly
contradicted Chadwick’s assertion that a tractor-trailer pulled into his driveway
during the sale. Pursuant to our requirement that the district court make explicit
factual findings as to the perjured testimony, the court concluded Chadwick’s
testimony was false, material, and willful.
We see no basis to conclude that the court’s finding constitutes clear error,
and Chadwick does not explain why we should. Instead, Chadwick asserts that
the district court found he committed perjury based only on the jury verdict. Of
course, a guilty verdict is inadequate to establish that a defendant committed
perjury during his testimony. A defendant may give inaccurate testimony due to
confusion, or the jury may find the defendant’s testimony truthful but insufficient
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to escape criminal liability. See Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 95. But an enhancement
for perjury requires an explicit finding of willful false testimony. The district
court made such a finding in Chadwick’s case. Chadwick offers no reason to
conclude that this finding was clearly erroneous.
III. Conclusion
We AFFIRM the judgment and sentence of the district court.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT,
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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