Daniel v. Dowling ( 2018 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
TENTH CIRCUIT June 11, 2018
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
MANUEL DANIEL, JR.,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 18-6010
(D.C. No. 5:17-CV-00120-F)
JANET DOWLING, (W.D. Oklahoma)
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER DENYING
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before LUCERO, HARTZ, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
Manuel Daniel, Jr., an Oklahoma state prisoner proceeding pro se,1 seeks a
certificate of appealability (“COA”) to challenge the dismissal of his petition for writ of
habeas corpus. He also seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. We deny both requests
and dismiss this appeal.
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and 10th Circuit Rule 32.1.
1
Because Mr. Daniel is pro se, “we liberally construe his filings, but we will not
act as his advocate.” James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 2013).
I. BACKGROUND
In 2014, Mr. Daniel was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life
imprisonment.2 The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”) affirmed. After
failing to secure post-conviction relief in state court, Mr. Daniel next sought habeas relief
in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Mr. Daniel’s habeas petition raises a single
claim—that he is “actually innocent of the charged offense.” R. Vol. 1 at 7. The district
court referred Mr. Daniel’s petition to a magistrate judge, who liberally construed it as
seeking habeas relief based on insufficiency of the evidence, rather than as asserting a
freestanding actual-innocence claim. Daniel v. Dowling, No. CIV-17-120-F, 2017 WL
6803441, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 27, 2017). The magistrate judge explained that he did
so for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court has not resolved “whether a prisoner may be
entitled to habeas relief based on a freestanding claim of actual innocence,” id. (quoting
McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 392 (2013)), and so “interpreting Petitioner’s
allegation in this manner would likely result in dismissal,” id. Second, even if actual
innocence were a viable freestanding claim, Mr. Daniel did not allege any newly
discovered evidence, which would be a prerequisite to proving actual innocence. Id. After
2
In brief, Mr. Daniel was convicted of murdering his drug dealer, Melissa Bost.
Evidence presented at trial established that Mr. Daniel called Ms. Bost in the early hours
of February 28, 2012, asking her to come to his home to sell him drugs. In reality, Mr.
Daniel had no money, and he planned to rob Ms. Bost instead. After Ms. Bost arrived at
his home, Mr. Daniel stabbed her multiple times in the body and neck, killing her. With
help from an acquaintance who was present at the scene, Mr. Manual carried Ms. Bost’s
body to her car and drove her away. Police discovered her body the same day. A few
weeks later, police executed a search warrant at Mr. Daniel’s house. They discovered that
Mr. Daniel had removed large carpet pieces and scrubbed the underlying wooden floors.
They also found a torn fingernail belonging to Ms. Bost in a vacuum cleaner.
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carefully reviewing the trial evidence and the OCCA’s summary opinion on direct
appeal, the magistrate judge recommended that the petition be denied because the OCCA
reasonably applied federal law in rejecting Mr. Daniel’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence
claim. Id. at *5. The district court accepted, adopted, and affirmed the magistrate judge’s
report and recommendation in its entirety. It also denied a COA.
The district court entered final judgment on January 2, 2018. Mr. Daniel filed a
timely notice of appeal. He also sought leave to proceed on appeal without prepayment of
fees and costs or giving security therefor. The district court denied that request. And, in
doing so, it certified pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that the present appeal is not
taken in good faith. That appeal is now before us.
II. ANALYSIS
On appeal, Mr. Daniel attempts to renew his actual-innocence claim. His argument
is a bold one: he contends that evidence presented at trial “establishes far beyond all
doubt that he had absolutely nothing to do with Ms. Bost’s death.” Appellant’s Br. 12.
And there is no doubt that Mr. Daniel means to pursue an actual-innocence claim, as
opposed to a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim. See, e.g., id. at 13 (“The FACTS
Appellant has presented to the Court establish[ ] his ACTUAL INNOCENCE.”).
Because the district court denied a COA, we lack jurisdiction to consider Mr.
Daniel’s claim unless and until we issue a COA of our own. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1)(A); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). And we cannot issue a
COA unless we are persuaded that Mr. Daniel “has made a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Where, as here, the district court
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rejected a petitioner’s constitutional claim on the merits, “the showing required to satisfy
§ 2253(c) is straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists
would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or
wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). At this stage, “the only question is
whether the applicant has shown that ‘jurists of reason could disagree with the district
court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues
presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.’” Buck v. Davis,
137 S. Ct. 759, 773 (2017) (quoting Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327).
Mr. Daniel has not made that showing. As an initial matter, Mr. Daniel was not
prejudiced by the district court’s choice to construe his petition as raising a sufficiency-
of-the-evidence claim rather than an actual-innocence claim. As the magistrate judge
correctly observed, Mr. Daniel “does not allege there is any newly discovered evidence.”
Daniel, 2017 WL 6803441, at *1. Mr. Daniel does not dispute that finding. To the
contrary, his actual-innocence claim appears to rely exclusively on evidence admitted at
trial. See, e.g., Appellant’s Br. 7 (conceding that “the two most important facts”
supporting Mr. Daniel’s actual innocence were both presented through testimony at his
trial). If the trial evidence was sufficient to support a guilty verdict, it is necessarily
insufficient to support habeas relief on actual-innocence grounds. That is to say, Mr.
Daniel’s actual-innocence claim is subsumed by the easier-to-prove sufficiency-of-the-
evidence claim.
To prevail on a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, a habeas petitioner must show
“that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have
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found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Lott v. Trammell, 705 F.3d 1167, 1219–
20 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979)). Mr. Daniel’s
application for a COA details the lack of physical evidence connecting him to the murder:
there was no blood found in his house, his DNA was not found under the victim’s
fingernails, and neither his blood nor his DNA was found in the victim’s car. Appellant’s
Br. 7–12; see Daniel, 2017 WL 6803441, at *4. But lack of physical evidence does not
doom a conviction. See Matthews v. Workman, 577 F.3d 1175, 1185 (10th Cir. 2009)
(noting that circumstantial evidence may alone suffice). And after careful consideration
of the record, the district court held that the direct and circumstantial evidence admitted
at Mr. Daniel’s trial was sufficient to support the jury’s finding, Daniel, 2017 WL
6803441, at *5; see supra, n.2, and (more to the point) that Mr. Daniel failed to show the
OCCA unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent in rejecting his sufficiency-of-the-
evidence claim on direct appeal, Daniel, 2017 WL 6803441, at *5. Because nothing in
Mr. Daniel’s application shows that jurists of reason would disagree with the district
court’s resolution of his claim or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are
adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further, Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 773, we deny a
COA.
***
“An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in writing
that it is not taken in good faith.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). Although the trial court so
certified in this case, Mr. Daniel “may nonetheless move this court for leave to proceed
on appeal in forma pauperis pursuant to the mechanism set forth in” Federal Rule of
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Appellate Procedure 24(a)(5). Rolland v. Primesource Staffing, L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1077,
1079 (10th Cir. 2007); see, e.g., Allen v. Colorado, 697 F. App’x 604, 605 (10th Cir.
2017). As in the district court, “[i]n order to succeed on his motion, an appellant must
show a financial inability to pay the required filing fees and the existence of a reasoned,
nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support of the issues raised on appeal.”
DeBardeleben v. Quinlan, 937 F.2d 502, 505 (10th Cir. 1991). After careful
consideration of Mr. Daniel’s application, we agree with the district court that he has not
shown the existence of such a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument. His motion for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis is accordingly denied.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we deny Mr. Daniel a COA and dismiss this appeal. His
motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is also denied.
Entered for the Court
Carolyn B. McHugh
Circuit Judge
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