United States v. Vargas-Medina ( 2012 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSFebruary 7, 2012
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 11-1356
v. (D. Colorado)
MARLON JAVIER VARGAS- (D.C. No. 1:10-CR-00370-MSK-1)
MEDINA, a/k/a Carlos Caria, a/k/a
Marlo Vargas-Reyna, a/k/a Marlon
Acosta-Vargas, a/k/a Norlan J. Vargas,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before PORFILIO, ANDERSON, and BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Defendant and appellant Marlon Javier Vargas-Medina pled guilty to one
count of illegally reentering the country following deportation after a felony
conviction, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). He was sentenced to
fifty-seven months’ imprisonment. Arguing that his sentence is procedurally and
substantively unreasonable, Mr. Vargas-Medina appeals that sentence, which we
affirm.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Vargas-Medina is a citizen of Honduras. Beginning in the mid-1990s,
Mr. Vargas-Medina moved repeatedly between the United States and Honduras.
While records reveal three prior deportations, Mr. Vargas-Medina claimed he had
been deported at least eight or nine times. In January 2011, federal agents
discovered Mr. Vargas-Medina in the Aurora, Colorado, jail following his arrest
for a traffic violation.
As indicated, Mr. Vargas-Medina pled guilty pursuant to an agreement
where the government agreed to recommend that he receive full credit for
accepting responsibility. In preparation for sentencing under the advisory United
States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) (2010), the United
States Probation Office prepared a presentence report (“PSR”). The PSR
calculated an advisory Guidelines sentencing range of seventy to eighty-seven
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months’ imprisonment, based upon a total offense level of 21 and a criminal
history category V.
Mr. Vargas-Medina objected to his criminal history category classification,
arguing that a 2005 California state court conviction included in his criminal
history rested upon insufficient documentation. Specifically, he argued that there
were no records of the California conviction. Without this conviction, he argues
his criminal history category would be IV.
Additionally, Mr. Vargas-Medina asked the court to provide a downward
variance from the advisory Guidelines range, arguing that the Guideline provision
providing for a 16-level increase in his base offense level because he was
deported following a prior conviction for a felony (a 2008 conviction for
attempted distribution of heroin) was unfair and unnecessary. He also argued that
his own history and characteristics mandated that the 16-level increase not be
applied. In particular, he stated that he left his family in Honduras when he was
just a teenager, that he was poorly educated, and that he spent much of his time
figuring out how he could get to the United States.
The district court agreed with Mr. Vargas-Medina that the government had
failed to carry its burden to prove that the challenged 2005 California conviction
was actually attributable to Mr. Vargas-Medina. This lowered his criminal
history to category IV, with the result that the advisory Guidelines range was
fifty-seven to seventy-one months. The district court then rejected Mr. Vargas-
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Medina’s motion for a variance, and ultimately sentenced him to fifty-seven
months’ imprisonment, at the low end of the applicable advisory Guidelines
range.
Mr. Vargas-Medina argues his sentence is procedurally and substantively
unreasonable, primarily because he objects to the 16-level increase in his offense
level based upon his prior deportation following a felony conviction:
The 16-level bump the Guidelines assigned to Vargas-Medina’s drug
conviction raised his total offense level from 6 to 21, and raised his
Guideline range from 6-12 months to 57-71 months. When viewed
against the other factors set out in § 3553(a), particularly the nature
of the offense, the unreasonableness of his sentence becomes
apparent, for those other factors played little or no role in fixing his
punishment.
Appellant’s Op. Br. at 9.
DISCUSSION
We review the reasonableness of a sentence under the “familiar abuse-of-
discretion standard of review.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007).
“Reasonableness review has a procedural and substantive component.” United
States v. Martinez, 610 F.3d 1216, 1223 (10th Cir. 2010). “Procedural
reasonableness addresses whether the district court incorrectly calculated or failed
to calculate the Guidelines sentence, treated the Guidelines as mandatory, failed
to consider the § 3553(a) factors, relied on clearly erroneous facts, or failed to
adequately explain the sentence.” United States v. Huckins, 529 F.3d 1312, 1317
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(10th Cir. 2008). “[S]ubstantive reasonableness addresses whether the length of
the sentence is reasonable given all the circumstances of the case in light of the
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Id. Furthermore, “[w]e apply a
rebuttable presumption of reasonableness for sentences imposed within the
correctly calculated advisory guideline range.” United States v. Perez-Jiminez,
654 F.3d 1136, 1146 (10th Cir. 2011) (further quotation omitted).
Mr. Vargas-Medina’s procedural reasonableness argument amounts to an
attack on the 16-level enhancement contained in the Guidelines and applicable to
individuals, like himself, who illegally reentered the United States after being
previously deported following an aggravated felony conviction. He argues the
enhancement “was not the product of a rational, empirically based exercise of the
Sentencing Commission’s institutional role, namely, the provision of expert and
data-driven insight into the sentencing process.” Appellant’s Op. Br. at 11. He
further argues that the district court failed to acknowledge that it had the ability
to vary from the advisory Guidelines sentencing range because it disagreed with
the Guidelines as a policy matter. See Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, ___,
129 S. Ct. 840, 842-43 (2009) (per curiam) (holding a district court has discretion
to vary from the Guidelines based solely on a policy disagreement with the 100:1
ratio for crack and powder cocaine offenses); Kimbrough v. United States, 552
U.S. 85, 91 (2007) (holding district courts have authority to consider the disparity
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between the Guidelines’ treatment of crack and powder cocaine offenses when
choosing an appropriate sentence).
It is clear from the transcript of the sentencing hearing that the district
court did not believe it lacked the authority to depart from the advisory
Guidelines range, based on a policy disagreement with the Guidelines. Rather,
the court simply chose not to exercise its authority to vary from the advisory
Guidelines sentencing range. As the court explained:
To find that the Sentencing Commission has not performed its
obligations would require me to know precisely what they have done
in an evidentiary context with regard to the determination of
particular facets in the guidelines. And although I generally take that
into account in the 3553 analysis, I am reluctant on simply an
argument to find that there is a problem in the guideline calculation
or guideline structure that is caused by some deficiency, oversight, or
usurpation of authority by the Sentencing Commission.
I therefore take that argument into account under 3553(a) in a
general context with regard to this particular defendant, but I make
no findings as to the appropriateness of the offense increase.
Tr. of Sentencing Hr’g at 20, R. Vol. 2 at 52 (emphasis added). Thus, the court
understood that it could vary, but, in essence, determined that it would not do so
in this particular case, based merely on Mr. Vargas-Medina’s argument to do so,
with no specific information on why the 16-level enhancement was inappropriate
in this case. The court then considered the argument in the context of examining
all the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, but rejected it as a basis for
varying from the Guidelines range.
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Additionally, we have already rejected a very similar, if not identical,
argument. In United States v. Alvarez-Bernabe, 626 F.3d 1161 (10th Cir. 2010),
the defendant made the argument that “the application of the 16-level
enhancement works some sort of injustice on [him].” Id. at 1164. We responded
that “the Sentencing Commission was merely following Congressional policy to
impose more severe statutory penalties on previously deported aliens with a
criminal record, who illegally return to the United States. Thus, Mr. Alvarez’s
arguments really should be directed at Congress, not the Sentencing
Commission.” Id. at 1166. We also noted that a number of courts have
“explicitly rejected this same argument.” Id. (citing cases). The district court
accordingly committed no procedural error when it calculated Mr. Vargas-
Medina’s sentence and imposed the 16-level enhancement contained in the
Guidelines.
Mr. Vargas-Medina also argues his sentence is substantively unreasonable.
As we stated above, a substantive reasonableness inquiry requires us to consider
whether the sentence is reasonable in light of all the sentencing factors contained
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). He claims that “[w]hen viewed against the other factors
set out in § 3553(a), particularly the nature of the offense, the unreasonableness
of his sentence becomes apparent, for those other factors played little or no role
in fixing his punishment.” Appellant’s Op. Br. at 9. Once again, Mr. Vargas-
Medina’s argument really amounts to an attack on the 16-level enhancement the
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Guidelines provide for illegal aliens reentering the country following a
deportation after an aggravated felony conviction. This wholesale attack is
unavailing.
Moreover, the district court explicitly stated that it had reviewed all the
sentencing factors in § 3553(a). And, considering all those factors, nothing
convinces us that Mr. Vargas-Medina has rebutted the presumption of
reasonableness attaching to the district court’s within-Guidelines sentence.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the sentence imposed in this case.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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