Smith v. Board of County Commissioners for County of Otero ( 2009 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
March 18, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
HENRY MORGAN SMITH and
DESIREE SMITH, for themselves and
on behalf of their minor children, No. 08-2263
BRANDON SMITH and MORGAN
MARIE SMITH,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
(D. of N.M.)
v.
BOARD OF COUNTY (D.C. No. CIV-07-1107-WJ)
COMMISSIONERS FOR THE
COUNTY OF OTERO, NEW
MEXICO; OTERO COUNTY
SHERIFF JOHN BLANSET,
individually and in his official
capacity; OTERO COUNTY DEPUTY
ROB HANSEN, individually and in
his official capacity; DEPUTY M.
MACHEWICH, individually and in his
official capacity; DEPUTY F.
PICAZO, individually and in his
official capacity; DEPUTY JOHN
DOES #1-14, and DEPUTY JANE
DOE #1, individually and in their
official capacities,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
(continued...)
Before TACHA, TYMKOVICH, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges. **
Henry Morgan Smith and Desiree Smith bring this appeal challenging the
district court’s dismissal of their civil rights complaint against various Otero
County officials. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we AFFIRM.
I. Background
Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we provide only a brief
summary. The Smiths owned and operated the Grubsteak Restaurant & Saloon
and the Alamarosa Travel Center. The Smiths allege their family also used the
property as their residence, with bedrooms located in separate parts of the
building.
On September 21, 2007, the Otero County sheriff’s department received a
complaint about smoking being allowed in the Grubsteak Restaurant. Deputy Rob
Hanson went to the restaurant to investigate the complaint and spoke with the
owner, Henry Morgan Smith. After a visual investigation confirming the smoking
complaint, Deputy Hanson issued a citation to Smith for a violation of New
*
(...continued)
Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
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Mexico’s Dee Johnson Clean Indoor Air Act (Act), which prohibits smoking in
public facilities and places of employment, including restaurants.
Over the following week, Otero County sheriff’s deputies appeared at the
restaurant and issued additional citations for violations of the Act; people had
continued to smoke in the Grubsteak Restaurant and Smith had posted a sign
expressly stating that smoking was permitted. In total, sixteen citations were
issued to Smith over the entire course of this dispute. All but one of the citations
were eventually upheld as valid in state court.
The Smiths brought suit against the Otero County Board of County
Commissioners, the Otero County Sheriff, and various sheriff’s deputies
(collectively Defendants). In their complaint, the Smiths alleged the Defendants
had committed various torts and violated their constitutional and civil rights.
In particular, Count I of the complaint alleged the sheriff’s deputies
violated the Smiths’ Fourth Amendment rights by coming onto their premises.
Count II alleged the deputies deprived Henry Morgan Smith of his identity by
putting his social security number on the citations. Count III alleged a violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and stated that the deputies
acted with an intent to falsely imprison Henry Morgan Smith. Count IV alleged a
deprivation of liberty. Count V alleged the Defendants engaged in a conspiracy
to violate the Smiths’ civil rights, including their rights to due process, equal
protection, and “to be secure persons, houses, and effects” in violation of 42
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U.S.C. § 1985. Count VI alleged the Defendants violated Article II, Section 10 of
the New Mexico Constitution—a parallel provision to the United States
Constitution’s Fourth Amendment. Finally, Count VII, brought under the New
Mexico Tort Claims Act, raised a tort claim against the Defendants for abuse of
process.
The district court dismissed all of the Smiths’ claims, with prejudice, for
failure to state any plausible case for relief. Notably, the district court found that
the Smiths had no reasonable expectation of privacy in their restaurant as it was
open to the public and the deputies’ actions had taken place during business
hours. Further, the court found the Smith’s deprivation of liberty allegations were
without merit because Henry Morgan Smith had never been detained, arrested, or
imprisoned. The court also found the Smith’s civil rights claims were without
merit because the facts failed to demonstrate the deprivation of any federal right.
Finally, the court dismissed the abuse of process claim because Deputy Hanson
had the authority and probable cause to issue the citations as a matter of law.
The Smiths filed this timely appeal.
II. Analysis
The Smiths contend the district court erred in dismissing their Fourth
Amendment claims. According to the Smiths, the Defendants violated their
Fourth Amendment rights by coming into their restaurant without a warrant and
without probable cause. Additionally, they claim the Defendants attempted to
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enforce an unconstitutional state law that banned smoking in certain public
establishments.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6), applying the same legal standard applicable in the district court.
Christensen v. Park City Mun. Corp., 554 F.3d 1271, 1275 (10th Cir. 2009). “In
reviewing a motion to dismiss, this court must look for plausibility in the
complaint. Under this standard, a complaint must include enough facts to state a
claim [for] relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quotation omitted). The
allegations must be sufficient such that, if assumed to be true, the plaintiff
plausibly—not just speculatively—has a claim for relief. Id. Even under the
liberal standard by which we judge a pro se litigant’s pleadings, see Ford v.
Pryor, 552 F.3d 1174, 1178 (10th Cir. 2008), the Smiths have failed to meet this
pleading requirement.
We conclude based on our independent review of the record, and for
substantially the same reasons given by the district court in its thorough opinion,
the Smiths have failed to state any facts that demonstrate a deprivation of any
federal or constitutional rights. As the district court concluded, the Smiths
retained no reasonable expectation of privacy in the public areas of their
restaurant. Consequently, they cannot point to any constitutional deprivation that
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could form the basis for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action. 1 Therefore, even
assuming all their allegations are true, the Smiths have failed to state any
plausible claim for relief.
Lastly, we address the Smiths’ contention the district court erred in failing
to appoint counsel to help prosecute their civil rights claims. There is no
automatic right to appointment of counsel in a civil rights case. Beaudry v.
Corrections Corp. of America, 331 F.3d 1164, 1169 (10th Cir. 2003); MacCuish
v. United States, 844 F.2d 733, 735 (10th Cir. 1988). In determining whether to
appoint counsel, the district court should consider the merits of the litigant’s
claims, the nature and complexity of the factual and legal issues, and the litigant’s
ability to investigate the facts and to present his claims. Hill v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., 393 F.3d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 2004). We review a district
court’s refusal to appoint counsel for a litigant in a civil case for abuse of
discretion. Id. (“The burden is on the applicant to convince the court that there is
sufficient merit to his claim to warrant the appointment of counsel.”). “Only in
those extreme cases where the lack of counsel results in fundamental unfairness
1
The Smiths’ appellate brief states that they seek relief for violation of
their “civil rights as secured by the Fourth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments.”
Aplt. Br. at 1. But the Smiths only present arguments relating to alleged Fourth
Amendment violations by the Defendants. To the extent the Smiths challenge the
district court’s dismissal on these other grounds as well, we agree with the district
court and find the facts fail to demonstrate the Defendants deprived the Smiths of
any federal or constitutional rights.
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will the district court’s decision be overturned.” Id. (quoting McCarthy v.
Weinberg, 753 F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir. 1985)).
We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
Smiths’ motion for appointment of counsel. It appears from the record the Smiths
did not feel they were capable of representing themselves. However, the Smiths
were able to recount all the pertinent facts and the district court was able to
understand their claims. Even with appointed counsel, the Smiths would have had
little likelihood of prevailing on the merits. The fact that appointed counsel may
have presented the strongest possible case is not sufficient to warrant reversal; the
same could be said in almost every pro se case. Rucks v. Boergermann, 57 F.3d
978, 979 (10th Cir. 1995). Therefore, there was no fundamental unfairness in the
district court’s decision declining to appoint counsel to the Smiths in their civil
case against the Defendants.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment
dismissing the Smiths’ claims with prejudice.
Entered for the Court
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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