United States v. Williamson , 315 F. App'x 734 ( 2009 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS March 5, 2009
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
No. 08-2050
Plaintiff-Appellee, (District of New Mexico)
v. (D.C. No. 1:07-cr-01333-JP)
ALONZO WILLIAMSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO, Circuit Judge, McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge, and
McCONNELL, Circuit Judge.
On April 19, 2007, Alonzo Williamson, also known as Alonzo Clemons-
Williamson (the defendant), was charged in the United States District Court for the
District of New Mexico with being a felon in possession of a firearm and with
being a felon in possession of two rounds of ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922 (g)(1) and 924 (a)(2). The defendant pled not guilty and, after a jury trial,
the jury convicted him of being a felon in possession of a firearm, but acquitted
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
him on the charge of being a felon in possession of ammunition. The presentence
report set defendant’s offense level at 26, and his criminal history category at VI,
with a resultant guideline range of imprisonment for 120 to 150 months. At
sentencing, the District Court granted defendant’s request for a variance and
sentenced him to imprisonment for 108 months. Defendant now appeals his
conviction and sentence.
Evidence adduced at trial disclosed that a local police officer in Farmington,
New Mexico, while on patrol, recognized the defendant walking through his
apartment complex parking lot and followed him by car into a store parking lot
next to the apartment building, and knew that there was an outstanding warrant for
his arrest. The officer exited his car, confronted the defendant in the store parking
lot, and told him he was under arrest. As he did so, the defendant fled on foot and
in the process discarded his backpack. He was soon apprehended hiding in some
nearby bushes. A search of the backpack revealed a .38 caliber automatic pistol
and two .22 caliber bullets in a shaving kit. Also found in the backpack were
digital scales, some small baggies, and a pink iPod containing drugs.
At trial, defendant testified in his own behalf and stated that he and his
girlfriend had been living in the apartment building adjacent to the parking lot
where he was accosted by the police. He went on to state that he and his girlfriend
had just had an argument, and, as he was hurriedly leaving their apartment, he
grabbed his backpack, in which he had his shaving kit. Defendant testified that he
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did not know that his girlfriend had placed a pistol and ammunition in his shaving
kit which, as stated, were in his backpack. His girlfriend testified as a defense
witness and stated that they had just had a fight, and that she had placed the
firearm and ammunition, which belonged to her, in the shaving kit which was later
found in defendant’s backpack.
On appeal, counsel, who also represented the defendant in the District
Court, raises four issues which he frames in question form as follows:
1. Whether the trial court erred by failing to give a requested jury
instruction on fleeting possession.
2. Whether the trial court erred by allowing de facto expert testimony
regarding fingerprinting.
3. Whether the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s Motion in
Limine to exclude evidence of drug possession and paraphernalia.
4. Whether the trial court erred by enhancing the Defendant’s offense
level pursuant to U.S.S.G. 3C1.1.
I. Instruction on “Fleeting Possession”
The District Court refused to give the jury one of counsel’s tendered
instructions which stated, inter alia, that “momentary or transitory control of an
object is not possession,” and that “you should not find that the defendant
possessed the object if he possessed it only momentarily, or did not know that he
possessed it.” The District Court refused to give that instruction to the jury, stating
that it did not “fit” the facts in the instant case and that the jury had in other
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instructions been instructed that “possession of a firearm” means “knowing
possession.”
In general connection with the foregoing, in United States v. Adkins,
196 F.3d 1112, 1115 (10th Cir. 1999), we spoke as follows:
Thus, even if a felon held a firearm for a mere second or
two, unless that felon truly did not know that what he
possessed was a firearm or there was some recognized
legal justification for his holding the firearm, § 922(g)
will still impose criminal liability. If, however, a felon
who momentarily possessed a firearm genuinely lacked
knowledge that he possessed a firearm or had a legally
justifiable reason for possessing it, the fleeting possession
theory would apply because the government would have
failed in its burden of proving intent. Therefore, the court
need only give a fleeting possession instruction when the
evidence at trial supports a possible finding that the
defendant only momentarily possessed the contraband,
and in so doing, lacked either knowledge he possessed
contraband or criminal intent to possess it.
Further, by way of general background, in United States v. Baker, 508 F.3d
1321, 1326 n.2 (10th Cir. 2007), we stated that this Circuit had never explicitly
recognized a “fleeting possession” defense, which requires proof that the defendant
“(1) merely momentarily possessed the contraband, and (2) either lacked
knowledge that he possessed contraband or had a legally justifiable reason to
possess it temporally.” We need not reach that issue in the present case, since, in
our view, even if this Circuit recognized the defense of “fleeting possession,” the
facts of the present case would not necessitate giving the “fleeting possession
instruction.” Defendant’s “possession” was not “fleeting.”
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Accepting the defendant’s testimony, the defendant, carrying his backpack
containing the firearm, exited the apartment which he shared with his girlfriend and
then proceeded to exit the apartment building itself. He proceeded through the
apartment complex parking lots to a business parking lot where he was seen by a
police officer who knew that there was an outstanding warrant for defendant’s
arrest. Moments later, he was confronted by the officer, whereupon the defendant
fled, and in the process, threw off his backpack. That sequence would not require
an instruction on “fleeting possession.” As said, it was not “fleeting.” See the
recent case of United States v. Turner, 553 F.3d 1337 (10th Cir. Jan. 26, 2009).
II. Fingerprint Testimony
Apparently, the firearm found in defendant’s backpack bore no fingerprints.
To counteract any favorable inference that could be made by the absence of
fingerprints on the firearm found in defendant’s backpack, the Government
proposed to call as its witness in its case-in-chief, an ATF agent who would testify
that in his 23 years of experience as a ATF agent involving a thousand or so cases
it was difficult to discover or obtain fingerprints from a firearm. Prior to trial, the
District Court ruled that such testimony would be allowed at trial providing the jury
was instructed that he was not being qualified as an “expert witness,” but only was
drawing on his considerable experience. See Fed. R. Evid.§ 701. On appeal,
defendant argues that such was reversible error. We disagree. The agent’s
testimony made clear that he was not a fingerprint expert, and was testifying only
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from his personal experience.
III. Motion in Limine
As stated, the firearm and ammunition were found in a shaving kit in the
defendant’s backpack, and drug paraphernalia and drugs were also found in the
backpack. Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence at
trial that drug paraphernalia and drugs were found in his backpack, arguing that
such was inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. §§403 and 404(b). The district court
deferred ruling on that matter until trial. However, at trial the district court
allowed the United States to introduce, under Fed. R. Evid. §§403 and 401, in its
rebuttal case, evidence that drug paraphernalia and drugs were found in defendant’s
backpack. In our view, the district court did not err in admitting into evidence the
fact that defendant’s backpack contained, in addition to the firearm, and
ammunition, drug paraphernalia and a small amount of drugs. Indeed such was part
of the res gestae. See United States v. Kimball, 73 F.3d 269, 272 (10th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Cook, 745 F.2d 1311, 1317 (10th Cir. 1984), and our more recent
unpublished opinion in United States v. Clark, 258 Fed. App’x. 208, 2007 WL
4290497 (10th Cir. 2007). The testimony that drugs and drug paraphernalia were
also found in the backpack arguably supports the Government’s theory of the case,
that the defendant carried the firearm to “protect” his small drug trafficking
business.
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IV. Sentence Enhancement
U.S.S.G. 3C1.1 provides that if a defendant “willfully obstructed or impeded,
or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice ... increase the
offense level by 2 levels.”
Pursuant to U.S.S.G. 3C1.1 the district court increased defendant’s offense
level by two levels, and on appeal, counsel asserts that such was reversible error.
We disagree.
At the outset, the fact that the jury acquitted the defendant on the charge of
unlawfully possessing ammunition does not preclude a raising of the defendant’s
offense level under U.S.S.G. 3C1.1. United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65
(1986). The district court made specific and detailed findings that the defendant
testified falsely at his trial and the record amply supports that finding.
Judgment affirmed.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Robert H. McWilliams
Senior Circuit Judge
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