Martinez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey , 313 F. App'x 154 ( 2009 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
February 20, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
SANDRA LETICIA
MARTINEZ-RODRIGUEZ,
Petitioner,
v. No. 08-9533
(Petition for Review)
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., *
United States Attorney General,
Respondent.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT **
Before MURPHY, McKAY, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
Sandra Leticia Martinez-Rodriguez, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered
this country illegally in 1988 when she was twelve years old. She now has three
daughters who are United States citizens. In 2004, the Department of Homeland
*
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Eric H. Holder, Jr. is substituted for
Michael B. Mukasey as the respondent in this appeal.
**
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Security issued a notice to appear charging Ms. Martinez-Rodriguez with being
subject to removal. Ms. Martinez-Rodriguez admitted removability but applied
for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). 1 After an Immigration
Judge (IJ) denied her application, she appealed to the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA). A single member of the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision with a
short opinion under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(5). The BIA member agreed that, “[f]or
the reasons identified by the [IJ],” Ms. Martinez-Rodriguez did not qualify for
cancellation of removal because, while her “removal would adversely affect her
1
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b):
(1) In general
The Attorney General may cancel removal of, and adjust to the status
of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, an alien who
is inadmissible or deportable from the United States if the alien –
(A) has been physically present in the United States for a
continuous period of not less than 10 years immediately
preceding the date of such application;
(B) has been a person of good moral character during such
period;
(C) has not been convicted of an offense under section
1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3) of this title, subject to
paragraph (5); and
(D) establishes that removal would result in exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or
child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence.
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family, the level of hardship f[ell] short of the exceptional and extremely unusual
standard set forth in section [1229b(b)(1)(D)].” Admin. R., Vol. 1 at 18. The
BIA also denied her motion to reconsider. Ms. Martinez-Rodriguez has petitioned
this court for review of the BIA’s decisions, raising three points of error: (1) that
the BIA denied her due process by adopting “[m]aterial and [e]rroneous [f]actual
[f]indings” made by the IJ, Pet’r Opening Br. at 20 (emphasis omitted); (2) that
the BIA denied her due process because neither the IJ’s nor the BIA’s decisions
showed that BIA precedent had been properly applied, and (3) that the BIA
denied her due process and failed to follow the applicable regulation because the
member assigned to the case did not forward her appeal to a three-member panel
for review.
I
Because the BIA member assigned to the case issued a brief order under
§ 1003.1(e)(5), we review that independent decision, which constitutes the final
order of removal. See Uanreroro v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1197, 1204 (10th Cir.
2006). But when, as in this case, the BIA member specifically adopts the IJ’s
reasoning in his decision, see Admin. R., Vol. 1 at 18, we may also look to the
IJ’s decision, Uanreroro, 443 F.3d at 1204.
Generally, when reviewing a decision from the BIA “we consider any legal
questions de novo, and we review the agency’s findings of fact under the
substantial evidence standard. Under that test, our duty is to guarantee that
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factual determinations are supported by reasonable, substantial and probative
evidence considering the record as a whole.” Diallo v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 1274,
1279 (10th Cir. 2006) (alteration and quotation omitted). But, even after the
passage of the REAL ID Act of 2005, “challenges directed solely at the agency’s
discretionary and factual determinations remain outside the scope of judicial
review.” Id. at 1281. This includes challenges to the discretionary determination
of whether an alien showed the requisite “exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship” for cancellation of removal under § 1229b(b)(1)(D). See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); Morales Ventura v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1259, 1261-62
(10th Cir. 2003).
A
Nevertheless, Ms. Martinez-Rodriguez claims she is not appealing the
BIA’s decision that she failed to show the requisite “exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship.” Instead she claims that she is appealing the agency’s failure
to provide her due process in reaching that decision. See Diallo, 447 F.3d at 1280(“The Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in removal
proceedings.”). She claims the BIA failed to provide her due process because it
relied on the IJ’s decision which, in turn, relied on erroneous factual findings and
failed to properly follow BIA precedent in denying her application for
cancellation of removal.
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We turn first to Ms. Martinez-Rodriguez’s claim that she was denied due
process because the BIA relied on material and erroneous factual findings.
Although it is true that following enactment of the REAL ID Act, we have
jurisdiction to review constitutional claims and questions of law raised in a
petition for review, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), Ms. Martinez-Rodriguez has done
nothing to tie her naked factual challenges to the Due Process Clause other than
use the words “due process.” She simply points to the factual findings she
disagrees with and then claims a due process violation occurred. As noted above,
challenges directed solely at an agency’s factual determinations are outside our
jurisdiction. Diallo, 447 F.3d at 1281. Simply “[r]ecasting challenges to factual
or discretionary determinations as due process or other constitutional claims is
clearly insufficient to give this Court jurisdiction under § 1252(a)(2)(D).”
Jarbough v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 483 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2007). We thus have
no jurisdiction over Ms. Martinez-Rodriguez’s first point.
B
In her second point, Ms. Martinez-Rodriguez argues that her due process
rights were violated because the IJ failed to properly apply BIA precedent in
denying her application.
“At the core of due process are the requirements of notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard.” Jarbough, 483 F.3d at 190. It is clear that
Ms. Martinez-Rodriguez received both. She complains that the IJ and BIA failed
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to consider and discuss her argument comparing her factual situation with that in
the three BIA precedential decisions that address the “exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship” standard. This assertion misrepresents the record.
Our review shows that the IJ did discuss and consider all three decisions,
recited the factual situation in each of those cases, and at places directly
compared those factual situations with that in the present case. Further, the BIA’s
decision also cited the same three cases and, after examining a number of
Ms. Martinez-Rodriguez’s arguments on appeal, held that “the hardship faced by
her family members [did not reach] the exceptional and extremely unusual level
as outlined in th[e] Board’s precedents.” Admin. R., Vol. 1 at 19.
It therefore appears that Ms. Martinez-Rodriguez’s actual complaint is that
the BIA simply made the wrong decision regarding her application. We have held
that a determination that an alien has not shown the “exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship” necessary to qualify for cancellation of removal was an
unreviewable discretionary decision because “[t]here is no algorithm for
determining when a hardship is ‘exceptional and extremely unusual.’” Morales
Ventura, 348 F.3d at 1262. Further, Ms. Martinez-Rodriguez acknowledges in her
opening brief that “[t]here are no hard and fast rules or definitions as to when the
‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship’ standard is satisfied,” and that
“[e]ach case must be individually reviewed and assessed.” Pet’r Opening Br. at
29.
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Consequently, to the extent that Ms. Martinez-Rodriguez is arguing in her
second point that the BIA violated her due process rights, we disagree. To the
extent she is asking that we review the BIA’s discretionary decision that she had
not shown “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship,” we lack the jurisdiction
to do so.
C
In her third point, Ms. Martinez-Rodriguez argues that the BIA failed to
provide her due process and violated 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(e)(5) and (6) by not
assigning her appeal to a three-member panel for review. Under § 1003.1(e), the
BIA may use one of three methods to decide appeals from IJ decisions. First, it
may affirm the IJ’s decision without opinion
if the Board member [to whom the case is assigned] determines that
the result reached in the decision under review was correct; that any
errors in the decision under review were harmless or nonmaterial;
and that
(A) The issues on appeal are squarely controlled by existing
Board or federal court precedent and do not involve the
application of precedent to a novel factual situation; or
(B) The factual and legal issues raised on appeal are not so
substantial that the case warrants the issuance of a written
opinion in the case.
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4)(i).
Second, if the BIA member who is assigned the case decides that an
affirmance without opinion is not appropriate,
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the Board member shall issue a brief order affirming, modifying, or
remanding the decision under review, unless the Board member
designates the case for decision by a three-member panel under
paragraph (e)(6) of this section under the standards of the case
management plan. A single Board member may reverse the decision
under review if such reversal is plainly consistent with and required
by intervening Board or judicial precedent, by an intervening Act of
Congress, or by an intervening final regulation.
Id. § 1003.1(e)(5).
Finally, a case may be assigned to review by a three-member panel only if
the case presents one of a number of circumstances:
(i) The need to settle inconsistencies among the rulings of different
immigration judges;
(ii) The need to establish a precedent construing the meaning of laws,
regulations, or procedures;
(iii) The need to review a decision by an immigration judge or the
Service that is not in conformity with the law or with applicable
precedents;
(iv) The need to resolve a case or controversy of major national
import;
(v) The need to review a clearly erroneous factual determination by
an immigration judge; or
(vi) The need to reverse the decision of an immigration judge or the
Service, other than a reversal under § 1003.1(e)(5).
Id. § 1003.1(e)(6). As discussed above, the BIA member in this case issued a
brief order under § 1003.1(e)(5) adopting the reasoning of and affirming the
IJ’s decision.
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As to Ms. Martinez-Rodriguez’s argument that the failure to provide review
by a three-member panel denied her due process, we note that we held in Tsegay
v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1347, 1353 (10th Cir. 2004), that an alien has no
constitutional right to appeal an IJ’s decision to the BIA, and that the IJ’s
decision alone, affirmed without opinion by the BIA under § 1003.1(e)(4),
provided the needed “reasoned agency decision on the merits of her petition for
asylum.” A fortiori, the BIA’s short decision in this case, adopting the more
detailed reasoning of the IJ’s decision, provided the reasoned agency decision on
the merits of her petition required by the Due Process Clause.
We therefore turn to Ms. Martinez-Rodriguez’s argument that the BIA
member violated § 1003.1(e)(6) in not forwarding her case to a three-member
panel because (1) under § 1003.1(e)(6)(iii), the IJ’s decision did not conform to
BIA precedents; and (2) under § 1003.1(e)(6)(v), the IJ made clearly erroneous
factual determinations. Ms. Martinez-Rodriguez asks that we reverse the BIA
member’s procedural decision, and remand the case, directing that it be assigned
to a three-member panel. We agree with the government that we do not have
jurisdiction to review the BIA member’s procedural decision.
In Tsegay, this court addressed the issue of whether we had jurisdiction to
review the decision of a BIA judge to affirm an IJ’s decision without opinion
under § 1003.1(e)(4), rather than issue a written opinion. We did not have
jurisdiction to review the IJ’s underlying decision rejecting Tsegay’s asylum
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application on the ground that the changed circumstances exception did not apply.
Tsegay, 386 F.3d at 1354. In determining that we also did not have jurisdiction to
review the BIA’s decision to affirm without opinion, we examined the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the Administrative Procedures Act
(APA), the “[t]wo statutes defin[ing] our jurisdiction to review immigration
decisions.” Id. at 1353.
We first noted that we had no jurisdiction under the INA–which grants
jurisdiction to review “final order[s] of removal,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1)–because
“the BIA’s procedural decision to affirm without opinion” was not a final order of
removal; it was simply the procedural agency action that made the IJ’s decision
the final order of removal, and the IJ’s decision was not reviewable. 386 F.3d
at 1353.
In the present case, unlike the situation in Tsegay, the BIA judge issued a
short opinion under § 1003.1(e)(5) instead of affirming without opinion, and that
short opinion became the final order of removal. But the actual decision that
Ms. Martinez-Rodriguez is appealing from is the intermediate procedural decision
not to forward the case to a three-judge panel, not the BIA member’s final order,
which in no way addressed his decision not to forward the matter to a three-judge
panel. We note that under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9),
[j]udicial review of all questions of law and fact, including
interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory
provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to
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remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter shall be
available only in judicial review of a final order under this section.
But here, as we held above, the final order of removal is not reviewable.
In Tsegay, we next considered the APA’s jurisdictional grant, noting:
“[t]o be subject to review under the APA, the action at issue must be a ‘final
agency action.’” 386 F.3d at 1354 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 704). We held that
[t]he BIA’s decision to affirm Tsegay’s case without opinion was the
final agency action here because it marked “the consummation of the
agency decision-making process” and was an action “from which
legal consequences flow,” in that the affirmance without opinion
establishes the IJ’s asylum decision as the final order of removal.
Id. (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997)). We went on,
however, to find that there was still no jurisdiction because the BIA’s decision
was committed to agency discretion as a matter of law. Id. at 1355-58.
Here, the procedural decision that Ms. Martinez-Rodriguez is appealing
was not the final agency action. The final agency action was the BIA member’s
short opinion affirming the IJ’s decision, not his preceding procedural decision.
Similar to the INA provision quoted above, APA provides that “[a] preliminary,
procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is
subject to review on the review of the final agency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. But,
again, we have no jurisdiction over the final agency action. Thus, under Tsegay,
we have no jurisdiction to review that procedural decision not to assign the appeal
to a three-judge panel.
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This does not mean, however, that we never have jurisdiction to review a
BIA member’s decision not to forward a case to a three-judge panel. As correctly
recognized by the parties, we held in Batalova v. Ashcroft that we did have
jurisdiction to review the BIA judge’s decision in that case. 355 F.3d 1246, 1253
(10th Cir. 2004). But in Batalova we had jurisdiction over the merits of the
appeal and the petitioner was asking us to also review the decision not to forward
to a three-judge panel. See Tsegay, 386 F.3d at 1358 (distinguishing Batalova on,
among others, the ground that the court in Batalova had jurisdiction over the
merits of the underlying appeal). Thus, in Batalova the court noted that “it
ma[de] little difference whether the BIA member properly or improperly
determined to [affirm with a short order], or whether the BIA acted through a
single member or a three-member panel, because we directly review the IJ’s
decision, which the BIA member adopted,” and then went on simply to hold:
“As our review of the merits of petitioners’ case will reveal, we find no error in
[the decision not to forward to a three-judge panel].” 355 F.3d at 1253 & n.8.
Here, the only issue on appeal to the BIA–whether Ms. Martinez-Rodriguez
showed the requisite “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” for
cancellation of removal under § 1229b(b)(1)(D)–is an issue we do not have
jurisdiction to review. And it would be impossible for us to determine whether
this case presented either “[t]he need to review a decision by an immigration
judge or the Service that is not in conformity with the law or with applicable
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precedents” or “[t]he need to review a clearly erroneous factual determination
by an immigration judge,” under § 1003.1(e)(6)(iii) and (v), as
Ms. Martinez-Rodriguez requests, without engaging in the same merits
determination we are without jurisdiction to conduct. See Ngure v. Ashcroft,
367 F.3d 975, 986 (8th Cir. 2004) (“[W]here a statute precludes judicial review of
the IJ’s determination, the court of appeals also lacks jurisdiction to review the
BIA’s decision to affirm without opinion, because such review would require the
court to examine the merits of the IJ’s unreviewable determination.”); Falcon
Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845, 853 (9th Cir. 2003) (same). Thus, we have
no jurisdiction to review the BIA member’s procedural decision to decide the case
with a short order under § 1003.1(e)(5) instead of forwarding it to a three-judge
panel for review under § 1003.1(e)(6).
II
To the extent the second point of Ms. Martinez-Rodriguez’s petition for
review raises a proper due process challenge, it is DENIED. The remainder of
her petition is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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