Hernandez v. Jones , 556 F. App'x 672 ( 2014 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT February 7, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
JESUS HERNANDEZ,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 13-5107
(D.C. No. 4:10-CV-00534-GKF-TLW)
JUSTIN JONES, Director of the (N.D. Okla.)
Oklahoma Department of Corrections,
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
Before LUCERO and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and BRORBY, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Jesus Hernandez, a pro se Oklahoma prisoner, seeks a certificate of
appealability (“COA”) to challenge the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254
habeas petition.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (stating that no appeal may be taken
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order is not binding precedent, except
under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be
cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
1
We liberally construe Mr. Hernandez’s pro se materials. See Van Deelen v.
Johnson, 497 F.3d 1151, 1153 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007).
from a final order disposing of a § 2254 petition unless petitioner first obtains a
COA). We deny a COA and dismiss the appeal.
I
Mr. Hernandez was tried by a jury on two counts of first-degree murder for the
stabbing death of his pregnant girlfriend. On count one, he was convicted and
sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. On count two, he was
convicted of the lesser charge of second-degree murder and sentenced to a
consecutive thirty-year term. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”)
affirmed his convictions and sentence, and the trial court denied post-conviction
relief. The OCCA then affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief, and
Mr. Hernandez filed this § 2254 petition. The district court denied the petition as
well as a COA, and Mr. Hernandez now seeks a COA from this court.
II
“A COA is a jurisdictional prerequisite to our review of a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus.” Allen v. Zavaras, 568 F.3d 1197, 1199 (10th Cir. 2009); 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1)(A). A COA will issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), which is
accomplished when an applicant shows “that reasonable jurists could debate whether
(or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different
manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to
proceed further,” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (internal quotation
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marks omitted). Where a petition has been denied on procedural grounds, an
applicant “must also show ‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable . . . whether
the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.’” Coppage v. McKune,
534 F.3d 1279, 1281 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Slack, 529 U.S. at 484). Where a state
court has adjudicated the merits of a claim raised in a federal habeas petition, as
occurred here, we may grant habeas relief only where the state court decision was
“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court” or was “based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Dockins v. Hines, 374 F.3d 935, 937-38 (10th Cir.
2004).
Mr. Hernandez seeks a COA to pursue three claims: 1) that he was denied a
fair trial by the admission of a crime-scene video; 2) that he cannot be punished twice
for committing a single act of violence; and 3) that his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance.2
2
In the district court, Mr. Hernandez argued that both trial and appellate counsel
were ineffective, specifically appellate counsel by failing to communicate with him
and help him understand his constitutional rights. R., Vol. 1 at 13. He also argued
that interpreter services were withheld until late in the trial and during his appeal. In
his COA application, Mr. Hernandez does not mention his claim that an interpreter
was withheld, and he only refers to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in the
heading section of his argument. We decline to consider these and any other
inadequately presented issues. See Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104
(10th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e routinely have declined to consider arguments that are not
raised, or are inadequately presented, in an appellant’s opening brief.”); United States
(continued)
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Mr. Hernandez’s first contention is unavailing, as no reasonable jurist would
debate whether Mr. Hernandez was a denied a fair trial by the admission of the
crime-scene video. See Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036, 1055 (10th Cir. 2002)
(“Under Tenth Circuit precedent, [a petitioner] may only obtain habeas relief for an
improper state evidentiary ruling if the alleged error was so grossly prejudicial that it
fatally infected the trial and denied the fundamental fairness that is the essence of due
process.” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)). The OCCA explained
that the video “accurately depicted the location of [the victim’s] body . . . and gave
the jury a view of the entire crime scene, including blood spatter and pooling of
blood in relation to her body.” R., Vol. 1 at 100. The OCCA also determined that
the video corroborated witnesses’ testimony without focusing on the body for an
inordinate duration. And although there were photos of the crime scene, the OCCA
found the video was not cumulative because it provided a walkthrough visualization
not provided by the photos. Given this explanation, we agree with the district court
that the video was not so prejudicial as to render the trial fundamentally unfair.
Mr. Hernandez next contends he cannot be punished twice for committing a
single act of violence.3 To the extent Mr. Hernandez maintains that his sentences
v. Springfield, 337 F.3d 1175, 1178 (10th Cir. 2003) (finding waiver where applicant
failed to address claim in either his COA application or appeal brief).
3
To the extent Mr. Hernandez characterizes this claim as a double jeopardy
violation, we note that he attempted to amend his § 2254 petition to advance this
theory but the district court ruled he was raising a new claim that was time-barred.
See R., Vol. 1 at 357-58. Mr. Hernandez offers no argument suggesting that the
(continued)
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violate Oklahoma’s prohibition against multiple sentences found at Okla. Stat. tit. 21,
§ 11, the OCCA rejected this claim on direct appeal, ruling that although “various
acts are part of the same transaction, they will constitute separate and distinct crimes
where they are directed at separate and distinct persons.” Id. at 101. The OCCA
observed that the jury convicted Mr. Hernandez of killing two people—his pregnant
girlfriend and her unborn child—and concluded that state statutes authorized separate
punishments. Mr. Hernandez disputes this conclusion, but the OCCA’s interpretation
of state law is not cognizable on federal habeas review. See Estelle v. McGuire,
502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Moreover, as the state’s highest criminal court, the
OCCA’s conclusion regarding the intent of Oklahoma’s legislature was binding.
See Cummings v. Evans, 161 F.3d 610, 614-15 (10th Cir. 1998). Thus, no reasonable
jurist could debate the district court’s resolution of this claim.
Finally, Mr. Hernandez contends his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to
impeach witnesses who proffered contradictory testimony. Although he raised this
claim in his post-conviction proceedings, the district court ruled it was procedurally
defaulted because Mr. Hernandez failed to raise it on direct appeal. See English v.
Cody, 146 F.3d 1257, 1259 (10th Cir. 1998) (recognizing Oklahoma’s procedural bar
against claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel not raised on direct appeal).
“Where a plain procedural bar is present and the district court is correct to invoke it
district court’s procedural ruling was wrong or even debatable, and as a consequence,
we decline to consider the issue, see Springfield, 337 F.3d at 1178.
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to dispose of the case, a reasonable jurist could not conclude either that the district
court erred in dismissing the petition or that the petitioner should be allowed to
proceed further.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. Mr. Hernandez offers no argument
suggesting the district court erred in applying Oklahoma’s procedural bar. Nor could
any reasonable jurist debate the district court’s conclusion that the claim was
defaulted. See Fairchild v. Workman, 579 F.3d 1134, 1142 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he
Oklahoma bar will apply in those limited cases meeting the following two conditions:
trial and appellate counsel differ and the ineffectiveness claim can be resolved upon
the trial record alone.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). This claim is therefore
unavailing as well.
Accordingly, we deny a COA and dismiss the appeal.
Entered for the Court
Wade Brorby
Senior Circuit Judge
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