United States v. Romero-Leon , 488 F. App'x 302 ( 2012 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
July 10, 2012
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 11-2065
v. (D.C. No. 1:09-CR-00902-WJ-1)
(D. N.M.)
REYNALDO ROMERO-LEON,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, SEYMOUR, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant, Reynaldo Romero-Leon, appeals his sentence under
the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). He contends that
his previous convictions do not meet the criteria for an enhanced sentence under
the ACCA. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. §
3742(a), and we affirm.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
Background
Mr. Romero-Leon pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm
and ammunition (Count 1) and being an alien unlawfully present in the United
States in possession of a firearm (Count 2). 1 R. 6-7, 9; 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1),
(g)(5)(A); 924(a)(2). Under the Sentencing Guidelines, applying a total offense
level of 25 and criminal history category of IV, Mr. Romero-Leon’s guideline
range was 84 to 105 months. 1 R. 130; Aplt. Br. at 1. But if Mr. Romero-Leon
was sentenced pursuant to the ACCA, with a total offense level of 32 and a
criminal history category of VI, the guideline range was 210 to 262 months. 2 R.
18.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court concluded that Mr. Romero-
Leon met the requirements for sentencing under the ACCA. 1 R. 65-66. It then
ordered supplemental briefing and reaffirmed its conclusion. Id. at 127-37. It
relied upon Mr. Romero-Leon’s conviction on June 28, 1999 for trafficking
(possession with intent to distribute) (cocaine), and another conviction (same
offense) on March 19, 2002. Id. at 129. The first drug trafficking conviction
covered three offenses, occurring on separate dates in 1996 and 1997, that were
consolidated into one plea agreement. Id.; 2 R. 6-10. Each of the consolidated
offenses carried a sentence of nine years, and an aggravation enhancement under
New Mexico law could have applied to each offense, N.M. Stat. § 31-18-15.1,
thereby raising each above the ten-year threshold required for sentencing under
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the ACCA. 1 R. 133, 135-36. It was undisputed that the 2002 conviction could
have been enhanced in several ways, and met the ten-year threshold. Id. at 106.
Discussion
We review de novo legal questions about whether a sentence should be
enhanced pursuant to the ACCA. See United States v. Johnson, 630 F.3d 970,
975 (10th Cir. 2010). The ACCA provides that a person who violates certain
federal gun laws, and has three previous convictions for a serious drug
offense—defined as a drug offense for which maximum imprisonment is ten years
or more—shall be sentenced pursuant to the ACCA. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Mr.
Romero-Leon argues that he does not have three prior convictions that meet the
requirements of the ACCA, as only one of the sentences carried a maximum
sentence of ten years or more, and three of the offenses were covered by one plea
agreement. Aplt. Br. 2-3. The government argues, on the other hand, that the
district court was correct in applying the ACCA because each offense was
committed on a separate date and that each carried a penalty of ten years or more.
Aplee. Br. 12-13.
The ACCA defines a “serious drug offense,” in the state context, as: “an
offense under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with
intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance . . . for which a
maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.” 18
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U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). As the Supreme Court stated in United States v.
Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377 (2008), “[s]ince ACCA is a recidivist statute, Congress .
. . must have understood that the ‘maximum penalty prescribed by [state] law’ in
some cases would be increased by state recidivism provisions” applicable to the
defendant, and not merely limited to the upper end of the applicable guidelines
range. Id. at 386, 390.
In this case, the district court held that the applicable aggravation or
mitigation provisions under state law resulted in potential maximums over the
ten-year threshold. 1 R. 133. Though the New Mexico Supreme Court
subsequently held that N.M. Stat. § 31-18-15.1—allowing a judge to increase a
sentence by one-third for aggravating circumstances after a jury’s verdict—is
facially unconstitutional, see State v. Frawley, 172 P.3d 144, 154-56 (N.M. 2007),
it did not apply this holding retroactively, see id. at 156-58. Therefore, when Mr.
Romero-Leon was originally sentenced for his 1996 and 1997 offenses, it was
prior to the state court’s 2007 holding in Frawley. Accordingly, § 31-18-15.1
could have been applied, raising the potential maximum penalty above the ten-
year threshold required under the ACCA. See McNeill v. United States, 131 S.
Ct. 2218, 2220 (2011) (“[F]or ACCA purposes . . . the ‘maximum term of
imprisonment’ for a defendant’s prior state drug offense is the maximum sentence
applicable to his offense when he was convicted of it.” Id. (emphasis added)).
This circuit addressed a similar question in United States v. Hill, 539 F.3d
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1213 (10th Cir. 2008). In that case, this court considered whether a term of
imprisonment could be calculated with reference to aggravation enhancements
under state law for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)—the federal felon in
possession statute. This statute makes it unlawful for any person “who has been
convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year” to carry a gun or ammunition. Id. We held that applicable
aggravation enhancements could be used to consider whether a sentence was
greater than one year, given the Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriquez. Hill,
539 F.3d at 1221. Analogizing § 922(g)(1) to the ACCA, this court held that,
regardless of whether applicable aggravating factors were applied to the specific
defendant’s sentence, they should be taken into consideration when calculating
the length of the underlying sentence for purposes of § 922(g)(1). Id. at 1218-19;
see also United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237, 247 (4th Cir. 2011) (“A first-
time offender does not commit . . . an aggravated, repetitive ‘offense’; he
therefore cannot be convicted of any offense ‘punishable’ by a term of
imprisonment reserved for repeat offenders.”). Three of Mr. Romero-Leon’s
offenses were subject to enhancements under New Mexico law. 1 R. 132-33.
The ACCA further states that the prior convictions must have taken place
on “occasions different from one another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). In United
States v. Bolton, 905 F.2d 319, 323 (10th Cir. 1990), this court held that although
the defendant was convicted in a “single judicial proceeding” for four armed
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robberies, the ACCA enhancement was proper because the robberies took place
“on separate dates and at separate locations.” Id.; see also United States v.
Michel, 446 F.3d 1122, 1133-35 (10th Cir. 2006) (finding three separate criminal
incidents when all occurred in the same night); United States v. Tisdale, 921 F.2d
1095, 1098-99 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding that three burglaries occurring on the
same night, in the same mall, were “separate criminal episodes” for purposes of
the ACCA). There is no question, then, that Mr. Romero-Leon’s prior offenses
took place on separate occasions as they occurred on separate dates—even if
consolidated into one plea agreement. 1 R. 26-30; 2 R. 7-10.
Here, while all of Mr. Romero-Leon’s consolidated offenses carried a
sentence of nine years, at the time of his convictions each could have been
enhanced under New Mexico law by three years for aggravating circumstances. 2
R. 7-10. In addition, each occurred on a separate occasion, as defined by this
circuit. Therefore, the district court was proper in sentencing him under the
ACCA.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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