United States v. Hopper (Jessie) ( 2018 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT May 25, 2018
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Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 15-2190
(D.C. No. 2:14-CR-02130-KG-1)
JESSIE ANDREW HOPPER, SR., (D. N.M.)
Defendant - Appellant.
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT
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Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
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On May 7, 2014, Mr. Hopper, his son Jessie Jr., and his sister Polly Hopper
kidnapped Jessie Jr’s ex-wife, Melissa Hopper, at gunpoint and transported her to their
residence. All three were eventually arrested by the New Mexico State Police. Mr.
Hopper was ultimately charged with (1) conspiring with Polly and Jessie Jr. to kidnap
Melissa in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(c); (2) kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1201(a)(1); (3) using, carrying, or brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a
crime of violence, namely kidnapping, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); (4) being a

This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive
value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2); and
(5) possessing an unregistered short-barreled shotgun in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§
5861(d), 5871, and 5845(a). After a five day trial, Mr. Hopper was convicted on all five
counts.
Mr. Hopper now appeals his conviction and sentence. He contends that 18 U.S.C.
§ 1201(a), the federal kidnapping law, does not qualify as a crime of violence under
§ 924(c)(3). Section 924(c) sets forth a discrete crime for using, carrying or possessing a
deadly weapon in connection with “any crime of violence.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). A
crime of violence is defined as “an offense that is a felony” and
(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person or property of another, or
(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against
the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing
the offense.
Id. § 924(c)(3)(A)-(B). Subsection A is often referred to as the elements clause, while
subsection B is referred to as the residual clause.
In turn, § 1201(a) provides that “[w]hoever unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles,
decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or carries away and holds for ransom or reward or otherwise
any person . . . shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for life . . . .”
The parties concede and we agree that kidnapping under § 1201(a), Mr. Hopper’s
predicate crime of violence, does not fit within the elements clause because it can be
committed by “inveigling,” which does not involve force. See Tenth Circuit Criminal
Pattern Jury Instructions § 2.55 (“To ‘inveigle’ a person means to lure, or entice, or lead
the person astray by false representations or promises, or other deceitful means.”). Thus,
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our only question on appeal is whether § 1201(a) qualifies as a crime of violence under
the residual clause of § 924(c)(3)(B).
Mr. Hopper does not argue that § 1201(a) kidnapping fails to qualify as a crime of
violence under the text of § 924(c)(3)(B) because one of our prior cases forecloses that
argument. See United States v. Morgan, 748 F.3d 1024, 1035 (10th Cir. 2014) (holding
that kidnapping pursuant to § 1201(a) is a crime of violence). Rather, Mr. Hopper
contends that the residual clause in § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague in light of
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). Because he did not make this
argument below, our review is for plain error. United States v. Malone, 222 F.3d 1286,
1292 (10th Cir. 2000). Plain error occurs when there is “(1) an error; (2) that is plain or
obvious; (3) that affects substantial rights; and (4) that seriously affects the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Avery, 295 F.3d
1158, 1182 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. James, 257 F.3d 1173, 1182 (10th
Cir. 2001)).
Mr. Hopper’s contention that § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague is easily
resolved by our recent decision in United States v. Salas, 889 F.3d 681, 686 (10th Cir.
2018). Salas also involved the constitutionality of § 924(c)(3)(B) and we held there that
a recent Supreme Court case, Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018), was
dispositive. In Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1223, the Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is
unconstitutionally vague in light of Johnson. Because § 924(c)(3)(B) and § 16(b) have
identical statutory text, we held in Salas that § 924(c)(3)(B) is also unconstitutionally
vague. Thus, Salas resolves our present case.
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Accordingly, we remand this matter to the district court with instructions to vacate
count 3 of Mr. Hopper’s conviction and to resentence him.
Entered for the Court
Stephanie K. Seymour
Circuit Judge
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