Quarrie v. New Mexico Inst. of Mining & Tech. , 621 F. App'x 928 ( 2015 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT July 23, 2015
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
LINDSAY O’BRIEN QUARRIE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 15-2006
(D.C. No. 2:13-CV-00349-MV-SMV)
NEW MEXICO INST. OF MINING & (D. N.M.)
TECH.; BHASKAR MAJUMDAR;
LORIE LIEBROCK; KENNETH (KEN)
MINSCHWANER; SCOTT TEARE;
DANIEL LOPEZ; PETER GERITY,
Defendants - Appellees.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before HARTZ, PHILLIPS, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Lindsay O’Brien Quarrie appeals the district court’s dismissal of his pro se
civil rights action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). The court dismissed his action with
prejudice based on his failure to comply with a court order to pay Defendants’
expenses incurred in opposing Mr. Quarrie’s frivolous motion for protective order.
Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
I.
Mr. Quarrie filed his pro se action asserting various claims under federal and
state law arising from his termination from a Ph.D. program at the New Mexico
Institute of Mining and Technology. He alleged that Defendants improperly
terminated his course of study and denied him the degree he had earned because he is
African American.
A.
Defendants served Mr. Quarrie with a notice scheduling his deposition for
March 31, 2014. In response, he filed a motion to quash the deposition notice and
also sought a protective order. The magistrate judge quashed the deposition notice
on April 16 because Defendants failed to confer with Mr. Quarrie before scheduling
his deposition. But noting that Mr. Quarrie presented no argument why he was not
subject to being deposed at a later date, the magistrate judge denied his request for a
protective order and expressly instructed him to cooperate with Defendants’ counsel
in scheduling his deposition.
Mr. Quarrie did not cooperate. He refused to respond to Defendants’ counsel’s
voicemails or emails. Instead, he filed a second motion for protective order on
May 6, 2014, arguing he should be excused from a deposition because it would
interfere with his work schedule and would be an extension of Defendants’
oppressive acts, which continued to cause him emotional distress. The magistrate
judge found that Mr. Quarrie’s motion for protective order was frivolous and ordered
him to appear for his deposition on July 25. The magistrate judge also found that an
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award of Defendants’ reasonable expenses was required by Fed. R. Civ. P.
37(a)(5)(B).
Defendants submitted an affidavit of expenses totaling $786.45. Mr. Quarrie
objected to the magistrate judge’s order denying his motion for protective order and
awarding expenses, but he did not challenge the amount or reasonableness of
Defendants’ stated expenses. On July 28, 2014, the district court overruled
Mr. Quarrie’s objections and ordered him to appear for his deposition.1 The court
agreed that his second motion for protective order was frivolous, that an award of
expenses was mandated, and that Defendants’ stated expenses were reasonable. It
ordered Mr. Quarrie to pay Defendants $786.45 by August 27, 2014 (hereafter,
“expenses order”). The expenses order warned Mr. Quarrie that if he failed to
comply he risked sanctions up to and including dismissal of his action.
Mr. Quarrie moved for reconsideration of the expenses order. The district
court denied his motion. He filed a second motion for reconsideration, which the
court also denied. Mr. Quarrie then filed objections to the order denying his second
motion for reconsideration.
On August 26, 2014—one day before Mr. Quarrie’s deadline to comply with
the expenses order—he filed a notice attempting to appeal that order to this court.
This court dismissed Mr. Quarrie’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction on September 15,
2014. Meanwhile, after Mr. Quarrie failed to pay Defendants’ expenses by the
1
Mr. Quarrie had apparently already appeared for his deposition on July 25,
2014, as previously ordered by the magistrate judge.
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August 27 deadline, they filed a notice of non-compliance and requested dismissal of
his action under Rule 41(b).
After his appeal was dismissed, Mr. Quarrie repeatedly attempted to renew his
objections to the expenses order in the district court, asking that it be set aside at
least six more times. On September 24, in addition to asking the district court to
vacate the expenses order, Mr. Quarrie sought an extension until October 31 to
comply. On October 3, he notified the court he had been laid off from his job and
asked that the expenses order be set aside on that basis. He moved for the same relief
on October 6; renewed that request on October 8; and moved again on October 19.
Mr. Quarrie asserted that his requests to set aside the expenses order were no longer
frivolous due to his unemployment.
Mr. Quarrie’s proposed extension date—October 31—came and went without
him paying Defendants’ expenses. Defendants filed a second notice of
non-compliance and again sought dismissal under Rule 41(b). Mr. Quarrie responded
by stating he had paid $50 toward Defendants’ expenses, but he continued to
challenge the expenses order as unjust and unlawful.
B.
On November 13, 2014, the magistrate judge issued proposed findings and a
recommended disposition (“PF&RD”) on Defendants’ request for dismissal under
Rule 41(b). That rule provides: “If the plaintiff fails . . . to comply with . . . a court
order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it.” The
PF&RD applied the Ehrenhaus factors: (1) “the degree of actual prejudice to the
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defendant”; (2) “the amount of interference with the judicial process”; (3) “the
culpability of the litigant”; (4) “whether the court warned the party in advance that
dismissal of the action would be a likely sanction for noncompliance”; and (5) “the
efficacy of lesser sanctions.” Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds, 965 F.2d 916, 921 (10th Cir.
1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The magistrate judge found that Defendants were prejudiced by Mr. Quarrie’s
failure to comply with the expenses order and would continue to be prejudiced by his
frivolous filings. At that time, Mr. Quarrie still had not paid the full amount of
Defendants’ expenses and had offered little indication he intended to do so. The
magistrate judge also found that Mr. Quarrie’s repeated, frivolous filings were
interfering with the judicial process. The PF&RD further concluded that Mr. Quarrie
alone was culpable for his failure to comply with the expenses order. Regarding his
claim of poverty, the magistrate judge found that, through the deadline to comply
with the expenses order, the evidence indicated that Mr. Quarrie was earning $8,000
per month. Therefore, even assuming he later became indigent, his current poverty
did not mitigate his culpability for failing to comply with the expenses order by the
August 27 deadline. The magistrate judge also found that the district court had
expressly warned Mr. Quarrie at least three times before that date that his case may
be dismissed if he failed to pay Defendants’ expenses. Finally, the PF&RD
concluded that a lesser sanction would not be effective based on Mr. Quarrie’s
continued frivolous challenges to the expenses order. The magistrate judge therefore
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recommended dismissal of Mr. Quarrie’s action based on his failure to comply with
the expenses order.
C.
Mr. Quarrie filed objections to the PF&RD, in which he indicated he had made
another partial payment of Defendants’ expenses. Over the next two weeks, he filed
several more notices of additional partial payments, indicating that he had paid
Defendants’ expenses in full as of December 1, 2014.
On January 6, 2015, the district court overruled Mr. Quarrie’s objections,
adopted the magistrate judge’s PF&RD, and dismissed his action with prejudice. The
court agreed that Mr. Quarrie’s repeated attempts to challenge the expenses order
were frivolous and had impeded the judicial process; Defendants had been prejudiced
and would continue to be prejudiced by having to respond to his frivolous filings;
Mr. Quarrie’s failure to comply with the expenses order by the August 27 deadline
demonstrated his defiance of that order; he alone was culpable for his failure to
comply and for his frivolous filings; Mr. Quarrie had been admonished that his action
would be dismissed if he failed to comply with the expenses order; and further
sanctions less than dismissal had not been and would not be effective.
Regarding Mr. Quarrie’s culpability, the district court addressed his alleged
poverty and the fact he had ultimately paid Defendants’ expenses in full. Like the
magistrate judge, the court found his current poverty was irrelevant because he was
still employed and able to pay as of the August 27 deadline to comply with the
expenses order. It also concluded that Mr. Quarrie’s payment in full of Defendants’
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expenses, after the magistrate judge recommended dismissal of his action, did
nothing to mitigate his culpability for failing to pay Defendants’ expenses in August,
as ordered.
II.
We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s dismissal of an action
under Rule 41(b) based on a party’s failure to comply with a court order. See Gripe
v. City of Enid, 312 F.3d 1184, 1188 (10th Cir. 2002). Discovery rulings are also
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See World Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
672 F.3d 825, 832 (10th Cir. 2012). Under this standard,
[A] trial court’s decision will not be disturbed unless the appellate court has
a definite and firm conviction that the lower court made a clear error of
judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the
circumstances. . . . An abuse of discretion occurs when the district court’s
decision is arbitrary, capricious or whimsical, or results in a manifestly
unreasonable judgment.
Moothart v. Bell, 21 F.3d 1499, 1504-05 (10th Cir. 1994) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
We liberally construe a pro se party’s briefs. See de Silva v. Pitts, 481 F.3d
1279, 1283 n.4 (10th Cir. 2007). But contrary to Mr. Quarrie’s suggestion, the court
rules apply equally to represented parties and pro se litigants. See Garrett v. Selby
Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005). And we will not craft
legal arguments for a pro se party. See id. at 841.
On appeal, Mr. Quarrie contends that the district court abused its discretion by:
(1) denying his second motion for protective order; (2) entering the unlawful and
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unduly harsh expenses order; and (3) dismissing his action under Rule 41(b) because
(i) his filings after entry of the expenses order were not frivolous; (ii) he was not
required to comply with the expenses order while it was on appeal to this court;
(iii) the court ignored his loss of employment and his requests for relief from the
expenses order; and (iv) he paid Defendants’ expenses in full before the district court
entered the dismissal order.
A.
In his second motion for protective order, Mr. Quarrie asked the district court
to preclude Defendants from taking his deposition altogether. He argues the court
abused its discretion in denying that motion because he was legitimately concerned
about his ability to attend a deposition in New Mexico while he was working in
another state. But the district court found that Mr. Quarrie made no attempt to show
that the requested discovery would be unduly costly or burdensome. We see no
abuse of discretion.
Mr. Quarrie also contends that the district court abused its discretion in
denying his second motion for protective order—and more specifically, in ordering
him to appear for his deposition on July 25, 2014—because the deadline for
discovery had passed at that time. The district court held that Mr. Quarrie waived
this argument by failing to raise it before the magistrate judge. But in any event, the
court said his contention failed on the merits because Mr. Quarrie’s filing of the
second motion for protective order caused the delay in scheduling his deposition and
the magistrate judge had discretion to reopen discovery to allow the taking of a single
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deposition. See Dowell ex rel Dowell v. Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch., 8 F.3d
1501, 1508 (10th Cir. 1993) (“The decision to reopen discovery is . . . left to the
district court’s discretion.”).
Mr. Quarrie has not demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion in
denying his second motion for protective order.
B.
Mr. Quarrie contends that the district court abused its discretion in entering the
expenses order because the order is unlawful and unduly harsh. The first contention
lacks merit, and Mr. Quarrie cannot raise the second issue for the first time on
appeal.
After the district court denied his second motion for protective order,
Rule 37(a)(5)(B) required the court to order Mr. Quarrie to pay Defendants’
“reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney’s fees”
unless his “motion was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award
of expenses unjust.” The district court found that Mr. Quarrie’s second motion for
protective order was frivolous and therefore not substantially justified. It noted that
he filed his second motion for protective order after the magistrate judge, in denying
his first motion for protective order, admonished him that he was subject to being
deposed and ordered him to cooperate with Defendants’ counsel in scheduling his
deposition. Mr. Quarrie fails to show an abuse of discretion in the court’s ruling that
his second motion for protective order was frivolous.
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He also argues that the amount of the expenses award—$786.45—is
unreasonable. Although he claims that he objected to Defendants’ proffered
expenses, citing his filings in response to the magistrate judge’s order, the record
does not support that contention. As the district court found, Mr. Quarrie never
objected to the amount or the reasonableness of Defendants’ expenses. And he
cannot raise that issue for the first time on appeal. See Somerlott v. Cherokee Nation
Distribs., Inc., 686 F.3d 1144, 1150 (10th Cir. 2012) (“An issue is preserved for
appeal if a party alerts the district court to the issue and seeks a ruling.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
C.
In dismissing Mr. Quarrie’s action under Rule 41(b), the district court
addressed each of the Ehrenhaus factors, concluding that they weighed in favor of
dismissal as a sanction for his failure to comply with the expenses order. Mr. Quarrie
contends that the district court abused its discretion.
He first argues that Defendants were not prejudiced by his failure to timely
comply with the expenses order because he ultimately paid their expenses several
months later, and his numerous filings in the interim were not frivolous, but were part
of the normal course of jurisprudence. The district court disagreed. It found that
Mr. Quarrie repeatedly challenged the expenses order as unlawful and unjust, even as
he finally began making partial payments long after the deadline to comply.
Consequently, Defendants were required to expend further resources in responding to
his repeated frivolous and dilatory attempts to challenge that order, thereby causing
10
and continuing to cause prejudice to Defendants. Moreover, Mr. Quarrie’s string of
frivolous filings evidenced his willful disregard of the expenses order, and they
interfered with—and would continue to interfere with—the judicial process to an
unacceptable extent. Mr. Quarrie fails to show the district court abused its discretion
in making these findings.
Mr. Quarrie also challenges the district court’s finding that he alone was
culpable for his failure to comply with the expenses order. He first argues that he
was not required to comply with that order while it was on appeal to this court. But
the district court did not lose jurisdiction to enforce the expenses order based on his
deficient notice appealing a non-final order. See Arthur Andersen & Co. v.
Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338, 340-41 (10th Cir. 1976). Nor did Mr. Quarrie seek, and
this court did not grant, a stay of the expenses order pending his appeal. In any
event, Mr. Quarrie did not file his notice of appeal until the day before the August 27
deadline to comply with the expenses order. Thus, the pendency of his appeal could,
at most, excuse his noncompliance for a single day.
In finding him entirely culpable, Mr. Quarrie also contends that the district
court ignored his unemployment, his poverty, and his requests to modify the terms of
the expenses order, as well as his eventual payment in full of Defendants’ expenses
as of December 1, 2014. But the court did not ignore these allegations; rather, it
found them irrelevant to his culpability because he did not lose his job until October,
and there was no evidence that he was unable to pay Defendants’ expenses by the
August 27 deadline. As to his eventual full reimbursement months later, the court
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concluded it did not mitigate Mr. Quarrie’s culpability for advancing repeated,
frivolous attempts to challenge the expenses order, rather than timely complying with
it. Mr. Quarrie has not demonstrated an abuse of discretion in the district court’s
finding that he was solely culpable for his failure to obey the expenses order.
As to the final factor,2 Mr. Quarrie asserts generally that courts should
consider the efficacy of lesser sanctions against pro se parties. But he does not
identify any lesser sanction that would have been effective in his case where, despite
the district court’s several warnings before the August 27 deadline, he persisted in his
refusal to obey the expenses order, and he continued (before and after that date) his
frivolous challenges to the order. He did not make any partial payment until
Defendants’ filed their second notice of noncompliance, asking for dismissal of his
action. And he made no additional partial payments until after the magistrate judge
recommended the dismissal sanction. In finding that no lesser sanction would be
effective, the district court concluded, “Plaintiff has never indicated his willingness
to comply with the sanctions, and instead insists that he is entitled to endlessly repeat
and rehash his complaints about the expenses order itself. And Plaintiff sees no
reason such conduct is outside the normal course of civil procedures.” R. at 2189
(internal quotation marks omitted).
2
Mr. Quarrie does not contend that the district court failed to warn him his
action could be dismissed based on his noncompliance with the expenses order.
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Mr. Quarrie has not demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion in
dismissing his action under Rule 41(b) based on his failure to comply with the
expenses order.
III.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Entered for the Court
Carolyn B. McHugh
Circuit Judge
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