United States v. Richardson ( 2023 )


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  • Appellate Case: 22-3114         Document: 010110810077   Date Filed: 02/08/2023   Page: 1
    FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS        Tenth Circuit
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                February 8, 2023
    _________________________________
    Christopher M. Wolpert
    Clerk of Court
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.                                                           No. 22-3114
    (D.C. No. 6:17-CR-10103-EFM-1)
    TIMOTHY A. RICHARDSON,                                        (D. Kan.)
    Defendant - Appellant.
    _________________________________
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
    _________________________________
    Before HARTZ, BALDOCK, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________
    Timothy A. Richardson filed a timely, counseled notice of appeal from the
    final judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. His
    counsel has since moved to withdraw from the case under Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967), asserting there are no non-frivolous grounds for appeal. Upon
    independent review of the record, we conclude there are no grounds for appeal that
    * After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
    this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
    ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
    precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
    estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
    Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1.
    Appellate Case: 22-3114     Document: 010110810077         Date Filed: 02/08/2023     Page: 2
    are not “wholly frivolous.” Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, and
    we dismiss the appeal.
    I.     BACKGROUND
    In 2018, Mr. Richardson pleaded guilty to one count of counterfeiting
    currency, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 471
    . He was sentenced to thirty-three months of
    imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. Upon his release from
    prison in January 2020, Mr. Richardson began his term of supervised release.
    In April 2022, the probation office filed a report detailing Mr. Richardson’s
    alleged violations of multiple conditions of his supervised release: (1) unlawful
    possession of a controlled substance, (2) unlawful use of a controlled substance,
    (3) failure to report law enforcement contact to the probation office, (4) failure to
    attend mental health treatment appointments and to take prescribed mental health
    medications, (5) failure to report to the probation office as instructed, (6) failure to
    notify the probation office prior to a change in residence, and (7) commission of
    another crime.
    At Mr. Richardson’s initial appearance hearing, in April 2022, the court
    informed Mr. Richardson of the allegations in the violation report, advised
    Mr. Richardson of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel, appointed
    counsel to represent Mr. Richardson, and ordered Mr. Richardson be kept in
    temporary custody pending a detention hearing. At the ensuing hearing, the district
    court ordered that Mr. Richardson be detained until his final revocation hearing
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    because he posed a danger to the community and a flight risk. The court also advised
    Mr. Richardson of his right to a preliminary hearing to assess whether the
    government could demonstrate probable cause to believe the allegations in the
    violation report. Mr. Richardson, represented by counsel, waived his preliminary
    hearing.
    In June 2022, the district court conducted a hearing on the revocation of
    Mr. Richardson’s supervised release. Mr. Richardson admitted to six of the seven
    alleged violations of his conditions of supervised release. The United States declined
    to proceed with any evidence regarding the unadmitted-to violation—
    Mr. Richardson’s alleged failure to report law enforcement contact to the probation
    office. The district court accepted Mr. Richardson’s admissions, and no other
    evidence was entered by either party.
    The district court determined Mr. Richardson’s highest violation was a grade B
    violation and that his criminal history at the time of original sentencing was within
    category VI. At the revocation hearing, Mr. Richardson argued he should be released
    to an inpatient substance abuse treatment center rather than face revocation of his
    supervised release and a new term of incarceration. In his statement to the court,
    Mr. Richardson admitted to the violations, asserted he had been trying to do better
    until his relapsed drug use, and requested referral to inpatient substance abuse
    treatment. The government argued for revocation of Mr. Richardson’s supervised
    release and imposition of a term of 21-months’ imprisonment. The government
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    argued a continued period of supervised release would be ineffective because
    Mr. Richardson had “clearly shown that he [was] not amenable to supervision.” ROA
    Vol. III at 96.
    The district court first identified the advisory Guidelines term as 21- to 24-
    months’ imprisonment and up to an additional three-years supervised release. In
    selecting an appropriate sentence informed by that advisory term, the court
    considered the applicable U.S. Sentencing Commission Guidelines, Mr. Richardson’s
    history with mental health and substance abuse problems, and his prior difficulty
    adhering to recommended mental health treatment while on supervised release. The
    court reasoned that Mr. Richardson’s “underlying concerns are mental health, not
    substance abuse” and expressed its concern that “we’re not sure what to do more than
    we’ve done with respect to this to make it work.” 
    Id. at 107
    .
    Ultimately, the court found Mr. Richardson had violated his conditions of
    release and sentenced him to the maximum Guidelines sentence of 24-months’
    imprisonment. The court also recommended that the Bureau of Prisons place
    Mr. Richardson in a medical facility capable of treating his mental health issues. The
    district court, however, declined to impose another term of supervised release
    following Mr. Richardson’s release. Mr. Richardson objected to the revocation of his
    supervised release and the imposition of a term of imprisonment rather than
    admission to substance abuse treatment.
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    Mr. Richardson’s counsel filed a timely notice of appeal of the district court’s
    judgment. Mr. Richardson’s counsel now moves to withdraw because there are no
    non-frivolous grounds for appeal.
    II.   DISCUSSION
    Under Anders, counsel may “request permission to withdraw where counsel
    conscientiously examines a case and determines that any appeal would be wholly
    frivolous.” United States v. Calderon, 
    428 F.3d 928
    , 930 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing
    Anders, 
    386 U.S. at 744
    ). “[C]ounsel must submit a brief to the client and the
    appellate court indicating any potential appealable issues based on the record.” 
    Id.
    Then, in his own submission to the court, the client may also raise any points he
    chooses. Anders, 
    386 U.S. at 744
    . We must then independently examine the record to
    determine whether appeal would be “wholly frivolous.” 
    Id.
     If we conclude there are
    no non-frivolous grounds for appeal, we may grant counsel’s request to withdraw and
    dismiss the appeal. 
    Id.
    Counsel’s Anders brief identifies two potential bases for appeal: that
    revocation of Mr. Richardson’s supervised release was an abuse of discretion, and
    that Mr. Richardson’s revocation sentence was procedurally and substantively
    unreasonable. In his pro se submission to us, Mr. Richardson raises concerns that
    (1) “the sentence was unreasonably unfair based on the harsh sentence” relative to
    the timing of his violations and previous adherence to the conditions of release; and
    (2) the decision to sentence him “to prison instead of treatment” was unreasonable
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    given his need for mental health treatment to address the underlying reason for his
    drug use.1 Appellant’s pro se Br. at 1–2. We construe these concerns, respectively, as
    objections to the substantive reasonableness of Mr. Richardson’s revocation sentence
    and to the decision to revoke Mr. Richardson’s supervised release. We consider each
    of these questions in turn.
    A.      Revocation of Supervised Release
    We “review[] a district court’s decision to revoke a term of supervised release
    for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Metzener, 
    584 F.3d 928
    , 932 (10th Cir.
    2009). A district court exceeds its discretion “when it renders a judgment that is
    arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.” United States v. Haley,
    
    529 F.3d 1308
    , 1311 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted).
    1
    Mr. Richardson raises two additional concerns regarding his sentence: (1) the
    Coronavirus, which was “totally disregarded in [his] case[,]” and (2) “missing out on
    the[] lives” of his two young children. Appellant’s pro se Br. at 2–3. This appeal is
    not the proper forum to consider Mr. Richardson’s concerns regarding the
    Coronavirus, which we construe as a possible claim for sentence reduction or
    compassionate release under 18 U.S.C § 3582(c)(1)(A).
    Additionally, Mr. Richardson made no argument before the district court that
    his family circumstances warranted a downward departure. Because Mr. Richardson
    failed to raise this issue before the district court, he may not raise it on appeal other
    than through the lens of plain error. See United States v. Calderon, 
    428 F.3d 928
    , 932
    (10th Cir. 2005). Mr. Richardson does not argue plain error, and this issue is waived.
    See United States v. Leffler, 
    942 F.3d 1192
    , 1198 (10th Cir. 2019). Even if we
    reached the merits, we cannot say the district court plainly erred. Although the
    district court may consider family circumstances in fashioning an appropriate
    sentence, see United States v. Muñoz-Nava, 
    524 F.3d 1137
    , 1148 (10th Cir. 2008),
    “family circumstances are not typically a predominating consideration in the
    § 3553(a) analysis.” United States v. Littlejohn-Conner, No. 21-1224, 
    2022 WL 2359347
    , at *6 (10th Cir. June 30, 2022) (unpublished).
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    The district court may revoke a term of supervised release if it “finds by a
    preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised
    release[.]” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (e)(3). Revocation of supervised release is generally
    presumed mandatory when a defendant is found to have possessed a controlled
    substance in violation of the conditions of release. 
    Id.
     § 3583(g)(1). However, this
    presumption is subject to exception, and it is within the court’s discretion to consider
    enrollment in a substance abuse treatment program where the defendant is found to
    have failed a drug test. Id. § 3583(d); United States v. Hammonds, 
    370 F.3d 1032
    ,
    1038 (10th Cir. 2004). Procedurally, a court’s determination of whether to revoke a
    term of supervised release is governed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1.
    The district court properly adhered to the procedural mandates of Rule 32.1
    throughout Mr. Richardson’s revocation proceedings. The court found
    Mr. Richardson violated the conditions of his release, relying on Mr. Richardson’s
    own admissions. To the extent it was within the district court’s discretion to consider
    substance abuse treatment, the court did so and explained its reasoning for rejecting
    inpatient treatment as an alternative to imprisonment. On our independent review of
    the record, we conclude that any argument the district court abused its discretion by
    revoking Mr. Richardson’s supervised release would be wholly frivolous. We now
    consider the revocation sentence itself.
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    B. Revocation Sentence
    This court reviews a district court’s revocation sentence for abuse of
    discretion. United States v. Alapizco-Valenzuela, 
    546 F.3d 1208
    , 1214 (10th Cir.
    2008). We will uphold a district court’s revocation sentence if it is both “reasoned
    and reasonable.” United States v. Contreras–Martinez, 
    409 F.3d 1236
    , 1241 (10th
    Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted). “[A] ‘reasoned’ sentence is one that is
    ‘procedurally reasonable’; and a ‘reasonable’ sentence is one that is ‘substantively
    reasonable.’” United States v. McBride, 
    633 F.3d 1229
    , 1232 (10th Cir. 2011). “[W]e
    review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de
    novo.” United States v. Handley, 
    678 F.3d 1185
    , 1188 (10th Cir. 2012) (emphasis
    omitted).
    1.    Procedural Reasonableness
    Procedural review looks to “whether the sentencing court committed any error
    in calculating or explaining the sentence.” Alapizco-Valenzuela, 
    546 F.3d at 1214
    .
    Such errors may include “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the
    Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18
    U.S.C] § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or
    failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any
    deviation from the Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51 (2007).
    On review of the record, the district court correctly calculated the revocation
    sentence range recommended by the Guidelines based on Mr. Richardson’s original
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    offense, criminal history, and violation grade. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (e)(3); United
    States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, §7B1.4(a)–(b), p.s. (Nov. 2021).2
    The district court imposed a revocation sentence within the recommended range and
    provided a satisfactory explanation to establish the procedural reasonableness of its
    sentence. See McBride, 
    633 F.3d at 1234
     (discussing rationale for a court only
    needing to “provide a general statement of the reasons for its imposition of the
    particular sentence” when imposing a within-guidelines sentence after conviction or
    revocation of supervised release) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the
    court considered inpatient substance abuse treatment, it ultimately rejected that
    alternative, pointing to Mr. Richardson’s history, the circumstances of his violations,
    and his difficulty adhering to a mental health treatment plan while on supervised
    release. Nothing in the record suggests the court treated the Guidelines as mandatory
    2
    Mr. Richardson’s original offense, counterfeiting United States currency, was
    a Class C Felony. His criminal history category at the time of sentencing for his
    original offense was category VI, and the most serious violation of his conditions of
    supervised release was a grade B violation. Based on Mr. Richardson’s criminal
    history category and violation grade, the Guidelines advise a revocation sentence of
    21- to 27-months. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual,
    §7B1.4(a)–(b), p.s. (Nov. 2021). But because Mr. Richardson’s original offense was a
    Class C Felony, that range is lowered to a maximum term of 24-months’
    imprisonment. See id. §7B1.4(b); 
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (e)(3).
    We note the probation office’s violation report does not identify which edition
    of the Guidelines Manual was used in its calculation—the 2016 edition in effect at
    the time of Mr. Richardson’s original sentencing, or the 2021 edition in effect at the
    time of his revocation hearing. However, because the relevant portion of the
    Guidelines has not changed since 2010, whether the probation office and court used
    the 2016 or 2021 edition of the Guidelines cannot have prejudiced Mr. Richardson.
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    rather than advisory or that the court relied on clearly erroneous findings of fact. To
    the contrary, the court’s explanation of its revocation sentence was rooted in the facts
    stipulated to by Mr. Richardson. Nothing in our independent review of the record
    supports finding a meritorious argument that the district court’s revocation sentence
    was not procedurally reasonable.
    2.    Substantive Reasonableness
    Substantive review looks to “whether the length of the sentence is reasonable
    given all the circumstances of the case in light of the factors set forth in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a).” Alapizco-Valenzuela, 
    546 F.3d at 1214
    . A revocation sentence which
    falls within a properly calculated Guidelines range may be presumed reasonable.
    McBride, 
    633 F.3d at 1233
    .
    Based on Mr. Richardson’s original offense, criminal history, and violation
    grade, the Guidelines advise a revocation sentence of 21- to 24-months’ incarceration
    followed by up to three-years’ supervised release. See supra n.2. The district court’s
    24-month revocation sentence falls within the range recommended by the Guidelines
    and is therefore presumed reasonable.
    Nothing in the record rebuts this presumption. In selecting the revocation
    sentence, the district court considered the nature and circumstances of the violations
    and Mr. Richardson’s history and characteristics. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)(1). The
    court recognized “Mr. Richardson has substance abuse issues” but “his major concern
    is mental health issues,” and that many of his violations related to his failure to
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    comply with treatment obligations imposed by his conditions of release. ROA Vol.
    III at 106–08. The court considered “the need for the sentence imposed” to provided
    needed “correctional treatment in the most effective manner[,]” 
    18 U.S.C. §3553
    (a),
    recommending that Mr. Richardson be placed in a Bureau of Prisons medical facility
    “where they can evaluate and address and treat his mental health conditions.” ROA
    Vol. III at 107. Lastly, although it imposed the maximum term of imprisonment
    within the Guidelines range, the court elected not to impose a further term of
    supervised release thereafter. The court explained, “I [] don’t think that we have any
    sense that we can do anything that will work” on supervised release. 
    Id. at 108
    . While
    the district court did not expressly identify each of the factors enumerated in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a), “it is enough if the district court considers § 3553(a) en masse and
    states its reasons for imposing a given sentence.” United States v. Kelley, 
    359 F.3d 1302
    , 1305 (10th Cir. 2004). The district court did just that.
    On our independent review of the record, we conclude the district court’s
    revocation sentence is reasonable and plainly within “the bounds of permissible
    choice” given the facts and circumstances of the case and the factors set forth in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a). United States v. Chavez, 
    723 F.3d 1226
    , 1233 (10th Cir. 2013)
    (quotation marks omitted). We can perceive no non-frivolous argument that the
    sentence imposed was not substantively reasonable.
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    III.   CONCLUSION
    Mr. Richardson lacks any non-frivolous grounds for reversal based on the
    issues raised in his counsel’s Anders brief or in his own pro se submission to this
    court. We therefore GRANT counsel’s request to withdraw, and we DISMISS the
    appeal.
    Entered for the Court
    Carolyn B. McHugh
    Circuit Judge
    12